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Abstract 
The rise of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin is driving a paradigm shift in organization 
design. Their underlying blockchain technology enables a novel form of organizing, which I 
call the “decentralized autonomous organization” (DAO). This study explores how tasks are 
coordinated within DAOs that provide decentralized and open payment systems that do not 
rely on centralized intermediaries (e.g., banks).  
Guided by a Bitcoin pilot case study followed by a three-stage research design that uses both 
qualitative and quantitative data, this inductive study examines twenty DAOs in the 
cryptocurrency industry to address the following question: How are DAOs coordinated to 
enable growth? Results from the pilot study suggest that task coordination within DAOs is 
enabled by distributed consensus mechanisms at various levels. Further, findings from 
interview data reveal that DAOs coordinate tasks through “machine consensus” and “social 
consensus” mechanisms that operate at varying degrees of decentralization. Subsequent 
fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analyses (fsQCA), explaining when DAOs grow or decline, 
show that social consensus mechanisms can partially substitute machine consensus 
mechanisms in less decentralized DAOs.  
Taken together, the results unpack how DAO growth relies on the interplay between machine 
consensus, social consensus, and decentralization mechanisms. To conclude, I formulate 
three propositions to outline a theory of DAO coordination and discuss how this novel form 
of organizing calls for a revision of our conventional understanding of task coordination and 
organizational growth.  
Keywords 
Task Coordination, Organizational Growth, Decentralized Autonomous Organization, 
Blockchain, Cryptocurrency, fsQCA. 
 ii 
 
Acknowledgments 
Participating in Ivey’s PhD program has been an exciting and inspiring intellectual 
experience. I have been extremely fortunate to witness and work on the intriguing blockchain 
innovation at the forefront of the FinTech revolution. Writing a dissertation on Bitcoin and 
the cryptocurrency space was a bold decision to make with lots of experimentations, 
especially in the early days when the industry was mainly associated with shady images. The 
completion of this dissertation and of my PhD was an intellectual adventure that would not 
have been possible without the support of many important people. 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Prof. Jean-Philippe Vergne, the perfect scholar to work 
with on this difficult phenomenon. He showed me how an academic can attend to both 
creativity and rigor. On the one hand, he is ambidextrous while navigating the research 
landscape; on the other hand, he stays laser-focused working on a specific problem. He 
encouraged me to think about transcending the boundaries of management theory by 
challenging the underlying assumptions. As a scholar, Dr. Vergne sets very high academic 
standards for his students. As a mentor, he is always there to provide clear guidance and 
timely feedback. He gives his students top priority and is always the first to celebrate their 
achievements and provide honest feedback when they need improvement. 
I would also like to thank my thesis supervisory committee, comprised of Prof. Tima Bansal, 
Prof. Claus Rerup, and Prof. Michael King. They played an important role in shaping the 
early stages of my work by providing valuable and constructive feedback that helped me 
build my dissertation on a solid foundation. I will never forget Prof. Bansal’s advice that a 
PhD dissertation should aspire to top-journal quality. She has always provided excellent 
advice on how to craft qualitative research in a way that is both insightful and sophisticated. I 
also learned a great deal from Prof. Rerup about how to formulate my research by asking the 
right questions and by sitting in the reader’s chair. He is a serious scholar who thinks deeply 
about the nature of phenomena and attends to the rich details that shed new light on the 
research question. Finally, I benefited immensely from Prof. King’s expertise in finance and 
FinTech. He has helped me connect my work with the real world and to make it relevant. I 
feel privileged to have had these leading scholars on my committee. 
 iii 
 
I also would like to thank the members of my examination committee who took the time to 
be part of the developmental process of my dissertation. I am fortunate to have Prof. Tima 
Bansal from the Ivey thesis supervisory committee, Prof. Diane-Laure Arjalies from Ivey, 
Prof. Aleksander Essex from the Computer Science Department of Western University, and 
Prof. Phanish Puranam from INSEAD as the external examiner on the committee. I benefited 
tremendously from their comments and insights which help me move forward not only this 
dissertation but my broader research ideas.   
I would like to thank the Ivey PhD program for its financial and research support. The faculty 
and staff at the PhD program office have provided an enriching environment and have 
equipped me with the necessary skillsets for a future academic career. I am also indebted to 
the Scotiabank Digital Banking Lab at Ivey, which provided me with the opportunity to work 
as a research fellow conducting FinTech-related research. My participation in the First 
Annual Toronto FinTech Conference would not have been possible without the tremendous 
support of the Lab. Chairing the conference was an invaluable learning experience, which 
will inform my research and teaching as a junior faculty member in the years to come. I also 
owe a big thank you to all of the Ivey and non-Ivey friends I met over the course of the last 
five years. Your friendship has brightened up my doctoral studies, and your support has been 
a strong force driving me forward.  
Finally, this journey could not have begun without the support of my family. My parents 
have always been my strongest supporters and biggest fans. I would like to thank them for 
looking after my children while I pursued my studies. Big thanks are due also to my husband, 
TC, who put his academic career as a tenure track faculty member in Taiwan on hold to 
support me in my dream. And most of all, I am grateful to my wonderful children, Lillian and 
Yong, who have been patient while I was busy, cheered me when I was down, and inspired 
me when we learnt together. You are my sources of power and motivation. You are the best 
gift I have from God.  
 
 iv 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................ i 
Acknowledgments............................................................................................................... ii 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... iv 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................... viii 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... ix 
List of Appendices .............................................................................................................. x 
Chapter 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1 
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Dissertation Structure.............................................................................................. 4 
Chapter 2 The Context: It All Begins with Bitcoin ............................................................ 6 
2 The Context: It All Begins with Bitcoin ........................................................................ 6 
2.1 What is Bitcoin? ...................................................................................................... 6 
2.2 How Does Bitcoin Work ? .................................................................................... 10 
2.3 Protocol Update .................................................................................................... 12 
2.4 Bitcoin as the First Decentralized Autonomous Organization ............................. 13 
2.5 Cryptocurrencies beyond Bitcoin ......................................................................... 14 
2.6 Other Unique Features of Cryptocurrencies ......................................................... 15 
2.7 Other Features (not directly enabled through mining) .......................................... 17 
2.8 The Growth of Cryptocurrency DAOs ................................................................. 18 
Chapter 3 Literature Review ............................................................................................. 20 
3 Literature Review ......................................................................................................... 20 
3.1 Theoretical Motivation: Why the Organization Design Lens? ............................. 20 
3.1.1 The Divide: Organizational Innovation vs. Technological Innovation .... 20 
3.2 Organizations as Coordination Systems ............................................................... 23 
 v 
 
3.3 What is Being Coordinated? The Nature of Task Interdependence ..................... 23 
3.4 Coordination Mechanisms .................................................................................... 25 
3.5 Coordination without Hierarchy: The Case of OSSD........................................... 26 
3.6 Integrating Conditions for Coordination: Accountability, Predictability, and 
Common Understanding ....................................................................................... 27 
3.7 Coordination and Consensus................................................................................. 28 
3.8 Coordination and Growth ..................................................................................... 30 
3.8.1 Growth based on Efficiency...................................................................... 30 
3.8.2 Growth based on Effectiveness ................................................................. 31 
3.9 Opening the Black Box of Coordination within DAOs ........................................ 32 
Chapter 4 Distributed Consensus: The Case of Bitcoin.................................................... 35 
4 Distributed Consensus: The Case of Bitcoin* ............................................................. 35 
4.1 Research Design: A Pilot Case Study ................................................................... 35 
4.2 Findings................................................................................................................. 37 
4.2.1 Two Major Types of Task at Various Levels ........................................... 37 
4.2.2 Distributed Consensus Mechanisms: The Defining Feature of Task 
Coordination in Bitcoin............................................................................. 42 
4.2.3 Defining Organizational Boundaries: Internal Stakeholders of DAOs..... 44 
4.2.4 Consensus Mechanism at the Blockchain and Protocol level: Coordinating 
Network Validation ................................................................................... 46 
4.2.5 Consensus Mechanism at the Peer-to-Peer Network Level: Coordinating 
Protocol Update ........................................................................................ 50 
4.2.6 What happens when Consensus cannot be reached? ................................ 54 
4.2.7 Integrating Consensus at Varying Levels: the Organizational Level ....... 56 
4.2.8 Decentralization is a Continuum ............................................................... 57 
4.3 Conclusions from the Pilot Case Study ................................................................ 58 
Chapter 5 Research Design ............................................................................................... 60 
5 Research Design* ......................................................................................................... 60 
 vi 
 
5.1 Study Stage #1: How Are DAOs Coordinated? .................................................... 61 
5.1.1 Method ...................................................................................................... 61 
5.1.2 Findings..................................................................................................... 62 
5.2 Study Stage #2: The Growth Implications of Task Coordination Patterns ........... 72 
5.2.1 Method: Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) ................. 72 
5.2.2 FsQCA findings: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Growth and 
Decline ...................................................................................................... 79 
5.3 Study Stage #3: Triangulation and Proposition Formation................................... 80 
Chapter 6 Results .............................................................................................................. 81 
6 Results* ........................................................................................................................ 81 
6.1 Configurations of Coordination Mechanisms Sufficient for DAO Growth (G1 and 
G2) ........................................................................................................................ 82 
6.2 Configurations of Coordination Mechanisms Sufficient for DAO Decline (D1 and 
D2) ........................................................................................................................ 84 
6.3 Propositions........................................................................................................... 85 
6.3.1 Machine Consensus and Decentralization of Strategy Making as 
Complements ............................................................................................ 85 
6.3.2 Social Consensus as a Substitute for the Machine Consensus-
Decentralization Pair ................................................................................. 87 
6.3.3 Balancing Efficiency and Effectiveness—but Privileging Effectiveness . 89 
Chapter 7 Discussion and Conclusions ............................................................................. 91 
7 Discussion and Conclusions ......................................................................................... 91 
7.1 DAOs as a Novel Form of Organizing ................................................................. 91 
7.2 Distributed Consensus Mechanisms ..................................................................... 93 
7.3 A New Form of Coordination: Coordination with Machine Consensus and 
Network Validators ............................................................................................... 97 
7.4 Growth Implications: Organizational Growth: DAOs vs. Traditional.................. 98 
7.5 Limitations and Future Directions ...................................................................... 100 
7.5.1 Limitations .............................................................................................. 100 
 vii 
 
7.5.2 Future Directions .................................................................................... 101 
7.6 Managerial Implications ..................................................................................... 103 
7.7 Organizations of the Future: An Under-Socialized Worldview? ........................ 104 
References ....................................................................................................................... 109 
Appendices ...................................................................................................................... 121 
Curriculum Vitae ............................................................................................................ 147 
 viii 
 
List of Tables  
Table 1 Thompson’s Classification of Interdependence and Management Implications ....... 24 
Table 2 Forms of Organizing: Banks and Payment Organizations vs. Bitcoin ...................... 38 
Table 3 Updating Software Protocol: Open-Source Software Development vs. Bitcoin ....... 40 
Table 4 Fs-QCA Calibration Table ......................................................................................... 79 
Table 5 Configurations for Early Transaction Growth and Decline ....................................... 82 
 
 ix 
 
List of Figures  
Figure 1 Summary of Study Stages and Corresponding Chapters ............................................ 5 
Figure 2 International Clearing and Settlement ........................................................................ 8 
Figure 3 Bitcoin vs. Traditional Banking ............................................................................... 10 
Figure 4 Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIPs) Voting Process .......................................... 13 
Figure 5 Traditional Privacy Model vs. the Bitcoin Privacy Model ....................................... 17 
Figure 6 Bitcoin Global Network ........................................................................................... 19 
Figure 7 Bitcoin Blockchain Size (MB) ................................................................................. 47 
Figure 8 Bitcoin Hash Rate (TH/s) ......................................................................................... 48 
Figure 9 Bitcoin Difficulty...................................................................................................... 48 
Figure 10 Percentage of Blocks Signaling SegWit Support from Miners .............................. 55 
Figure 11 The Three-Stage Research Design ......................................................................... 61 
Figure 12 Task coordination within Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) ...... 71 
Figure 13 Conceptual Framework of Consensus Mechanisms and Conditions at the Task vs. 
Organizational Levels ............................................................................................................. 95 
Figure 14 The four functions of a Bitcoin network node: Wallet, Miner, full blockchain 
database, and network routing .............................................................................................. 124 
Figure 15 Types of Nodes on the extended Bitcoin Network ............................................... 126 
Figure 16 The extended Bitcoin Network ............................................................................. 127 
 
 x 
 
List of Appendices 
Appendix A The Byzantine Generals Problem ..................................................................... 121 
Appendix B: Semi-Structured Interview Guide .................................................................... 123 
Appendix C Types and Roles of Nodes ................................................................................ 124 
Appendix D List of All BIPs ................................................................................................ 128 
Appendix E A Sample BIP (BIP #151) ................................................................................ 138 
Appendix F Fs-QCA Calibration .......................................................................................... 143 
 
  
1 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1 Introduction 
“Bitcoin is the first breed of a new type of organization that simply did not exist before . . .” 
Daniel Diaz, Business Development Director, Dash 
“It makes most sense to see Bitcoin . . . as a decentralized autonomous organization.” 
Vitalik Buterin, co-founder, Ethereum cryptocurrency 
Bitcoin is the first and most famous “cryptocurrency,” defined as a digital asset 
transacted securely, transparently, and peer-to-peer by means of cryptography. At a basic 
level, cryptocurrencies are powered by software that enables decentralized and 
disintermediated online transactions using distributed ledger (or “blockchain”) 
technology (Nakamoto, 2008; Lee, 2015). Between 2009, when Bitcoin was first 
introduced, and December 2017, the market capitalization of the cryptocurrency industry 
increased from nothing to $800 billion (CoinMarketCap, 2018).  
One industry expert contends that, “Bitcoin is the first breed of a new type of 
organization that simply did not exist before” (Daniel Diaz, interview #2, 2016). In fact, 
industry experts and legal scholars alike (Atzori, 2015; Wright & De Filippi, 2015) argue 
that cryptocurrency transactions all fundamentally take place within a new form of 
organizing (Puranam, Alexy & Reitzig, 2014) known as the “decentralized autonomous 
organization” (DAO) (Buterin, 2014). In this dissertation, I define DAOs as non-
hierarchical organizations that perform and record routine tasks on a distributed, 
cryptographically secured, public ledger; and that rely on the voluntary contributions of 
their internal stakeholders to operate, manage, and evolve the organization through a 
democratic consultation process (see also Van Valkenburgh, Dietz, de Filippi, Shadab, 
Xethalis & Bollier, 2015; Dietz, Xethalis, de Filippi & Hazard, 2016).1  
                                                 
1
 While some industry experts prefer the term “distributed organization,” I have opted for “DAO” to avoid 
confusion. The term “distributed organization” is already used in the management literature to describe 
work organized across geographically dispersed locations (e.g., Hinds and Kiesler, 2002; Lee and Cole, 
2003; Orlikowski, 2002). 
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In contrast with traditional organizations, DAOs do not have a CEO or other top 
managers who “write the rulebook,” i.e., define and write governance rules into the 
software code (Narayanan, Bonneau, Felten, Miller & Goldfeder, 2016: 173–175). A 
DAO does not have headquarters, subsidiaries, or employees. Instead, it has “network 
validators” who lend computing power to validate and record transactions on the public 
ledger in exchange for compensation in the form of digital tokens that represent 
ownership; for example, Bitcoin tokens represent ownership of Bitcoin currency. Rather 
than having shareholders, a DAO has early adopters who can buy in during “initial coin 
offerings.” A DAO makes decisions through community-based voting processes. While 
DAOs can perform tasks similar to those carried out by traditional organizations, the way 
in which tasks are coordinated is substantially different. In a nutshell, DAOs place 
“automation at the center [and] humans at the edges” (Buterin, 2014). 
The past few decades have seen the emergence of new forms of organizing. In contrast 
with traditional organizations, in which tasks are determined centrally and channeled 
through hierarchies, organizations such as Wikipedia, Uber, and AirBnB offer novel 
solutions to such problems as division of labor and integration of effort (Puranam, Alexy 
& Reitzig, 2014). Post-bureaucratic and humanistic organizations, similarly, are self-
managing organizations rooted in “radical decentralization,” in which the degree and 
scope of formal authority (e.g., reporting relationship) is hugely mitigated by 
organizational democracy (Lee & Edmondson, 2017).  
Despite the growing interest in alternative forms of organizing, the examples cited above 
are largely owned and controlled by centralized corporations. DAOs differ from these in 
terms of both design and coordination. The blockchain, meanwhile, may be understood as 
a “new coordination technology,” representing not just a technological but organizational 
innovation (Davidson, De Filippe & Potts, 2016a; 2016b). DAOs enable new forms of 
governance and coordination by revolutionizing well-received management concepts 
such as trust (Seidel, 2017). Despite the growing economic importance of DAOs, 
scholars have paid insufficient attention to this intriguing phenomenon. While a few 
management scholars have recently highlighted the opportunity to study the organization 
design and task coordination in this new and fascinating context (Dodgson, Gann, 
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Wladawsky-Berger, Sultan & George, 2015), I seek to address a more specific question, 
namely: 
How are DAOs coordinated to enable growth? 
Given the lack of prior studies in the management literature, I will take a mixed-methods 
and inductive theory-building approach to investigate how DAOs coordinate tasks 
(Young-Hyman, 2017) and how such novel approaches to organizational design affect 
growth. In order to answer the central research question posed above, I will rely on 
fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) as my main methodological tool, in 
combination with qualitative interviews and archival data. 
By theorizing about DAOs with empirical evidence, this research contributes to the 
management literature in the following ways. First, I identify, describe, and analyze the 
DAO as a novel form of organizing that cannot be fully explained by the extant literature. 
DAOs not only provide novel solutions to the universal problems of organizing, namely 
task division, task allocation, reward provision, and information flows (Puranam et al., 
2014), but, by incorporating a new class of stakeholder that integrates tasks at the 
organizational level, DAOs enable an extreme form of decentralization (e.g., Baldwin & 
Clark, 2006; O’Mahony, 2007; West & O’Mahony, 2008; Von Hippel & von Krogh, 
2003). Second, this research enhances our understanding of DAOs by unpacking the 
interplay between various coordination mechanisms and the implications of these for 
organizational growth. Growth is no longer driven by the need for external financial 
resources, managerial control, or power (Chandler, 1977; 1990; Perrow, 2002), but by the 
essential need to provide a secure, stable, and decentralized network (Narayanan et. al., 
2016; Lee, 2015). Third, I distinguish task-level coordination from organizational-level 
coordination to explore how the roles of integrative conditions, such as accountability, 
predictability, and common understanding, have been shifted when applied to the study 
of DAOs (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). Finally, DAOs can be applied to industries 
beyond cryptocurrencies. This study theorizes about DAOs by proposing propositions 
that shape the foundations for future work to build on. For example: how can alternative 
currencies be organized in post-capitalist societies to balance the efficiency and stability 
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of that society? (Cohen, 2016; Arjaliès, Hsieh & Vergne, 2017); and how does this new 
form of organizing and coordination help resolve the technical and social challenges 
associated with a cryptographically secured voting system (Essex & Hengartner, 2012)?  
1.1 Dissertation Structure 
The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 offers a detailed description of the cryptocurrency context, starting with 
Bitcoin. In this chapter I provide readers with background information on 
cryptocurrencies and explain what Bitcoin is, how Bitcoin works, and the unique features 
enabled by the blockchain technology underlying Bitcoin. My goal here is to set the stage 
for later conceptualization of DAOs. Chapter 3 provides a review of the literature 
germane to my research question, including research on organization design, 
coordination, and growth. Chapter 4 lays out an exploratory pilot study of Bitcoin, and 
describes the defining features of coordination mechanisms within DAOs. Chapter 5 
outlines the 3-stage research design, which extends the scope from Bitcoin to include 
multiple cases with variations in coordination mechanisms and growth patterns. In the 
first stage, I will inductively identify key dimensions for DAO coordination and growth 
from interviews and archival data. In the second stage, I will conduct fsQCA analysis to 
identify necessary and sufficient configurations for DAO growth (or decline). In the third 
stage, described in Chapter 6, I will triangulate my earlier findings and supplement these 
with interviews in order to propose a generalizable framework for DAO coordination and 
growth. I will also present the results of the empirical analyses and inductively develop 
theoretical propositions. In Chapter 7, I will discuss how my findings contribute to the 
extant literature and describe future directions for research. I will conclude this 
dissertation by summarizing the higher-level practical implications of my research. 
Figure 1 summarizes the study stages of this dissertation and the corresponding chapters. 
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Figure 1 Summary of Study Stages and Corresponding Chapters 
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Chapter 2 The Context: It All Begins with Bitcoin 
2 The Context: It All Begins with Bitcoin 
In this chapter, I will provide descriptive background information on cryptocurrencies 
starting with Bitcoin. I will then link cryptocurrencies with DAOs as the theoretical 
representation.  
2.1 What is Bitcoin? 
Bitcoin, the first decentralized cryptocurrency ever created, is a peer-to-peer, 
decentralized payment system that does not rely on centralized authorities or trusted 
intermediaries such as banks (e.g., the Federal Reserve, Wells Fargo) or payment 
companies (e.g., Visa, PayPal). The Bitcoin white paper was first published in 2008. In 
the following year, the first “coin” (in the form of a computer file) was created and the 
first Bitcoin transaction took place. The true identity of Bitcoin’s founder remains 
unknown; Satoshi Nakamoto, the reputed creator, is a pseudonym of the lead developer 
or development team.  
A key motivation behind the creation of Bitcoin was the desire to eliminate the 
inefficiencies of the intermediated banking model that has prevailed in capitalist societies 
since the early 17th century2. Whereas Bitcoin was the first decentralized cryptocurrency, 
the elemental technologies underlying Bitcoin had been created way before its formation. 
Specifically, a large part of the development was driven by the cypherpunk movement, a 
social movement advocating for libertarianism with minimal governmental interference 
of the financial system in the 1980’s and 1990’s. The initial goal was to create money 
that could facilitate online exchanges with the anonymity (or fungibility) of cash at the 
same time. As a result, research projects based on strong online privacy and strong 
cryptography were proposed. For example, David Chaum proposed digital cash systems, 
                                                 
2
 This model is premised on the existence of national central banks whose role is to mediate the supply of 
money, both directly (e.g., through the issuance of coins and bills) and indirectly (e.g., through loan-issuing 
and regulated private banking). The first central bank, the Bank of Amsterdam, was founded in 1609 in the 
Dutch Republic. 
7 
 
DigiCash and eCash based on public key cryptography combined with centralized 
electronic currency (Chaum, 1983; 1985). The idea then evolved into Wei Dai’s b-money 
rooted in the privacy model of public-private key cryptography, also known as digital 
signatures (Dai, 1998). Thus, ownership can be secured through the matching process 
between the public key for verification and the private key for signing and accepting 
funds without revealing the true identity. At around the same time, the core technology 
for securing the Bitcoin network—proof-of-work cryptographic hashing, was proposed 
by Adam Back’s (1997; 2002) Hashcash and Hal Finney’s (2004) creation of the first 
reusable proof of work (RPOW). The idea is to build in economic cost functions to “deter 
denial-of-service attacks” (Lee, 2015:10).  
However, Bitcoin was the first to integrate the three technologies—public key 
cryptography, digital signatures, and proof of work—to achieve distributed consensus 
within a “blockchain” ledger. The resulting system is peer-to-peer and does not rely on 
trusted third parties; and ensures transactional privacy and security (Wood & Buchanan, 
2015:392-393). This is where the true value of Bitcoin resides. More details will be 
provided in section 2.2. 
As a result of the 2008 financial crisis, the public increasingly lost faith in financial 
institutions. For many, Bitcoin became the logical alternative to the out-dated banking 
system. Bitcoin enables a completely disintermediated, peer-to-peer system that 
significantly reduces the delays and transaction fees that accompany traditional 
payments, e.g., international wire transfers.  
An international wire transfer between two countries typically involves four different 
banks (including two “correspondent” banks), two national payments systems, and an 
international settlement service (e.g., SWIFT). A standard international payment takes 
between three and 15 business days to complete, depending on the destination country. 
Expensive bank fees and punitive exchange rates add to the cost.  
Figure 2 shows the steps involved in an international wire transfer. First, assuming a 
sender in New York, USA wishes to send $1,000 USD to a receiver in London, UK, the 
sender must visit a local branch or give instructions online to his bank A to transfer the 
8 
 
specified amount to the receiver’s bank D in London. At this stage, Bank A charges a $25 
transaction fee. Second, Bank A works with a domestic correspondent Bank B through 
payment system (I) to effect the international transfer. Bank B is normally a large 
international bank that has settlement agreements with banks in the receiving country. 
The $25 fee is split between A and B. Third, Bank B notifies Bank C about the payment, 
and transfers funds through their clearing and settlement agreements. Bank C charges a 2 
per cent foreign exchange spread, which is around $20 in our case. Fourth, Bank C makes 
a payment to the receiver’s bank D through another payment system (II). Finally, Bank D 
transfers the $1,000 to the receiver but may charge an incoming wire fee of $15. The 
entire process involves 4 banks, two national payment systems, and an international 
agreement. Transaction fees and unfavorable exchange rates add up to $60 (sometimes 
more) costs to the process, making it cumbersome and costly. In addition, it is a slow 
process that takes up to 3 to 5 days for the transfer to complete given the number of 
intermediaries involved. 
 
Figure 2 International Clearing and Settlement 
 
(Source: http://paymentsviews.com/2014/05/15/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-
international-wire/ (modified)) 
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By contrast, Bitcoin payments are collected, validated, and updated every 10 minutes on 
average in so-called “blocks” by network validators called “miners” who “can leave and 
rejoin the network at will” (Nakamoto, 2008). Miners update and maintain a copy of the 
blockchain, a distributed public ledger shared on the Internet across thousands of network 
nodes. It is inherently borderless and protected by strong cryptography. This means that 
editing the blockchain without consensual approval by stakeholders is infeasible, and that 
it cannot be forged or destroyed, even by insiders. Transactions on the blockchain are 
publicly auditable (Nian & Lee, 2015: 15), which results in greater transparency. No 
intermediaries (e.g., banks, credit card companies, clearing houses) are required, which 
reduces transaction fees by one or two orders of magnitude relative to the traditional 
payments industry (i.e., users only need to pay a small fee to the miners who power and 
secure the network). Thus, an international transfer of $5,000 with Bitcoin would involve 
a fee3 of perhaps $2 whereas a retail bank would typically charge in excess of $100 to 
complete the same transaction.  
Figure 3 represents a simple comparison between traditional banking and Bitcoin 
transactions. 
                                                 
3
 Fees are given as tips, therefore they are voluntary and market based, 
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Figure 3 Bitcoin vs. Traditional Banking 
 
(Source: https://medium.com/@liamzebedee/3-essential-takeaways-from-the-mit-
microsoft-bitcoin-talk-54a4cd71a702#.l7zeppbil) 
2.2 How Does Bitcoin Work ? 
A payment system powered by machine routines. As a software protocol, coordination of 
work is rooted in the idea that “code is law” (Lessig, 2006). In contrast to traditional 
organizations that use human managers to strategically design routines, Bitcoin follows 
machine routines written in the formal software protocol, which define organizational 
programs such as plans, rules, and incentives. Machine routines refer to formal 
agreements, such as responsibility for tasks (i.e., who does what), schedules (i.e., when 
things should happen), and rules (i.e., how things should be done) written in the  self-
executing protocol.  
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As a payment system, the Bitcoin protocol requires that all exchanges and contractual 
relationships be broadcasted, verified, and maintained by a distributed network and 
updated on a shared blockchain ledger that is append-only and tamper-proof. Bitcoin 
secures its network through a “competitive bookkeeping” process called “mining” 
(Yermack, 2017).  
Mining is a process in which specific network nodes (“miners”) compete to validate 
transactions, arrange new transactions into a sequence, and time-stamp them by solving a 
“hash algorithm.” The process can be hastened by committing more computing power to 
the network. Thus, a miner’s chance of being able to provide the “proof-of-work” (PoW) 
required to update the ledger is proportional to the computing power s/he controls. The 
computing power committed every 10 minutes to blocks of transactions recorded in the 
ledger accumulates and forms a barrier to hacking, making it practically impossible to 
edit past transaction records contained in the blockchain (i.e. the proof-of-work would 
have to be entirely redone for every block added after the edited one, which is too 
computationally intensive and too costly to achieve). Successful miners are rewarded in 
Bitcoin in accordance with protocol for their work, which involves costs in hardware and 
electricity, as per the Bitcoin protocol. 
All miners perform the same task of collecting and verifying transactions, and compete to 
solve the hash algorithm using their own computing power. Only the first miner who 
solves the problem gets to record the collection of transactions on the public blockchain 
ledger; the thouands who have tried and failed get nothing. This process repeats itself 
every 10 minutes. As a result of mining, machine routines are able to prevent cyber-
attacks and to continuously keep track of transactions (Antonopoulos, 2014). 
The process is not dissimilar to gold mining, insofar as rewards are determined randomly. 
According to the Bitcoin white paper, “[t]he steady addition of a constant amount of new 
coins is analogous to gold miners expending resources to add gold to circulation” 
(Nakamoto, 2008). It would be inconceivable for a traditional business organization to 
ask all employees to perform the same routine task but to only reward one person with all 
other people’s effort going wasted. A system that creates thousands of redundancies is 
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highly inefficient if most of the resources used as input are purposefully wasted 
(Swanson, 2015)4. Yet, the counter-intuitive reward distribution process employed by 
Bitcoin allows it to provide both security and decentralization (Lopp, 2016). By reducing 
the likelihood of having a single point of failure, the reward distribution process makes 
the system highly reliable (Swanson, 2015). Given the size of the mining network, it 
would be impossible for a single miner to have enough computing power to control over 
51 per cent of the representation for decision making (Nakamoto, 2008; Swanson, 2015). 
2.3 Protocol Update 
What happens when decisions need to be made about the code? For issues such as bugs, 
code modifications, and community decisions, coordination needs to happen within and 
between stakeholder groups to ensure effective communication. Formal and informal 
channels exist to faciliate communication and decision making. Moreover, miners can 
cast votes on the blocks they upload to siginal support for a proposed protocol change. 
Take, for example, the Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP), “a design document 
providing information to the Bitcoin community, or describing a new feature for Bitcoin 
or its processes or environment” (GitHub BIPs, 2018). The BIP addresses issues, 
proposes features, or documents decisions with “concise technical specification of the 
feature and a rationale for the feature” (GitHub BIPs, 2018). As shown in Figure 4, The 
coordination process involves developers making a proposal, e.g., asking miners to vote 
on a code implementation. A majority vote for yes would move the implementation 
forward. This BIP is open and can be extended to all interested parties.  
                                                 
4
   It is important to distinguish mining from the “winner-take-all” logic of innovation (Katz & Shapiro, 
1994), in which the dominant design claims all the network effects. While slack resources are necessary for 
exploratory activities involving risk-taking, experimentation, and creativity resulting in highly uncertain 
outcomes that are difficult to value (March, 1991), mining is concerned with well defined, highly 
formalized routine tasks with specific goals. 
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Figure 4 Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIPs) Voting Process 
 
(source: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0001.mediawiki)  
2.4 Bitcoin as the First Decentralized Autonomous 
Organization 
Bitcoin effectively “runs a payment system” and “employs subcontractors who are 
miners” and who are paid “with newly issued bitcoin shares” (Latimer, as quoted by 
Vigna and Casey, 2015: 229). Unlike traditional corporations, Bitcoin is a non-
hierarchical organization that does not have shareholders, managers, or employees. Tasks 
related to currency issuance, payment processing, and maintenance of the shared public 
ledger are performed through machine routines written as open-source software, by 
volunteers who contribute programming skills and computing power to the network. The 
Bitcoin system thus shares the four core features common to all conceptualizations of the 
“organization”: it is a “multi-agent system […] with identifiable boundaries and [a] 
purpose […] towards which the constituent agents’ efforts make a contribution” 
(Puranam, 2017: 6). Thus, Bitcoin is not only a technological breakthrough that 
establishes the possibility of consensual agreement on the state of a distributed database 
without having to rely on a trusted authority5,  but also an organizational design 
innovation.  
                                                 
5
 This represents an innovative solution to an old network engineering problem known as the “Byzantine 
Generals’ Problem” (Lamport, Shostak & Pease, 1982; Fisher, Lynch, and Paterson, 1985). Please see 
Appendix A for detailed explanation. 
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 Bitcoin differs from “distributed organizations” such as Wikipedia (Lee & Cole, 2003; 
Shah, 2006) by grounding its design and task coordination in a cryptographically secured 
blockchain that cannot be edited without consensus among network participants. Unlike 
an online encyclopedia, a payments network must be highly predictable; it cannot tolerate 
the temporary editing of database entries until further verification has occurred. 
Otherwise, a user who holds $1 million worth of Bitcoin could see her account balance 
reduced to zero for some period of time, which would destroy her trust in the system. To 
prevent this, Bitcoin puts machine routines at the center of the system, and self-interested 
humans at the edges. Reliability is rooted in the code, in cryptography, and in the 
distributed network rather than in intermediaries (Nian & Lee, 2015: 14-21; 
Antonopoulos, 2014: 15). In other words, Bitcoin is simultaneously autonomous and 
decentralized—that is, it is a “decentralized autonomous organization” (DAO). These 
considerations lead us to the following question: how can tasks be adequately coordinated 
to enable organizational growth without placing human decision makers at the centre? 
2.5 Cryptocurrencies beyond Bitcoin 
Two years after the formation of Bitcoin, a number of other DAOs were created to 
compete against it in the cryptocurrency industry. For example, Peercoin introduced a 
new class of machine routines that relied on “proof-of-stake” (PoS) algorithms. With 
PoS, the chance that a “network validator” will be selected to add a new block of 
transactions to the chain depends on her “stake” in the ecosystem, i.e., how much 
cryptocurrency she owns, whereas, with PoW, her chance of being selected depends 
solely on the amount of computing power she is able to commit to the network 
(Narayanan et al., 2016: 40–45; 206–211). Network validators are voluntary contributors 
who invest their own resources (e.g., computing power or capital in the form of digital 
tokens) to maintain and secure the network in exchange for cryptocurrency rewards. In 
PoW systems, network validators are known as “miners.” Hybrid implementations, with 
mixed PoW and PoS mechanisms, meanwhile, provide a rich setting in which to study a 
broad range of coordination mechanisms. 
At the time of writing, there were more than 1,500 cryptocurrency DAOs on the market. 
40 cryptocurrencies have a market capitalization of $100 million or more, including 7 
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“unicorns” worth at least $1 billion (Coinmarketcap.com, July 13, 2017). Each 
cryptocurrency offers its own design features and coordinates organizational tasks in 
different ways in order to provide a variety of services to users looking for decentralized 
and disintermediated alternatives to traditional competitors (e.g., Visa, Western Union, 
Wells Fargo). It should be noted that, while our study of DAOs takes place within the 
cryptocurrency industry, DAOs are also used to manage transactions of non-currency 
assets such as diamonds, artwork, and shipping containers. My decision to focus on 
cryptocurrencies was motivated by the fact that this industry represents the largest and 
most mature sector in which the DAO form has been implemented. 
2.6 Other Unique Features of Cryptocurrencies 
There are a number of features that are unique to cryptocurrencies, which cannot be 
found in other open source software projects. These features are mostly enabled or 
enhanced by economic agents, i.e., miners or network validators, through the competitive 
bookkeeping (mining) process. 
Digital scarcity. Mining based on PoW is energy intensive (Swanson, 2015). Yet, it is 
this very characteristic that artificially creates an “unforgeable scarcity” (Tschorsch & 
Scheuermann, 2015), endowing Bitcoin with gold-like properties. It is important to note 
that, while artificial scarcity can be achieved through control of the coin supply, it takes 
mining to make this scarcity unforgeable and decentralized. I will elaborate on these 
characteristics in following sections. At present, I will focus on the issue of scarcity per 
se. 
As noted above, the distribution of Bitcoin does not rely on centralized issuers, but PoW 
mining. The seignorage, i.e., the difference between the cost of minting a coin and the 
value of the coin, is distributed as a reward to miners as new Bitcoin issued to the market 
(Swanson, 2014). “This scarcity creates a value, which is backed up by the real-world 
(computational) resources required to mint it” (Tschorsch & Scheuermann, 2016). In 
other words, the task of coin issuance is coordinated through artificial scarcity backed by 
intensive energy consumption. The speed of coin issuance is regulated by “mining 
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difficulty,” and the hash algorithm is adjusted every 14 days. For Bitcoin, scarcity is 
purposeful. 
Given the value generated by new coin issuance, however, the required energy 
consumption seems disproportionate. It is estimated that, by 2020, Bitcoin could consume 
as much electricity as Denmark (Deetman, 2016).  
Immutability and Security. Recall that scarcity produced by PoW is “unforgeable” 
(Tschorsch & Scheuermann, 2015). Recall as well the centrality of the concept of 
immutability to Bitcoin. Immutability is reflected by the fact that once transaction records 
are updated on the blockchain ledger they cannot be reversed (Lopp, 2016; Narayanan et 
al., 2016).  
Traditional banking is plagued by both data security and agency problems. Bank 
managers and employees are under tremendous pressure to bring in new customers to 
meet sales targets.  Both the incentivization of opportunistic practices and misconduct are 
common characteristics of the financial industry—the Wells Fargo scandal, involving 2 
million fake accounts created by 5,300 employees, exemplifies the potential scale of 
agent misconduct in this sector (Egan, 2016). 
Bitcoin also offers a solution to the biggest security threat to any decentralized digital 
payment system, namely, double spending. Double spending occurs when digital money 
(e.g., digital tokens) is sent (and spent) more than once (Nian & Lee, 2015: 15). 
Immutability permits high security in the Bitcoin system, thus minimizing the threat of 
double spending (Swanson, 2015).  
PoW consensus requires that the correct chain used for payment validation is always the 
“longest chain.” The amount of work required to reverse the transaction history increases 
exponentially relative to the length of the transaction history (i.e., the “block height”) and 
the size of the network (Leonardos, Kiayias & Garay, 2014). The security and reliability 
of Bitcoin also increase is relation to the length of the blockchain and the size of the 
mining network. Any attempt to tamper with the blockchain does not make economic 
sense, because an attacker needs to control over 51 per cent of the computing power of 
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the entire network to assume control and dominate decision making. This is simply too 
expensive (Nakamoto, 2008; Swanson, 2015). Energy consumption and the capital costs 
of the mining hardware thus serve as a barrier to attempts to tamper with the blockchain 
or to double spend (Torpey, 2015). As a result, the distributed network is both “resistant 
to and…resilient against attack” (Killeen, 2015). 
2.7 Other Features (not directly enabled through 
mining) 
Transparency. Transparency is another unique feature of Bitcoin. Not only is the Bitcoin 
code open source for testing and development, but transactions on the blockchain are also 
publicly auditable (Nian and Lee, 2015: 15). Information transparency significantly 
reduces the interdependency caused by information asymmetry.  
Pseudonymity. Bitcoin transactions do not require exchange parties to reveal their real-
world identity. One cannot open a traditional bank account without official identification; 
in the developing world, this often prevents access to banking. By contrast, anyone can 
become a Bitcoin user and freely obtain a pseudonymous Bitcoin address. In essence, a 
Bitcoin address is a public key cryptographically linked to a private key acting as a 
password to spend funds. The key pair is for digital signatures—whereas the public key is 
used to verify incoming funds, the private key is used to sign and spend funds. This 
enables a new privacy model that separates transactions from identity (Nakamoto, 2008). 
Figure 5 compares the Bitcoin privacy model with the traditional banking model. The 
vertical bar in the New Privacy Model indicates where Bitcoin interrupts the flow of 
information.  
Figure 5 Traditional Privacy Model vs. the Bitcoin Privacy Model 
Traditional Privacy Model (adopted from Nakamoto, 2008) 
 
New Privacy Model 
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Insofar as public keys are recorded and are trackable, Bitcoin is pseudonymous rather 
than anonymous. Nevertheless, pseudonymity adds another layer of protection and 
security to Bitcoin. This property endows cryptocurrencies with the cash-like 
characteristics, e.g., fungibility, with interchangeable units whose value is not attached to 
any user identities. 
2.8 The Growth of Cryptocurrency DAOs 
In the 9 years since its formation, Bitcoin’s market capitalization has increased from $0 
to $300 billion (at its height). Over 450 developers regularly contribute to the code (with 
many more contributing on an ad hoc basis); 200,000 transactions (worth, on average, 
$3,500) are processed every day; more than 11 million user accounts, known as “Bitcoin 
wallets,” currently exist (GitHub.com, 2017; Blockchain.info, 2017). To put things into 
perspective, the computing (or “hashing”) power that fuels the Bitcoin DAO is 100 times 
greater than that of Google. 
Figure 6 indicates the geographic distribution of the Bitcoin network. Currently, there are 
more than 10,000 nodes worldwide.  
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Figure 6 Bitcoin Global Network 
 
(Source: https://bitnodes.21.co/, Accessed March 2018.) 
 How can a DAO without centralized authority achieve market capitalization 
comparable to that of such major banks as JP Morgan ($376 billion) or Bank of America 
($300 billion)? How can a 9 year-old DAO perform tasks more effectively than banks 
that have been around for more than a century? How can a DAO without professional 
managers and employees provide faster, cheaper, and arguably more secure services than 
traditional financial institutions? These questions matter to practitioners and to 
management scholars alike. According to experts, the true innovation that makes this 
growth possible is the way in which various stakeholders within the DAO are coordinated 
and agree on the evolution of the organization (Ryan Zurrer, keynote speaker at the First 
Annual Toronto FinTech Conference, 2017; Narayanan et al., 2016; Buterin, 2017a). To 
understand coordination and growth within DAOs in the cryptocurrency industry requires 
that we review our current thinking about organizational growth, coordination, and 
consensus. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review 
3 Literature Review 
In the following chapter I will review three related concepts: organizational growth, 
coordination, and consensus. Using an organization design perspective, I will unpack the 
novelty of DAOs and identify opportunities for theory building.  
3.1 Theoretical Motivation: Why the Organization 
Design Lens? 
Organization design focuses on the problem of how to optimally align the internal 
structure of the organization with the tasks it performs and the technological environment 
in which it operates (Thompson, 1967; Tushman & Nadler, 1978; Galbreith, 1974). 
Therefore, an important objective of organization design is to devise strategic solutions to 
such universal problems as task division, task allocation, reward provision, and 
information flows (Puranam et al., 2014). As a result, new organizational forms emerge 
as strategies that may be used to enable different forms of coordination, thus highlighting 
the need for organizational flexibility, learning, and change (Daft & Lewin, 1993).  
3.1.1 The Divide: Organizational Innovation vs. Technological 
Innovation 
Organization design is currently undergoing an exciting phase of expansion and 
transformation. Powered by technological innovations, new forms of communication and 
collaboration have emerged. Faced with technological shifts, organizations often need to 
adopt new forms to respond to the changing landscape. Organizations experiencing 
technological change may adopt modular forms (Schilling & Steensma, 2001; Puranam & 
Jacobides, 2006), boundary structures (O’Mahony & Bechky, 2008), or autonomous units 
(Birkinshaw, Nobel & Ridderstråle, 2002) in order to deal with inter- or intra-
organizational learning, integration, and innovation. It is believed that technologies 
spawn new possibilities for organizational designs, which, in turn, bring about novel 
forms (Daft & Lewin, 1993; Kapoor & Lee, 2013; Puranam, Singh & Zollo, 2006; Vaast 
& Levina, 2006).  
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In the past two decades, the scope of organization design has also been broadened from 
“intentionally designed” organizations to include “emergent” organizations (Puranam et 
al., 2014). Many Open Source Software Development (OSSD) projects, for example, are 
managed in community forms to facilitate knowledge sharing and participation. They 
follow an emergent architecture, which relies on voluntary workers to develop the 
codebase (O’Mahony, 2007; O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007; von Hippel & von Krogh, 
2003; Zammuto, Griffith, Majchrzak, Dougherty & Faraj, 2007; von Krogh & von 
Hippel, 2006).  
Common to these organizational design themes is that they have relied on two implicit 
assumptions to make sense of technologies. The first assumption is that technology may 
be conceptualized as tools and artifacts that are mindfully adopted to enable certain 
organizational features (e.g., virtual teams) and to influence organizational performance 
(Huber, 1990; Faraj, Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2011; Garud, Kumaraswamy & 
Sambamurthy, 2006). In other cases, technology may be conceptualized as a product 
category (as in the case of OSSD), or a context (Barley, 1986), in which organizational 
forms are treated as separate entities designed to facilitate the exploitation or the 
development of the technology. The second implicit assumption is that human agents are 
at the centre of decision making for the four organizing problems: task division, task 
allocation, reward provision, and information provision (Puranam et al., 2014).  
The emergence of DAOs and blockchain technology casts doubt on these assumptions. 
For DAOs, the relationship between technology and organization appears to be reversed; 
alternatively, the two may be understood to have converged. In contrast to the traditional 
belief that organizational innovation is enabled by technology, I will argue that 
blockchain technology cannot be implementable unless organizational participants are 
organized in a decentralized and autonomous manner. Yes, one can argue that the 
blockchain program was made possible by the 30,000 lines of code written by Nakamoto 
(2008), and that the blockchain program is indispensable to the blockchain technology 
underlying DAOs. The protocol is enabled by computer science technologies, such as 
cryptography, and is not so very different from other computer-aided organizational 
forms. However, at least one miner and a few users need to act as “seed nodes” 
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(Antonopoulos, 2014: 145), and form a “seed DAO” ex ante to kick off the 
bootstrapping6 process (Narayanan et. al., 2016). For blockchain technology to enable 
faster, cheaper, and secure peer-to-peer transfer of value without relying on third party 
intermediaries, it is necessary to have mining that coordinates and integrates the tasks 
performed by various stakeholders across different levels. This also means that 
coordination, technology, and, consequently, organizational growth become intertwined. 
A number of scholars have theorized about this convergence. For instance, Garud and 
colleagues (2006) maintain that technology is part of organization design and plays an 
important role in the evolution of the organization. Baldwin and Clark (2006) examine 
the ways in which the architecture of the OSSD codebase interacts with the architecture 
of the organization through code modularity and option values. These two properties are 
thought to mitigate free riding, thus allowing developers’ personal interests to better align 
with organizational goals (Baldwin & Clark, 2006). Neverthleless, we need to think more 
about these technologies. As an organization design innovation, DAOs take our 
conceptualization about technology to another level by decentralizing authority, trust, and 
governance. DAOs play a central role in blockchain-based technological innovation, and 
require us to think about organizational growth, coordination, and consensus at a different 
level of abstraction. We need to theorize more deeply about DAOs, and the means by 
which they have used codebase architecture to serve as both organizational architecture 
and organizing principle.     
While scholars have long acknowledged that the emergence of new forms of organization 
outpaces academic research, this gap has widened as the boundaries of organization 
design and technological innovation increasingly blur (Daft & Lewin, 1993; Miller, 
Greenwood & Prakash, 2009). My research responds to this call by identifying DAO 
organization design as the bedrock of the blockchain innovation. 
                                                 
6
 Bootstrapping refers to the process by which the three preconditions for a cryptocurrency DAO, namely, 
“the security of the blockchain, the health of the mining ecosystem, and the value of the cryptocurrency” 
begin to interact with one another and reinforce one another to kickstart growth (Narayanan et al., 2016). 
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3.2 Organizations as Coordination Systems 
Coordination is the main focus of organizational design and redesign (Galbraith, 1973; 
1974; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; March & Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1967; Tushman & 
Nadler, 1978). An organization may be understood as a coordination system “that 
integrates a collective set of interdependent tasks” (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). 
Therefore, task coordination patterns should be adjusted to the type of interdependence in 
question.  
Although early conceptualization treated coordination mechanisms as inherently strategic 
(Daft & Lewin, 1993), scholars have recently argued that the human agents who design 
and adjust the coordination mechanisms need not be managers (Srikanth & Puranam, 
2014; Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). Coordination research also incorporates emergent 
practices and bottom-up approaches to management, and adopts a dynamic perspective to 
study coordination of organizational routines, learning, and the emergence of 
organizational structure (Brown & Duguid, 2001; D’Adderio, 2014; Malnight, 2001; 
Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011; Young-Hyman, 2017). In this line of research, 
coordination mechanisms are conceived of as dynamic processes through which 
organizations iterate and modify routine activities to achieve stable outcomes 
(Jarzabkowski, Le & Feldman, 2012). As such, distributed coordination is made possible 
through communities of practice in which collective competence, knowledge, and 
capabilities are enacted rather than treated as given (Brown & Duguid, 1991; 2001; 
Orlikowski, 2002). 
While these recent studies have shifted the focus of organizational coordination from top 
managers at the corporate level to frontline employees at the team level, they still regard 
coordination as a function embedded in a hierarchy, though, this time, from the bottom 
up. 
3.3 What is Being Coordinated? The Nature of Task 
Interdependence 
Since coordination concerns the integration of interdependent tasks, the type of 
coordination required corresponds closely to the nature of task interdependence 
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(Thompson, 1967; Daft & Armstrong, 2012). Interdependence is defined as “the extent to 
which departments depend on each other for resources or materials to accomplish their 
tasks” (Daft & Armstrong, 2012). Consequently, the value generated by performing 
interdependent tasks together will differ from the value generated by performing 
individual tasks separately (Puranam, Raveendran & Knudsen, 2012).  
Table 1 lists the classic categories of interdependence, namely, pooled (e.g., banks), 
sequential (e.g., assembly line), and reciprocal (e.g., hospital) (Thompson, 1967; Daft & 
Armstrong, 2012).  
Table 1 Thompson’s Classification of Interdependence and Management 
Implications  
 
(Source: Daft, 2013) 
Pooled interdependence, for instance, involves tasks performed independently and then 
pooled back to the overall organizational level (e.g., banks divide transactions into 
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independent subtasks that can be dealt with independently by various divisions and their 
multiple branches). Typically, pooled tasks can be coordinated through standardized rules 
and procedures due to low interdependence (Thompson, 1967; Daft & Armstrong, 2012; 
Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009).  
When the input of one task is dependent on the output of another, sequential or reciprocal 
interdependence will be present. These two forms entail greater interdependence than the 
pooled form, and thus require different types of coordination, such as feedback, 
schedules, or lateral communication and mutual adjustment (Thompson, 1967; Daft & 
Armstrong, 2012; Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). The next section explains coordination 
mechanisms in greater detail. 
3.4 Coordination Mechanisms 
Although the literature on coordination discusses both inter- and intra-organizational 
levels, my research focuses on the latter. Traditionally, coordination mechanisms entail 
the use of: (1) programing, i.e., coordination by programs, plans, rules, routines, targets, 
and goals; (2) feedback, including mutual adjustment and communication; and (3) 
hierarchy, i.e., supervision required for issues beyond programming and feedback 
(Galbraith, 1973; 1974; Tushman & Nadler, 1978; Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009; Puranam 
et al., 2012). The greater the uncertainty caused by task interdependence, the greater the 
need for coordination.  
For tasks with low interdependence, work can be coordinated through standardized 
procedures, such as rules or programs, which define responsibilities and resource 
allocation. Formal components, such as schedules, routines, and meetings, can be used to 
implement formal coordination mechanisms (Thompson, 1967; Okhuysen & Bechky, 
2009). In addition, tools and information technologies can assist teams to align their 
work. For example, boundary objects allow groups to better communicate progress 
(Bechky, 2003; Carlie, 2002).  
As we shift from a manufacturing-centered to knowledge-based economy characterized 
by greater complexity, coordination also shifts from being standardized and formal to 
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being characterized by knowledge sharing (Carlile, 2002; Deken, Carlile, Berends & 
Lauches, 2016), communication (Dahlander & O’Mahony, 2011), and flexibility 
(Bechky, 2006). Work is aligned through the creation of mutual understanding. In 
response, scholars have adopted a more dynamic view, treating coordination as an 
emergent process that changes with the design (which unfolds as things happen) (Weick, 
1995; Garud et al., 2006). Finally, for uncertainties and interdependence originating from 
the need for supervision, formal hierarchies enable actors to use their roles to obtain 
consistent understanding of project status and coordination (Bechky, 2006; Okhuysen & 
Bechky, 2009; Tushman & Nadler, 1978). 
3.5 Coordination without Hierarchy: The Case of 
OSSD 
While hierarchies based on centralized authority have traditionally served as the 
backbone of organizational coordination, decentralized organizations found in the OSSD 
sector have recently emerged as non-hierarchical alternatives to this model (O’Mahony, 
2007). Indeed, studies on OSSD examine the possibility of decentralizing organizational 
coordination in projects that govern software development through online communities, 
non-profit foundations, or corporate consortia (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007; Dahlander & 
O’Mahony, 2011; O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007; O’Mahony, 2007; O’Mahony & Bechky, 
2008; Shah, 2006). In OSSD contexts, community governance is a common feature 
(O’Mahony, 2007; Shah, 2006), and projects are characterized by non-hierarchical, self-
organized decision making by voluntary contributors who are motivated by practical 
needs or intrinsic fulfilment (O’Mahony, 2007; Shah, 2006).  
Typically, this type of coordination is based on technical contribution and open 
communication. Despite being non-hierarchical, OSSD communities evolve in such a 
way that certain forms of formal authority and career progression to the center are sought 
after (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007; Dahlander & O’Mahony, 2011). For example, 
contributors who do good work that gets noticed by the community gain legitimacy and 
reputation over time (Dahlander & O’Mahony, 2011), and the very best (non-
anonymous) contributors can acquire an informal “advisor” status, which positions them 
at the center of the project’s network of stakeholders. This means that, despite a lack of 
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formal hierarchy, a certain degree of centralization can emerge over time in OSSD 
projects, and thus it is best to conceive of (de)centralization as a continuum, rather than 
as a binary feature of organizational life.  
As Mintzberg (1979) proposes, “the fundamental ways in which organizations coordinate 
their work . . . should be considered the most basic elements of structure, the glue that 
holds organizations together.” Given that organizations can accomplish complex tasks 
with or without a formal hierarchical structure, we would argue that, although it may be 
true that an organization can function without hierarchy, it certainly cannot function 
without coordination. 
3.6 Integrating Conditions for Coordination: 
Accountability, Predictability, and Common 
Understanding 
A universal working assumption in early coordination research (Taylor, 1911; Fayol, 
1949) is that we need human decision makers—typically, managers—to design and 
adjust the “three integrative conditions for coordinated activity: accountability, 
predictability, and common understanding” (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009: 463). The three 
integrating conditions provide the means for “people [to] collectively accomplish their 
interdependent tasks in the workplace” (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). Accountability 
pertains to the definition of responsibilities channeled through formal and informal 
structures. Scholars have also long argued that hierarchy is a typical and effective 
coordination mechanism for achieving accountability (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). 
Predictability refers to the understanding of how subsequent tasks are related to each 
other and what to anticipate (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). Expectations can also be 
aligned among interdependent parties about their work with “predictive knowledge” 
about other parties’ behavior (Puranam et al., 2012; Okhuysen, 2005). Lastly, common 
understanding entails “a shared perspective on the whole task and how individuals’ work 
fits within the whole” (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). Common understanding coordinates 
work by establishing shared knowledge about specific tasks (Hoegl, Weinkauf & 
Gemuenden, 2004; O’Mahony, 2003).  
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Organizations can achieve these integrative conditions through various configurations of 
coordination mechanisms. For instance, accountability can be enhanced by using roles in 
the hierarchy and through monitoring, feedback, and communication to establish trust 
(Bechky, 2003; Mark, 2002; Jarzabkowski, Le & Feldman, 2012; Okhuysen & Bechky, 
2009). “Common understanding can be developed when plans are created by senior 
managers and handed down a hierarchy to be implemented by those lower in the 
organization” (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009: 488). Similarly, mechanisms for allocating 
resources, defining roles and responsibilities, sharing information, monitoring 
performance, or creating proximity all enhance coordination by contributing to 
organizational accountability, predictability, or common understanding. 
3.7 Coordination and Consensus 
Consensus is an important enabler for coordination in that it reflects the level of 
agreement necessary for common understanding (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009; 
Kellermanns, Walter, Lechner & Floyd, 2005; St. John & Rue, 1991). According to the 
definition of Kellermanns and colleagues (2005), strategic consensus is defined as “the 
shared understanding of strategic priorities among managers at the top, middle, and/or 
operating levels of the organization” (Kellermanns, Walter, Lechner & Floyd, 2005). 
Despite being ubiquitous in organization studies, the nature of consensus has mostly been 
discussed as a state in which top management teams, groups, or organizational control 
systems are employed for effective coordination (Mintzberg, 1979: 142; Barker, 1993; 
Amason, 1996; St. John & Rue, 1991). For example, Barker (1993) delineates how value 
consensus among self-managed team members enables “concertive control” (based on 
normative rules) through manifests, resulting in a flatter organization. At the 
organizational level, the viability of consensus is contingent upon various internal and 
external resource constraints (Dess, 1987; Dess & Origer, 1987; Homburg et al., 1999). 
At the field level, institutional theorists have studied how consensus forms and falls apart 
in the formative stage of a field, during which conflict can be resolved through 
communication, managerial authority, formal or informal rhetoric, and action (Grodal & 
O’Mahony, 2015). Overall, consensus is considered a desired state or “common end” for 
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both centralized and emergent strategic decision making as it facilitates coordination 
(Grodal & O’Mahony, 2015; St. John & Rue, 1991).  
In addition to a “common end” state, consensus is also treated as a by-product of the 
group approach toward strategic decision making (Schweiger, Sandburg & Ragan, 1986; 
Amson, 1996; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). “Human systems ought to have a clear, 
consensus-based goal to guide behavior” (Bourgeois, 1980). The assumption is that 
consensus facilitates decision-making quality and performance outcomes (Amason, 
1996).  While studies on consensus focus primarily on strategic decision making among 
top managers in the strategy formulation stage (e.g., Bourgeois, 1980; Dess, 1987; Dess 
& Origer, 1987; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Homburg, Krohmer & Workman Jr., 
1999; Priem, 1990), consensus in the strategy implementation stage receives relatively 
little attention.  
This is because the scope of consensus research mainly focuses on the role of top 
managers. The conjecture is that once the top management team agrees on the goals and 
actions of a policy, organizational members (i.e., employees) follow the mandates that 
have been agreed upon. There is a clear group of “strategic decision makers,” devising 
goals and policy alternatives either following a rational-comprehensive logic or a 
political-incremental rationale in the strategy formulation stage (Bourgeois, 1980; Dess & 
Origer, 1987; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1989; Kellermanns, Walter, Lechner & Floyd, 2005).  
In recent years, consensus at much lower levels of the organization has begun to receive 
attention from scholars studying less-hierarchical self-managing organizations (Lee & 
Edmondson, 2017). For example, organizations such as Zappos or Ternary adopt an 
organizational system called Holacracy, in which individuals are directed by role-based 
definition rather than managers (Bernstein, Bunch, Canner & Lee, 2016). Full autonomy 
is granted to organizational members who follow formal role definitions but, at the same 
time, have the flexibility to discuss rule changes in “governance meetings.” Members 
propose, discuss, and consent to proposals in governance meetings to activate change. 
Similarly, in participatory decision making, consensual agreement serves as the means of 
organizational governance (Black & Gregersen, 1997). Overall, for organization designs 
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in which authority is distributed, consensus about the normative features of the 
organization—how different roles should be defined or how work should be designed is 
bottom-up and formed among the participants (Lee & Edmondson, 2017). With an 
emphasis on the task level, the literature on self-managing organizations extends the 
scope of consensus from the management level to the operating level and from top-down 
to bottom-up.  
Arguably, blockchain-based consensus is of a different nature. Instead of agreeing on the 
normative features, organizational participants agree on the basic facts in a deterministic 
way. The DAO network must, for instance, agree on which transactions have taken place, 
when they happened, and who relayed which block of transactions (e.g., as in blockchain 
explorers such as https://btc.com/). In section 3.9 and in Chapter 4, I will elaborate on 
how the idea of consensus has shifted in blockchain-based organizations.   
3.8 Coordination and Growth 
With or without a hierarchy, a properly coordinated organization should be able to scale 
its operations. Specifically, coordination affects organizational growth by enhancing—
and sometimes balancing—efficiency (Nickerson & Silverman, 2003) and effectiveness 
(Doty, Glick & Huber, 1993; Lewin & Minton, 1986). 
3.8.1 Growth based on Efficiency 
From the standpoint of efficiency, organizations are more successful than markets in 
coordinating activities with high transaction costs; this is a key determinant for the 
expansion of organizational boundaries (Williamson, 1975). On the other hand, 
knowledge-based conceptualizations suggest that organizations are more efficient at 
coordinating knowledge assimilation, transfer, and integration (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
Kogut & Zander, 1992; 1993; 1996; Garicano & Wu, 2012; Whetten, 1987). Managers 
typically assume a strategic role in designing the organizational structure by which tasks 
are allocated and integrated for enhanced efficiency, i.e., by way of optimal resource 
deployment (Faraj and Xiao, 2006).  
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Through social relationships, top managers are able to make decisions on resource 
allocation and capability building, leading to more effective exploratory and exploitative 
innovation and growth (Lavie, Stettner & Tushman, 2010; March, 1991). Similarly, in the 
case of new ventures or community-based non-profits, organizational growth relies on 
coordination based on social resources and social capital (Khaire, 2010; Galaskiewicz, 
Bielefwld & Dowell, 2006), founding team human capital (Tzabbar & Margolis, 2017; 
Baum & Bird, 2010), and development of managerial strategies to foster external 
partnership with high-status firms (Khaire, 2010). Coordinating through social 
relationships provides a basis for reputation and trust building within the organization, 
which brings down communication costs and enhances efficiency. 
In non-hierarchical OSSDs, communities can evolve in such a way that certain forms of 
leadership emerge through the identification of informal advisors recognized as 
authoritative by community members (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007; Dahlander & 
O’Mahony, 2011). However, meeting efficiency requirements can be trickier in 
community-based organizations in which decision-making power is diffused and in 
which organizational members can come and go at will (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007; 
Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). 
3.8.2 Growth based on Effectiveness 
From an effectiveness perspective, coordination also helps organizations achieve their 
goals by increasing the fit between the internal and external environment (Argote, 1982; 
Crowston, 1997; Galbraith, 1973, 1974; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Srikanth & Puranam, 
2014; Thompson, 1967; Tushman & Nadler, 1978). For example, coordination 
mechanisms such as planning, sharing updates, or trust building can help to mobilize 
organizational members around goals and objectives that are aligned with customer 
needs.  
Overall, organizations are able to capitalize on efficiency and effectiveness and to 
achieve growth by mechanisms such as communication, routine, and learning (Starbuck, 
1965; Whetten, 1987; Salomon & Martin, 2008). Note that the relationship between 
coordination and growth is particularly important for organizations that rely on network 
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effects to scale. In fact, much of the OSSD literature attends to how community 
governance is linked to growth-enhancing network externalities (O’Mahony & Lakhani, 
2011; West & O’Mahony, 2008; Dahlander & O’Mahony, 2011). 
3.9 Opening the Black Box of Coordination within 
DAOs 
How, in the absence of top management and a centralized decision-making process that 
ensures optimal efficiency and effectiveness, do DAOs coordinate tasks and achieve 
growth?  
DAOs represent a case in which exchanges of value take place in non-hierarchical 
organizations governed by peer-to-peer, open networks. In many ways, DAOs epitomize 
an extreme form of decentralized organization. However, DAOs’ defining features go 
beyond decentralization and represent an under-socialized organizational terrain yet to be 
explored. According to the original Bitcoin white paper, which encapsulates key elements 
of Bitcoin’s coordination mechanisms, “nodes work all at once with little coordination. 
They do not need to be identified, since messages are not routed to any particular place 
and only need to be delivered on a best effort basis. Nodes can leave and rejoin the 
network at will, accepting the proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they 
were gone” (Nakamoto, 2008).   
While it may be true that DAOs in the cryptocurrency industry require “little 
coordination” compared to traditional payment corporations, what is more striking is the 
fact that some of the coordination mechanisms on which DAOs rely are completely new. 
Scholars have always seen human agents (from managers to frontline staff) as the main 
source of task coordination. But DAOs, by placing “automation at the center [and] 
humans at the edges” (Buterin, 2014) of the organization, coordinate tasks using open-
source software and a distributed ledger. Moreover, while DAOs rely on a community-
based form of governance, they differ fundamentally from OSSD projects in terms of 
organization design and task coordination mechanisms. In fact, DAOs achieve 
accountability, predictability, and common understanding—the three integrative 
conditions for coordination (Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009)—in ways previously unseen.  
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Specifically, for DAOs to secure the network without a third-party intermediary vouching 
for every single exchange, agreement needs to be reached among the network validators. 
We need a way for the payee to know that the previous owners did not sign any 
earlier transactions […] The only way to confirm the absence of a transaction is to 
be aware of all transactions […] To accomplish this without a trusted party, 
transactions must be publicly announced7, and we need a system for participants to 
agree on a single history of the order in which they were received. The payee needs 
proof that at the time of each transaction, the majority of nodes agreed it was the 
first received.   
[The Bitcoin white paper, Nakamoto, 2008] 
To provide security, consensus based on unanimity rule appears to be deterministic and 
central in DAOs insofar as every node runs the same protocol and agrees on one and only 
one true state of the blockchain ledger. However, unanimity rule in organization research 
is little studied. Romme (2004) argues that unanimity rule at a critical threshold enhances 
the organization’s performance and the quality of its decision making. Unsurprisingly, 
Romme found that large groups are less responsive to unanimity rule than small units in a 
hierarchical structure. Unanimity rule is uncommon in traditional organizations, hence 
the lack of visibility in the literature. For traditional banks, the ledger is a database that 
stores transaction information and is separate from the evolution of the organization 
itself. This is not the case for DAOs, for whom consensus on the true state of the ledger is 
a prerequisite and a centripetal force which holds the organization together. 
To conclude, in contrast to the extant literature that treats consensus as a state, common 
end, or by-product, for DAOs consensus is a precondition for task coordination. A lack of 
consensus implies a rejection of the organizing principle, which can bring progression to 
a halt or result in organizational division. How we think about consensus within such a 
sizable network requires that we take the consensus concept to a different level of 
abstraction and place it in the forefront of DAO coordination. I will discuss the notion of 
                                                 
7
 W. Dai, "b-money," http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt, 1998. Original citation in Nakamoto, 2008. 
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consensus and the lack thereof in Chapter 4, which details a pilot case study of the black 
box of coordination within DAOs using Bitcoin as the primary example. 
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Chapter 4 Distributed Consensus: The Case of Bitcoin 
4 Distributed Consensus: The Case of Bitcoin* 
* This chapter draws heavily from my paper “Bitcoin and the rise of decentralized 
autonomous organizations” co-authored with Dr. Jean-Philippe Vergne, forthcoming in 
the Organization Zoo Series of Journal of Organization Design. 
This chapter outlines a pilot case study and is intended to be descriptive and explanatory. 
My goal here is to identify the defining features of task coordination mechanisms within 
DAOs and to answer the following question:  
How are decentralized autonomous organizations coordinated? 
As the first and most established DAO, Bitcoin serves as a prototype, and allows for a 
deep understanding of DAO coordination. Launched in 2009, Bitcoin, with its underlying 
blockchain technology, has been characterized as a game changer by the mainstream 
media (e.g., the Economist, 2015a, 2015b; Wadhwa, 2015). As noted in Chapter 2, 
Bitcoin’s market capitalization was $300 billon at its peak in in December 2017, 
equivalent to that of Bank of America — only that Bitcoin was created out of a piece of 
software code! Given its significance as a DAO and its real-world economic impact, 
Bitcoin provides valuable data and a rich setting for my research. 
For the sake of clarity, throughout this chapter “Bitcoin” (upper case) will be used to 
refer to the DAO, while “bitcoin” (lower case) will be used to refer to the cryptocurrency 
tokens. 
4.1 Research Design: A Pilot Case Study 
Case studies serve as an appropriate method to build theories (e.g., Gersick, 1988; 
Gilbert, 2005) and as a source from which theoretical insights may be derived from rich 
data. For novel phenomena that are little understood and cannot be fully explained by 
extant theories, a case study may be used to inductively investigate emerging patterns and 
their underlying logic (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Siggelkow, 
2007).  
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In the course of my research, I collected data on Bitcoin from its formation in 2009 
through 2017. Between July 2016 and March 2018, I conducted twelve 60- to 90-minute 
semi-structured interviews with 13 industry experts who have direct experience or 
relevant knowledge of Bitcoin. Interviewees included Bitcoin developers, Bitcoin 
Improvement Proposal (BIP) authors, cryptocurrency miners, and experts on 
cryptocurrency start-ups. Questions revolved around two categoriess, namely: (1) what is 
the defining feature of coordination within Bitcoin which distinguishes it from OSSD; 
and (2) how do stakeholders8 coordinate tasks at various organizational levels? With 
these primary questions in mind, I also inquired into the communication and decision-
making processes characteristic of a DAO like Bitcoin. The interview guide is included in 
Appendix B. 
In addition to conducting interviews, I studied documents such as white papers, BIPs, 
technical and non-technical archives, academic papers, and industry reports. Finally, I 
accessed important online data at the blockchain level (e.g., blockchain.info), protocol 
level (e.g., GitHub Bitcoin repositories at https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin), peer-to-peer 
network level (e.g., bitinfocharts.com), organizational level (e.g., coinmarketcap.com), 
and community level (e.g., the Bitcoin sub-reddit at https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/). 
Using multiple data sources enhanced the robustness of my findings (Eisenhard, 1989).  
I went back and forth between the extant literature and the data I obtained to support 
subsequent theory building. Follow-up data collection was required to ensure internal 
validity. The goal was to arrive at a convergent theoretical framework that was tightly 
linked with empirical evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
                                                 
8
 Throughout this dissertation, I define organizational boundaries to include those network actors who 
directly maintain or provide services for the decentralized autonomous organization. In the case of Bitcoin, 
internal stakeholders of interest include network validators (i.e., miners) and developers. 
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4.2 Findings 
4.2.1 Two Major Types of Task at Various Levels 
To understand how DAOs coordinate tasks to solve the universal problems of organizing, 
I will first identify the tasks performed by Bitcoin. 
4.2.1.1 Task #1: Network Validation at the Blockchain and Protocol 
Levels 
Bitcoin represents a partial substitute for banks, albeit with notable differences. First, at 
an aggregate level, traditional banks store transaction histories in a centralized fashion. 
Users only get to view their personal bank statements and must trust that their 
information is protected from both cyber attacks and employee misconduct. Traditionally, 
banks employ clerks to process payments. Human agents are prone to agency problems 
which can lead to misconduct, such as theft. Human agents are also expensive. With 
Bitcoin, all transactions are recorded publicly and electronically onto the immutable 
blockchain and stored in a distributed fashion across thousands of network nodes. As a 
result, records are easier to maintain, and cyber attacks are less likely to succeed 
(transaction information is not held in one central location). The blockchain technology 
provides the multi-site copies of “ledgers,” which are essentially aggregations of past 
transactions (like a bank account statement). The technology also provides encryption to 
validate transactions. This is similar to the personal security devices used in online 
banking, which generate a unique transaction-specific signature based on a personal key. 
Second, whereas banks prevent double-spending by checking for funds sufficiency in a 
centralized server, in a peer-to-peer system like Bitcoin, payees cannot verify whether 
payers still have the funds they claim to have due to unpredictable network delays (e.g. 
an email sent now can reach its recipient before another email sent a minute earlier). To 
resolve this issue, the Bitcoin network relies on cryptographic routines to verify, 
timestamp, and order transactions in a non-reversible way, thereby avoiding the need for 
human reconciliation. The key idea is that somebody in the network will legitimately 
time stamp a block of transactions, but we cannot predict who that will be (e.g. replacing 
a bank clerk, who can be corrupted to fake time stamps, with a system that cannot be 
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corrupted). Table 2 illustrates the difference in coordination between Bitcoin and 
traditional banks and payment organizations. 
Table 2 Forms of Organizing: Banks and Payment Organizations vs. Bitcoin 
(Adopted from Hsieh & Vergne, 2017) 
Goal Provision of a Payment System 
 Banks and Payment Organizations Bitcoin 
Main Task Payment processing: verification, 
validation, recording, settlement, 
clearing, reconciliation 
Network validation: broadcasting, 
verification, validation and recording. 
Mechanism Centralized hierarchies Mining: competitive bookkeeping 
Task 
Division 
Centralized task division by job 
descriptions/ definitions, divided 
by formal organizational structure  
Task division is based on the criterion of 
computing power dedicated to mining and 
is automated by the blockchain software in 
a decentralized fashion. 
Task 
Allocation 
Assigned by formal hierarchies Miners self-select in the network. 
However, competitive bookkeeping only 
allocates payment validation tasks to the 
winning miner (essentially chosen at 
random, though the probability of winning 
is proportional to the computing power 
committed). 
Reward 
Distribution 
Defined by formal compensation/ 
incentive programs. In general, 
reward schemes are not publicly 
available.  
Automated, randomized, transparent. 
Linked with task allocation through 
competitive bookkeeping.  
Information 
Flows  
Centrally controlled by 
organizational rules. 
Inconsistencies can persist across 
teams, divisions, or subsidiaries.  
Transaction history is recorded in the 
blockchain, which is publicly auditable 
and immutable. Information is distributed 
among network nodes and all nodes have 
to run the same software protocol and keep 
the same transaction record on the 
blockchain public ledger. 
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For network validation tasks, coordination is achieved through a process whereby the 
blockchain produces agreement (aided by miners’ efforts) on the ordering of transactions 
through the timestamping created by miners’ success at guessing random numbers 
generated by the protocol (Hsieh & Vergne, 2017). 
4.2.1.2 Task #2: Protocol Update at the Peer-to-Peer Network 
Level 
Underlying the Bitcoin payment system is the blockchain software supported by ongoing 
protocol updates (Wang & Vergne, 2017). In terms of governance, miners voting on 
protocol update proposals resemble the community-based management OSSD observed 
in projects such as Linux. This aligns stakeholder expectations (Lopp, 2016), and 
facilitates knowledge sharing, problem solving, and the realization of collective outcomes 
(O’Mahony & Lakhani, 2011). Like OSSD, Bitcoin software development is also open 
source, decentralized, and community based. Bitcoin communities of volunteer software 
developers collaborate in a non-hierarchical network and self-select into tasks and roles 
based on expertise and preference. Over time, a team of core Bitcoin developers has 
formed and become increasingly influential in the community, even though their work is 
not funded by a centralized organization, but by a sponsorship program that relies on 
donations. 
The key organizational novelty of Bitcoin is that, in addition to developers, miners play 
an equally important role in protocol modification. Specifically, Bitcoin software is 
updated through BIPs, which are design documents proposing new features, changes, or 
processes for the protocol. BIPs allow developers to make proposals on software updates 
that miners must vote on. Proposals are first reviewed by BIP editors, and miners then 
indicate a “yes” or “no” vote in a block during the polling period (e.g., 100 blocks 
totalling 1,000 minutes). Voting power is proportional to the computing power a miner 
contributes to the network. A code change will only be implemented when 55 per cent of 
voters approve a given proposal (Franco, 2014: 90). Table 3 compares OSSD with 
Bitcoin software development in light of the four core dimensions of organizing: task 
division, task allocation, reward distribution, and information flows (Puranam, Alexy & 
Reitzig, 2014). 
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Table 3 Updating Software Protocol: Open-Source Software Development vs. 
Bitcoin 
(Adopted from Hsieh & Vergne, 2017) 
Goal                                                           Protocol Update 
 OSSD Bitcoin  
Main Task   Software development Standard development 
Mechanism Community governance Voting: Bitcoin improvement 
proposals (BIPs) 
Task 
Division 
Some centralization based on the 
structure provided by the founder; 
evolvable with community. 
Founder is unknown; BIPs proposed 
by developers and voted on by miners 
coordinate code modification. 
Centralization is undesirable. 
Task 
Allocation 
Open participation through self-
selection into the community 
Developers contribute to code 
upgrades through open participation 
and self-selection. Miners vote on the 
protocol change based on computing 
power. 
Reward 
Distribution 
Intrinsic motivation, 
professionalism, visibility,  
Developers volunteer and are 
motivated by intrinsic motivation. 
Miners are paid in Bitcoin and are 
driven by mining profitability. 
Information 
Flows  
Information is processed through 
“virtual support infrastructure and 
tools” (Puranam et al., 2014) 
Information is shared and 
communicated through BIP 
communication on the code repository 
(i.e., GitHub) and reflected in miners’ 
voting outcomes on the blockchain. 
We can compare tasks performed by Bitcoin and OSSD in terms of their goals, their 
coordination, and the subsequent security requirements. 
So development for the individual clients is very much like Linux and Python and 
so on … it's an open source project that welcomes contributions from anyone … 
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But the goal … isn't quite the same because you're not developing a, a piece of 
software, you're developing a standard, or a set of rules. That means that … it 
doesn't quite work the same way because you can't just commit a change in the 
code … It relies on human validation and so forth . . . It's not software 
development, it's standard development. [Nick Johnson, interview #26] 
Since protocol update in Bitcoin means setting up standards for the entire network to 
follow, this necessarily affects consensus layer.  
It's very similar. The only difference is probably the consensus layer, which is not 
so highly fragile in Linux or other open sources . . . when you look at Linux, there 
is not much in [terms of] consensus—maybe some drivers need to follow a 
standard and it doesn't hurt too much if you don't. While in Bitcoin if the 
consensus changes then you at the end have two chains like we have now with 
Bitcash and Bitcoin. And this is like an additional element, you not only split the 
[software] distribution like Linux, Ubuntu, as Debian, but you kind of split the 
financial system. [Jonas Schnelli, interview # 21] 
This leads to some fundamental differences between cryptocurrencies and other security-
critical projects. 
Bitcoin and Namecoin and Monero are security critical projects. And so, if you compare 
any security critical project . . . to a typical open source project that's not security 
critical, there will definitely be a much a higher standard involved for [the] 
security critical project, just because the stakes are higher if something goes 
wrong . . . so that's one aspect. The other aspect is that cryptocurrencies are 
decentralized consensus protocols . . . which interact [with economic agents] in 
weird ways . . . which historically have never all interacted at once before 
cryptocurrencies existed . . . There tend[s] to be a much higher standard for those 
systems compared even to other security critical projects. [Jeremy Rand, 
interview #31] 
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According to Nick Johnson, a major difference between developing a standard and 
developing a piece of code is that “a lot of the best practices in software development 
can’t be applied” (interview #26). The distinction between “software development” and 
“standard development” points to a fundamental difference between Linux and Python, 
on the one hand, and cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, on the other. This creates an 
intriguing scenario whereby a straightforward software update in OSSD could have 
complex interactions with a decentralized consensus system. A security update that 
would normally be deployed as quickly and as broadly as possible in OSSD, could be 
deemed to pose a security threat to Bitcoin. 
[N]ormally in a security critical project, if some other project that's a 
codependency of yours releases a security update, normally you would want to 
merge that as fast as possible and deploy to everyone as fast as possible . . . 
because how could a security update be a security issue in itself? Right? But in the 
context of things like Bitcoin, Namecoin and Monero, [if] I'm merging a security 
update for dependency without being very careful about how you test its 
interaction with the existing system, that can actually introduce security issues of 
its own. [Jeremy Rand, interview #31]  
Thus, these two categories of task, network validation and protocol update, lead to 
important insights into the nature of “distributed consensus.” 
4.2.2 Distributed Consensus Mechanisms: The Defining Feature 
of Task Coordination in Bitcoin 
“Any needed rules and incentives can be enforced with this consensus 
mechanism.” (Nakamoto, 2008) 
As the Bitcoin white paper rightly concludes, it is an almost insurmountable task to study 
coordination within Bitcoin without touching on the concept of consensus. Jeremy Rand 
elaborated: 
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Bitcoin is basically the first ever implementation of what's called a decentralized 
consensus protocol, which basically means I'm having a large number of users9 on 
the Internet, who by some mechanism all end up coming to an exact agreement on 
an order to [the] series of events . . . this was the problem that was previously 
believed to be impossible to solve. There was actually a mathematical 
impossibility . . . and [B]itcoin ends up taking advantage of a really interesting 
loophole in the important proof and basically solves it by relying on both 
cryptography and economic incentives rather than just cryptography. [Jeremy 
Rand, interview #31] 
The “mathematical impossibility” mentioned by Rand refers to the Fischer-Lynch-
Paterson theorem, which demonstrates the impossibility of reaching consensus about the 
true state of the network in a distributed network with dishonest actors (Fischer, Lynch & 
Paterson, 1985). Distributed consensus (or in computer science terms, decentralized 
consensus) is at the heart of Bitcoin’s coordination mechanism for network validation 
tasks. 
By design, network validators (e.g., Bitcoin miners) only belong to a DAO if the protocol 
is unanimously adopted. “You only use the system that has the rules that you agree with” 
(Nick Johnson, interview #26).  Consensus is no longer a state, but a set of rules that must 
be met for the organization to function and which serves as a prerequisite for organization 
members adopting the same protocol to stay in the same network. Think about how 
miners must agree on the true state of the ledger; consider how the network agrees on 
which protocol to follow (e.g., Bitcoin vs. Bitcoin Cash10), and how miners cast votes to 
signal support for important updates proposed by developers through BIPs or other 
                                                 
9
 According to the interviewee, “users” refers to all “miners (or network validators)” and “full nodes” who 
run the same Bitcoin protocol and keep the entire history of Bitcoin blockchain on their computer. 
10
 Bitcoin Cash is a hard fork of Bitcoin that features a larger block size to enable faster transaction 
processing. 
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platforms—these are characteristics specific to cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin but not 
to OSSD. Specifically, consensus rules for network validation are deterministic. 
[E]very single user on the Bitcoin peer-to-peer network, they need to come to [a] 
deterministic conclusion about what the state of the blockchain is. And even a 
trivially insignificant change in how they ended up computing . . . even if it's just 
one very obscure signature in one transaction and the entire blockchain isn't valid 
anymore. If there's even one tiny deviation, then they will fail to come to a 
deterministic agreement on what the state of the blockchain is. And as a result of 
that, that means suddenly now there's a disagreement on who has how much 
money . . . And the only way that Bitcoin can work is if everyone is in 100 
percent deterministic agreements on that state. [Jeremy Rand, interview #31]  
Thus, blockchain-based consensus is distinctive in that it requires all participants to agree 
on basic organizational facts and states instead of outlining a common strategic goal for 
members to follow. In other words, blockchain-based consensus no longer attends to the 
ends of coordination (i.e., the desired outcome), but the mechanisms of coordination. 
Blockchain-based consensus is guided primarily by formal rules and supported by 
informal communication among stakeholders. Traditionally, coordination mechanisms 
such as plans, rules, and routines were intended to foster agreement among organizational 
members and contribute to a common understanding (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). In the 
case of Bitcoin, by contrast, consensus is a default, i.e., a pre-condition for coordination 
at the blockchain and protocol levels.   
Before getting into a finer-grained view of “how” consensus mechanisms work, we first 
need to understand “who” the internal stakeholders with direct decision-making power 
actually are. 
4.2.3 Defining Organizational Boundaries: Internal Stakeholders of 
DAOs 
Although in practice, there are various types of nodes in the extended Bitcoin network 
connected by various protocols (see Figure 14-15 in Appendix C), in this study, I will 
adopt the generally accepted definition of a cryptocurrency network as a collection of 
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nodes running a cryptocurrency protocol. Organizational boundaries are drawn to include 
only those nodes running the Bitcoin protocol, i.e., those connected by the orange ties in 
Figure 16 in Appendix C.  
Specifically, I focus on two classes of stakeholder groups: miners and developers. The 
choice is based on their level of direct decision-making power and involvement in task 
coordination. 
Who has agency?  Every human participant in the Bitcoin network has agency. As the 
Bitcoin white paper states, “nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will” (Nakamoto, 
2008). Members make voluntary decisions to join the network and self-select into roles. 
Joint decisions are made through democratic community voting.  
Who has power? According to Narayanan and colleagues (2016:173-175), there are a 
few internal stakeholder groups that have power, including: developers, who write the 
code as a rulebook that everyone uses; and miners, who compete to write the history and 
validate transactions. Externally, investors can influence the value of DAOs by holding 
Bitcoin and users can utilize cryptocurrency to transfer value. Other external stakeholders 
include: regulators, merchants, and customers, who generate basic demands for 
cryptocurrency; and payment services, exchanges, and wallet providers who handle 
transactions. In general, external stakeholders build their products and services upon the 
Bitcoin blockchain and protocol. This classification is in line with how industry experts 
think about the difference between internal and external stakeholders in terms of 
governance: “we have kind of two cohorts or two classes of network participants, you 
know, what I call the retail layer or the end users and then what I call the utility or the 
keepers in general with respect to governance” (Ryan Zurrer, Principal and Venture 
Partner at Polychain Capital, interview # 30). 
The “keepers” referred to by Zurrer correspond to internal stakeholders, whereas the 
“retail layer” or “end users” correspond to external stakeholders. In this dissertation, I 
will focus on those internal stakeholders—developers and miners—who have a direct 
influence on operations, decision-making, and the value of the cryptocurrency. External 
stakeholders are beyond the scope of this study.  
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Who are the “shareholders”?  Anyone who owns bitcoin has “shares”. Investors and 
users hold and transact with bitcoin, the value of which is demonstrated by market 
capitalization and the total number of transactions (Narayanan et al., 2016: 47, 173).  
The following section examines the consensus mechanisms corresponding to tasks at the 
blockchain and protocol levels. 
4.2.4 Consensus Mechanism at the Blockchain and Protocol level: 
Coordinating Network Validation 
At both the blockchain and protocol levels, mining based on consensus provides the 
utility layer necessary for DAOs such as Bitcoin. Ryan Zurrer called this class of network 
participant the “keeper.” 
[T]hat utility layer, that’d be called keeper, [which] provides a specific resource or 
. . . a function to the network. So either it provides storage and computation or 
maybe it does validation or something like that . . . these sort[s] of permissionless 
actors can come and go and, and in providing the specific resource to the network 
for the retail layer, for the end users, end users get to use of that network basically 
nearly for free. [Ryan Zurrer, Principal and Venture Partner at Polychain Capital, 
interview #30] 
 In the case of Bitcoin, miners are the main providers of value in the network. In 
accordance with the coordination of machine routines in the Bitcoin protocol, Bitcoin 
keeps its maximum block size at 1MB. Bitcoin is also able to maintain a stable block 
generation speed averaging 10 minutes per block; this ensures that the Bitcoin blockchain 
size (i.e., the total number of blocks in the blockchain) grows at a constant speed (see 
Figure 7). To make sure this happens, the consensus mechanism needs to take into 
account the expansion of network computing power, which directly influences miners’ 
probability of solving hashes. Figure 8 shows the growth trajectory of the Bitcoin hash 
rate, which is the number of calculations the mining network performs each second. 
Every 14 days the machine routine adjusts the difficulty of the mathematical puzzles 
generated by the mining algorithm so that the average block time remains stable (see 
Figure 9). Over the course of the last three years (2015-2018), the slope of the Bitcoin 
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blockchain size growth curve (see Figure 7) remained constant while the slope of 
difficulty (see Figure 9) increased exponentially in response to the soaring growth in 
network computing power indicated in Figure 8. 
Miners are profit driven. The Bitcoin machine routine thus coordinates the reward 
distribution schedule to miners with new bitcoin injected into the economy in a 
deflationary fashion. At its launch in 2009, the initial reward started off at 50 BTC11. It is 
programed to halve approximately every 4 years until 2140, when the maximum supply 
of 21 million BTC is expected to run out (https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Controlled_supply).  
Figure 7 Bitcoin Blockchain Size (MB) 
(Defined as “the total size of all block headers and transactions. Not including database 
indexes.)” 
 
(Source: blockchain.info) 
                                                 
11
   BTC is the unit of one bitcoin. Additionally, while the upper case “Bitcoin” refers to the name of the 
cryptocurrency and decentralized autonomous organization, the lower case “bitcoin” stands for the 
currency itself.   
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Figure 8 Bitcoin Hash Rate (TH/s) 
(Defined as “the estimated number of terahashes per second (trillions of hashes per 
second) the Bitcoin network is performing.”) 
 
 (Source: blockchain.info) 
Figure 9 Bitcoin Difficulty 
(Defined as “a relative measure of how difficult it is to find a new block. The difficulty is 
adjusted periodically as a function of how much hashing power has been deployed by the 
network of miners.”) 
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(Source: blockchain.info) 
For Bitcoin and other DAOs, the consensus mechanism that coordinates network 
validation tasks at the blockchain protocol level requires that every node in the network 
run the Bitcoin protocol and that everyone keeps the same copy of the blockchain ledger. 
According to Hudson Jameson, “You show that you agree to the consensus by running 
the software. And if you chose to run the software or a different software or a modified 
version of the software, that's you disagreeing” (interview #32). 
The amount of “work” committed to PoW mining serves as a cost to validate the 
network. This “ante” cost makes Bitcoin highly resistant to cyber attacks. According to 
Adam Reeds, Vice President, Energy and Infrastructure at Dream, and an expert in 
mining, “if you think about a game of poker, if you're betting on the result of it, it's like 
you're ante” (interview #29). Reeds’ business partner, Mauricio Di Bartolomeo, 
elaborated: “[B]itcoin is the honeypot. Everybody's trying to get a piece of it and nobody 
has been able to. That’s why it is where it is” (interview #29). 
It follows that Bitcoin’s true organizational novelty lies in those unique solutions 
consensus-based mining provides to organizing. Coordination is characterized by: (1) 
pre-determined task division written into the protocol; (2) randomized task allocation that 
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is proportional to computing power; (3) randomized reward distribution subject to task 
assignment; and (4) peer-to-peer information flow among network nodes in the 
blockchain. It is important to note that the Bitcoin code does not assume away the 
problem of agency costs. Rather, Bitcoin explicitly deals with these long-standing 
problems by incorporating counterbalancing incentives in the code, making the payment 
system incorruptible. 
4.2.5 Consensus Mechanism at the Peer-to-Peer Network Level: 
Coordinating Protocol Update 
An important channel for code update is the BIP, a formal document used to propose 
protocol changes. There are three kinds of BIP: a standard-track BIP that describes a 
universal change to the protocol; an informational BIP that address a Bitcoin design 
issue; and, a process BIP, which pertains to changes to procedures and decision-making 
processes (Github BIPs, 2018). Appendix D lists all BIPs (including authors and status); 
Appendix E shows a sample BIP (BIP #151), with its key components. The BIP structure 
and process is not unlike the academic journal review process. New ideas and proposals 
are discussed in the community or in focus groups in order to get feedback. Proposals are 
then submitted to BIP editors, who can either reject or approve them. Approved proposals 
are then moved to a repository and their status changed to “draft,” as indicated in Figure 
1. The draft will not be finalized until the reference implementation is completed (e.g., in 
the form of code). Each BIP follows a well-defined format and is reviewed in a 
standardized process. However, the decision to adopt any proposed change is made by 
the user at the client end. 
While miners consent to playing by the rulebook, they can vote to change it using the 
influence derived from their computing power. When it comes to solving related issues, 
making changes to the code, or deciding which protocol to adopt with clients, decision 
making is coordinated through consensus within and between stakeholder groups, as in 
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OSSD. “Most of these processes actually happen a bit more fluid[ly] and more 
casual[ly],” said Fabian Vogelsteller, EIP12 developer (interview #27). 
However, an important distinction between DAOs and OSSD projects is the use of 
cryptocurrency tokens as an economic incentive. In contrast to OSSD contexts, Bitcoin 
relies on a mixed community of volunteer developers and paid miners who jointly revise 
the organizational design through BIPs. Put simply, Bitcoin offers a novel solution to 
“the universal problems of organizing” (Puranam et al., 2014), by involving a new class 
of stakeholders, incentivized by both machine routines and community discussions, and 
through the design of an organization whose parameters cannot be changed unilaterally 
by any stakeholder group and whose routine operations cannot be derailed by insiders’ 
covert misconduct. 
As shown in Figure 4 in Chapter 2, a BIP draft can progress to various stages of approval, 
e.g., deferred, proposed, rejected, withdrawn. What determines the acceptance of a 
proposal? Andy Chase, a Bitcoin developer and BIP author explained: 
Whether [a BIP] goes to final/active . . . depends on the BIP. Some BIPs are just . 
. . standard, like the UI schemes so you can just switch it to final when you're 
done making it. For active, it's just whether you were able to submit a change and 
the vast majority of users are using the change. So if it's a fork . . . [with] a feature 
change, then at least a certain number of users have to be using it. And then you 
get to that point where it gets more complicated because if it's in Bitcoin Core13 
then . . . you have to figure out, in order for enough users to use it, you either have 
to go through the Bitcoin Core process, which is like writ[ing] the code, get[ting] 
                                                 
12
 EIP stands for Ethereum Improvement Proposal. It is a concept based on Bitcoin’s BIPs repository. 
Similar to BIPs, EIP developers share protocol updates, discuss ideas and issues, and make a pull request as 
an EIP document. Once the pull request is merged, one could say that it has been officially accepted by the 
community. (Vogelsteller, interview # 27). 
13
 Bitcoin Core refers to the Bitcoin software protocol with all four functions: wallet, mining, blockchain, 
and network routing. See also Figure 14 and Figure 15 in Appendix C. 
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PR14 requests, which just like submitting code for review, getting it approved and 
then waiting for the next version or . . . a convincing people to use your own 
software (interview #28). 
In general, acceptance depends on the nature of the protocol update, i.e., whether it is 
contentious (e.g., changing blockchain consensus rules) or uncontentious (e.g., changing 
software behavior decisions unrelated to blockchain consensus rules).  
Generally, we don't end up adopting a proposal unless it has pretty much near 
unanimous agreement whether it's a good idea. Now, this can vary somewhat in 
the sense that ... if it's a blockchain consensus rule that would require a hard fork15 
then, obviously it must be pretty much unanimous agreement that it's a good idea 
because contentious hard forks tend to cause disasters as [the] kind of thing over 
in Bitcoin. If it's something like either a soft fork to the consensus rules or 
something that's not consensus critical . . . like a software behavior decision that 
isn't specific blockchain consensus rules . . . we won't require quite as much 
consensus. Generally, we try to avoid doing things that are particularly 
contentious. [Jeremy Rand, Lead developer of Namecoin, interview #31] 
While BIPs are intended to provide a formal structure to the proposal assessment process, 
less formal means of communication are also used to help developers reach consensus. 
Intriguingly, the threshold is usually so high that almost unanimous consensus is 
expected. 
                                                 
14
 PR stands for “pull requests”, which are a feature of code repositories such as GitHub, which allows 
developers to push code changes, discuss, and review the proposed modifications and add follow-up 
commits before the changes are merged into the repository (source: https://help.github.com/articles/about-
pull-requests/).   
15
 A hard fork refers to a protocol change in which the new version of the software is not backward 
compatible. For blockchain DAOs, this creates a new blockchain that requires the entire network to update 
their protocol to the new version in order to stay in the same DAO. Otherwise, a new blockchain will be 
created as a result. For this reason, changes to consensus rules can only be achieved through hard forks. 
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Part of the reason for this is that we generally recognize that we all kind of have 
varying areas of specialty and as a result, we tend to have somewhat . . . varying 
perspectives on how to solve the same problem. In our experience, it tends to be 
more effective to actually discuss a problem . . . until we reach a near unanimous 
consensus rather than to just do something like . . .  a majority vote. Majority 
votes simply don't work very well in a project like this, especially security critical 
projects. Generally speaking, if there's a significant portion of the developer 
community who are strongly against a particular change, then usually that's a sign 
that there really is a problem with it and then it needs to be addressed in some 
way. [Jeremy Rand, interview #31] 
For miners to signal support for a particular proposal, a threshold (e.g., 95 per cent of 
network computing power) may be identified. According to Jonas Schnelli, developer 
and BIP author, “In the past [the] threshold was [up] to 95 per cent of miners . . . 
signaling readiness. And if the 95 per cent has been reached, the BIP or the change was 
locked in16, so [it was] universally activated” (interview #21). 
 
For the case of individual BIPs, Tanaka Khan, Bitcoin developer and BIP author 
explained:  
Usually, this means miners will code the blocks they find with a signal (version 
bits) indicating their support. Basically, miners vote for particular changes to the 
code by indicating their willingness to run that code. If the miner voting yields 
above that threshold, then the code activates, and everyone must run it or be 
forked off the main network (interview #25). 
Following the example of BIPs, code development proposals for other DAOs have been 
created. For example, Bitcoin Unlimited has its own version called “Bitcoin Unlimited 
                                                 
16
 A BIP proposal being “locked in” refers to the status of a BIP being scheduled to activate at a certain 
block height. 
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Improvement Proposals” (BUIPs), Ethereum uses “Ethereum Improvement Proposals” 
(EIPs), and Bitcoin has another proposal called “Bitcoin Enhancement Proposals” 
(BEPs).  
“Most minor code changes don’t require a BIP, and instead are merged into the main 
code branch with pull requests on GitHub”, explained Khan (interview #25). 
Alternatively, developers may use less formal online forums to communicate ideas to 
different communities, e.g., “Bitcointalk” and “Bitcoin subreddit.” These are less 
technical and oriented toward the broader community. 
4.2.6 What happens when Consensus cannot be reached? 
Consensus is vital for DAOs as it constitutes the core of decision making and change. 
Consensus on the true state of the blockchain public ledger MUST be achieved—any 
disagreement will result in the splitting of the network through hard forks. 
[H]ard fork works like this: if you have . . . a network of 10 nodes and one node 
updates and say from block 2,000 on, I will change the consensus rules. Then 
from this block on, he will have a different hash in this block, so therefore his 
blocks will look different than the rest of the network. He will split off even alone 
. . . so if you have two of these 10 people, then these two split off, and 8 stay . . . 
so there's no majority vote necessarily. [Fabian Volgelsteller, interview #27] 
To give an example, Bitcoin Cash split from Bitcoin on August 1, 2017, over a 
disagreement concerning the means required to improve Bitcoin’s transaction processing 
speed. This is known as the scalability issue. Proposed solutions included implementing 
SegWit 2X17 (BIP #91) and increasing the Bitcoin block size limit to include more 
transactions per block. While the first proposal received nearly 100 per cent support from 
                                                 
17
 Segregated Witness (SegWit) is a solution to the scalability problem proposed in BIP#91 and, 
subsequently, by BIP #141 via BIP #9 activation. SegWit proposes that Bitcoin transaction data be 
segmented in two. By restructuring the data removing the unlocking signature ("witness" data) from the 
original transaction data and appending it as a separate layer, a Bitcoin block will be able to almost double 
its capacity. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SegWit, accessed April 2018] 
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Bitcoin miners (see Figure 10) and was scheduled for activation, those in favor of the 
second proposal followed a hard fork (i.e., a new software version) and became Bitcoin 
Cash, a separate DAO. Bitcoin Gold, meanwhile, was created as a result of another hard 
fork on October 24, 2017, which involved an attempt to restore GPU mining18, which had 
been replaced by the expensive specialist mining hardware, ASIC19. By changing the 
algorithm, a new DAO was created. As explained in the Bitcoin Gold (2017) white paper, 
“[a] blockchain hard fork occurs when a block is mined that does not comply with the 
network consensus rules” (Btcgpu.org). 
Figure 10 Percentage of Blocks Signaling SegWit Support from Miners 
 
To conclude, while disagreements in traditional organizations tend to be resolved through 
social and political means, for DAOs like Bitcoin, dissension means “the split of the 
                                                 
18
 GPU (or graphics processing unit) mining is a much more efficient way of mining Bitcoin using graphic 
cards.   
19
 ASIC (application-specific integrated circuit) is mining hardware specifically designed for Bitcoin 
mining. It is a circuit and not typically capable of general computing in the sense of a “computer”. ASIC is 
computing-power intensive and a cause of concern for mining centralization.  
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universe,” according to Nick Johnson, Ethereum Core Developer and EIP author. 
“Basically, the hard fork is the upgrade process and, in many ways, similar to a regular 
software upgrade process. But the difference [is] that everyone has to upgrade and 
anyone who doesn't team up ends up with the version of the chain without the upgrade. 
(interview # 26) 
The split of universe resulting from disagreements can also mean organizational 
innovation and change for DAOs.  
I think one of the strength[s] [of] blockchains is the ability to split . . . [It] is a sign 
as the health of the community is how well it's able to come to consensus . . . 
When people really do have fundamental disagreements, they can resolve them by 
going off on their own and starting their own system or continuing the old system 
as the case may be . . . A sign of the health of the community is how well it's able 
to come to consensus. So sometimes [there] will be irreconcilable differences, but 
in a healthy community that happens as little as possible. [Nick Johnson, 
Ethereum Core Developer and EIP author, interview #26] 
Johnson added, “hard forks are pretty much the only way we can institute change, then 
we can add new features and that we can change the system . . . soft forks are proven to 
be effectively impossible and it also much more restrictive in terms of what they can 
achieve” (interview #26). 
 In fact, some even consider forking as the only way a DAO like Bitcoin can 
innovate: “We can replace the words ‘hard fork’ and ‘soft fork’ with ‘software upgrade.’ 
They're the only ways to innovate inside Bitcoin (or any other mined cryptocurrency), 
and they're necessary when making changes that either aren't backwards compatible (hard 
fork) or are (soft fork). [Tenaka Khan, Bitcoin developer and BIP author, interview #25] 
4.2.7 Integrating Consensus at Varying Levels: the Organizational 
Level 
While task integration in traditional settings focuses on rules and processes designed, in 
large part, by managers (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Stan & 
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Puranam, 2016), Bitcoin network validation and protocol update tasks are integrated by 
miners, a brand new class of paid stakeholders incentivized by cryptocurrency tokens. 
An important defining feature of cryptocurrency is the economic value of the tokens used 
to exchange value (Ryan Zurrer, Polychain Capital, interview #30). Given that 
cryptocurrency tokens are also offered as an incentive to network validators, high 
security requirements are fundamental. This can be achieved through the implementation 
of the consensus protocol—the cryptocurrency network will have to be in complete 
agreement to reach distributed consensus (Jeremy Rand, Namecoin Core Developer, 2018 
Interview #31) The fact that token holders overlap with network validators and users 
provides a mechanism by which distributed consensus may be integrated at varying 
levels. 
4.2.8 Decentralization is a Continuum 
It is important to note that the decentralization of decision making at the organizational 
level is relative. Recently, a decision was made by a small group of members to suspend 
the scheduled implementation of SegWit 2X20.  
Prior to [SegWit2X] cancelation, it had enough miner support to be activated. 
Support obviously fell dramatically after the release was cancelled. ‘Lack of 
consensus’ in this case basically means a perceived lack of consensus, without 
any hard numbers to back it up ... There wasn’t much discussion on it and no 
decisions were made through its BIP [#144]. [Tenaka Khan, Bitcoin developer 
and BIP author, interview # 25] 
                                                 
20
 The suspension was announced on November 8, 2017, in an email written by Mike Belshe, one of the 
leaders of the SegWit2X project. He wrote: "Unfortunately, it is clear that we have not built sufficient 
consensus for a clean block size upgrade at this time. Continuing on the current path could divide the 
community and be a setback to Bitcoin’s growth. This was never the goal of SegWit2X…Until then, we are 
suspending our plans for the upcoming 2MB upgrade." (https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-
segwit2x/2017-November/000685.html, accessed December 2017) 
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Although SegWit2X was supported by 95 per cent of the miners, it was canceled due to a 
lack of consensus among the sponsors21 and developers of the project. A concern about 
the possibility of the highly contentious hard fork dividing the Bitcoin community and 
fear of subsequent market destabilization were the main reasons behind the suspension. 
Thus, miners, developers, and the rest of the network may not always arrive at the same 
decision. The presence of centralized sponsors or foundations associated with a 
cryptocurrency can mitigate the magnitude of decentralized decision making.  
Decisions on code modification by developers and miners can diverge in similar ways: 
[Y]ou could have all the miners wanting to double the mining reward and the . . . 
software implementers (developers) would go, no, that’s a bad idea for the 
network. We’d refuse. As long as you have a limited number of clients and a 
limited number of people working on those, then there's going to be some degree 
of centralization . . . On the other hand, if . . . you preach you really wanted [it] 
and it was not a terrible idea they knew could drive it forward even if you are . . . 
a complete outsider. So you propose an idea and if it seems like a good one and it 
will get implemented. If it's like, well this is good, but low priority you could put 
your own effort into implementing it yourself. And if you do the work you'll get 
the feature pretty much because even though it seems like [a] good idea and 
you've done for us. So great ([Nick Johnson, interview #26] 
In the next chapter, I will examine more closely determinants of the degree of 
decentralized decision making. 
4.3 Conclusions from the Pilot Case Study 
As a pilot study, this chapter drew on the example of Bitcoin in order to lay out a 
foundational understanding of DAO coordination. My findings reveal the following 
observations. First, separate levels define the two types of tasks performed by DAOs like 
                                                 
21
 The SegWit2X project is sponsored by various industry start-ups, such as the enterprise blockchain 
technology company Bloq, wallet providers Blockchain and BitGo, and mining hardware provider Bitmain. 
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Bitcoin, namely, network validation and protocol update. Second, the two types of tasks 
are coordinated by distributed consensus mechanisms and integrated through mining. 
Third, consensus mechanisms need to be studied at the corresponding levels at which 
tasks are performed—the blockchain and protocol levels versus the peer-to-peer network 
level. Fourth, complex interactions exist between these levels and influence 
organizational decision making. Finally, decentralization of strategic decision making at 
the organizational level needs to be studied as a continuum. I will delve into these 
concepts and examine their implications for growth in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5 Research Design 
5 Research Design* 
* This chapter draws heavily from the front end of my paper, “The Rise of Decentralized 
Autonomous Organizations: New Forms of Task Coordination and the Growth of 
Cryptocurrencies,” co-authored with Dr. Jean-Philippe Vergne. The paper is currently in the 
first round of revision-and-resubmission (R&R) with Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ). 
Building on the Bitcoin pilot study discussed in Chapter 4, I will now examine a range of 
blockchain-based cryptocurrency DAOs and perform a comparative study across multiple 
cases. The goal of this chapter is to provide a fine-grained picture and generalizable 
framework of how various coordination mechanisms work within DAOs, in order to 
answer the central research question identified, namely:  
How are DAOs coordinated to enable growth? 
To answer this question, I conducted fsQCA following a three-stage design. The first 
stage of the study extended the preliminary findings from the pilot study and identified 
important features of task coordination within DAOs through 16 semi-structured 
interviews with DAO founders and core developers, as well as through specialized 
archival sources such as industry reports, expert blogs, and white papers. I also attended 
11 industry conferences22 to conduct field observations and informally engage with 
insiders. I thickly described and elaborated upon concepts of consensus mechanisms at 
the blockchain and protocol versus peer-to-peer network levels by reconnecting them to 
recent theory that argues that coordination is about achieving accountability, 
predictability, and common understanding (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009).  
In the second stage, based on these findings, I sampled 20 DAOs in the cryptocurrency 
industry that differ in terms of how they coordinate such tasks as transaction verification, 
maintenance of the public ledger, and the rewarding of internal stakeholders along the 
                                                 
22
 My co-researcher attended some of these conferences to conduct separate observations. 
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previously identified dimensions of consensus mechanisms at various levels and 
decentralization of strategy making. I then conducted fsQCA using archival data to 
understand which configurations of task coordination features foster DAO growth (or 
decline).  
Finally, in a third stage, I triangulated the fsQCA results and fleshed these out in light of 
a second wave of interview data (n=10). Based on this inductive study, three propositions 
were formulated to outline a theory of DAO coordination. Figure 11 outlines the three-
stage design. 
Figure 11 The Three-Stage Research Design 
 
5.1 Study Stage #1: How Are DAOs Coordinated? 
5.1.1 Method 
Building on the findings of the pilot study in Chapter 4, Stage #1 allowed me to 
inductively obtain a deep understanding of how DAOs are coordinated by consensus 
mechanisms. From multiple data sources, I identified key characteristics and 
distinguishing features of DAO coordination. To begin, I reviewed: 15 cryptocurrency 
white papers; over 150 industry reports, articles, and academic papers; and 10 books 
authored by experts on Bitcoin, blockchain technology, and cryptocurrency. I also 
reviewed the primary websites of 20 cryptocurrencies to delve into the technology, use 
cases, and special features of each cryptocurrency. These technical, industry, and 
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research documents laid the foundation for my understanding of how cryptocurrencies 
work in general, and how they vary in terms of design and task coordination.  
I then conducted 16 semi-structured interviews to delve further into DAO design and task 
coordination. The interviewees included cryptocurrency founders who are also lead 
developers, directors of cryptocurrency foundations, network validators, and blockchain 
start-up founders in the FinTech industry. These are industry experts who have direct 
experience in creating, developing, or managing DAOs in the cryptocurrency industry. 
Each interview lasted 60 to 90 minutes. The questions asked focused on coordination and 
decision making, as well as on the design philosophy and evaluation of cryptocurrencies. 
In particular, I asked questions related to the origins, processes, and consequences of 
different types of coordination among stakeholders (e.g., how algorithms affect the 
DAO’s accountability vis-à-vis stakeholders; how developers and miners coordinate on 
code modifications; how stakeholders make decisions and come to agreements; and, how 
decentralization can be implemented).  
Finally, my co-researcher and I participated in 11 cryptocurrency conferences and 
workshops, during which I extensively observed and engaged with industry insiders in a 
more informal manner. I tap into these data to provide a thick description of how DAOs 
are coordinated. 
5.1.2 Findings 
5.1.2.1 Machine Consensus Based on Machine Routines at the 
Blockchain and Protocol Levels 
As noted in Chapter 4, at their core, DAOs rely on machine routines (as opposed to 
human routines) (Antonopoulos, 2014) that are written in the blockchain, protocol, and 
scripting code to coordinate network validation tasks. For instance, Bitcoin’s blockchain 
software entails a set of routines governing the “competitive bookkeeping” process, 
known as “mining” (Yermack, 2017: 13). In this process, voluntary network validators 
(“miners”) try to guess a very long random number to provide a PoW to the system and 
obtain the chance to earn a reward in the form of Bitcoin currency (Nian & Lee, 2015: 8). 
Proof-of-work mining is not dissimilar to gold mining, in that it resembles the process of 
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“gold miners expending resources to add gold to circulation”—except that for mining 
bitcoins, they expend computing power to validate user transactions and record them in 
the ledger (Nakamoto, 2008: 4). Machine routines also require that, at any point in time, 
the true ledger must be the one containing the largest amount of “proven work” (in the 
form of previously expended computing power).  
As a result, the Bitcoin DAO makes it much more expensive for potentially malicious 
users to tamper with the blockchain history (e.g., by adding 1,000 units of Bitcoin 
currency to their account) than to play by the rules. A past block cannot be edited without 
redoing all of the PoW leading up to the current one—a process that would not go 
unnoticed and that would be prohibitively expensive in terms of hardware and electricity. 
Thus, when it comes to processing, validating, and recording user transactions in a secure 
way, “any needed rules and incentives can be enforced with this consensus mechanism” 
that tells network validators what the true state of the ledger is (Nakamoto, 2008: 8). 
Following industry experts, I call this set of automated coordination mechanisms based 
on machine routines machine consensus mechanisms, defined as self-executing formal 
software protocols that define and implement rules, routines, and incentives for 
organizational participants to follow (Lopp, 2016; BlockchainHub.net, 2017). Machine 
consensus, for instance, makes it unnecessary to coordinate teams of employees whose 
primary task is the manual reconciliation of transaction balances that do not match across 
ledgers maintained by different financial institutions.  
I will now discuss two core dimensions of machine consensus along which DAOs in the 
cryptocurrency industry can differ substantially. Based on interview data and documents, 
I identified security and stability mechanisms as the foundational elements that support 
the exchange of value in a peer-to-peer, open network that does not rely on trusted 
intermediaries or personal identity. Subsequent investigation of these dimensions allowed 
me to capture variation in machine consensus across the DAOs in our fsQCA analysis.   
Machine Consensus #1: Providing security. A common feature across DAOs in the 
cryptocurrency industry is the provision of a peer-to-peer, decentralized, open payment 
system powered by cryptocurrency tokens which reward miners for their work. Since 
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financial transactions are involved, to operate effectively DAOs must ensure that 
cybersecurity is maximal and that record immutability is guaranteed—otherwise users 
will simply look for alternatives. Two broad categories of machine consensus 
mechanisms are implemented to coordinate security provision. As Jackson Palmer, co-
founder and lead developer of Dogecoin (interview #9), explains, 
The number one thing you want to look at with any DAO is how it secures the 
network. The network ultimately has to be secured through proof of something. 
Earlier coins had [PoW] via mining, which [relies on] intense computing. Some 
coins moved to [PoS] … Obviously the people that carry the greatest consensus in 
the network are those who own the highest stake.  
In contrast to PoW, PoS consumes little external energy, and correlates the probability of 
a network validator’s being chosen to validate the next block with the amount (and 
sometimes age) of the cryptocurrency that the validator holds (Narayanan et al., 2016: 
40-45; 206-211). As Douglas Pike, core developer and co-founder of Vericoin puts it,  
A lot of [PoS network security] depends on the value of the coin. If the coin has a 
very high value. [. . .] it is much more secure because it’s more costly to gain 
majority control of the network [. . . ] In both cases, the consensus is protected by 
cost, and it greatly depends on the value of the coin in [PoS], and greatly depends 
on the difficulty level in [PoW] mining (interview # 12). 
Although industry insiders hold different views on the effectiveness of PoW as opposed 
to PoS, the general belief is that expending external resources (electricity or capital) is 
necessary to coordinate security provision because it anchors the network to exogenous 
factors that insiders cannot control. 
Machine consensus #2: Ensuring stability. Since DAOs in the cryptocurrency industry 
are open organizations that anybody can join and leave at will (network validators 
included), characteristics such as network size or transaction validation speed change 
constantly, thereby affecting how quickly transactions are processed. Indeed, 
“decentralized things are hard to stabilize, just by the fact that they’re decentralized” 
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(Patrick Noskar, founder of Vericoin, interview #6, 2016). Thus, to remain stable, DAOs 
must have the capacity to adjust autonomously to a changing landscape.  
Bitcoin does this by automatically adjusting mining difficulty (i.e., the difficulty of 
guessing the random numbers) every 14 days to reset the target of an average transaction-
processing time of ten minutes. As the mining difficulty increases, “the coin distribution . 
. . mimics the distribution pattern of a precious metal . . . As you dig up more and more, it 
becomes more scarce,” according to Palmer (interview #9). The machine routines in 
charge of adjusting mining difficulty also stabilize the speed of new coin issuance (i.e., 
inflation) by taking into account factors such as the overall network’s computing power, 
the size of miners’ rewards, and transaction-processing times. 
These dynamic adjustments, governed by publicly auditable algorithms, determine the 
stability of rewards earned by network validators. While more frequent adjustments can 
jeopardize validators’ ability to earn cryptocurrency rewards, they also make DAOs more 
responsive to shocks in their environment. Thus, they play an important role in balancing 
efficiency (resource allocation) and effectiveness (maintaining fit between the internal 
and external environments to achieve the DAO’s high-level goals). 
5.1.2.2 Social Consensus Mechanisms based on Multi-Stakeholder 
Consultations at the Peer-to-Peer Network Level 
As noted in Chapter 4, another key layer of task coordination pertains to protocol update 
at the peer-to-peer network level. Lopp (2016) points out that “humans must first decide 
what protocol to run before the machines can enforce it.” In line with industry experts, I 
define social consensus mechanisms as the means by which DAO stakeholders reach an 
agreement about the higher-level DAO protocol (which acts as a strategic plan for the 
organization) (Buterin, 2014; Lopp, 2016). DAO software is open source and thus fully 
disclosed for auditing, testing, and improvement purposes; as a consequence, the multi-
stakeholder consultation around DAOs is coordinated in ways comparable to those which 
characterize OSSD projects (O’Mahony & Lakhani, 2011).  
In order to fix bugs, to implement new code, or to release a new version of the software 
(a “fork”), DAOs rely on formal and informal community voting processes. For example, 
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Bitcoin uses BIPs to discuss and align developers’ and miners’ expectations. A BIP 
serves as a formalized technical design document that proposes new features or 
documents decisions (GitHub BIPs, 2018). As noted in Chapter 4, coordination around 
BIPs involves developers proposing code modifications that miners vote on by adding a 
record of their decision into the blockchain. While the BIP author defines the threshold, 
the rule of thumb suggests that a majority vote in favor of the proposal, representing at 
least 55 per cent of the DAO’s computing power, leads to the adoption of the proposal.  
When network validators, representing 95 per cent of the DAO’s computing power, have 
implemented the software update, the proposal is considered “activated.” Any developer 
can propose a new BIP, and anyone can become a Bitcoin developer. Note, however, that 
not all DAOs in the cryptocurrency industry have formal voting mechanisms such as 
BIPs. In some cases, developers rely on informal communication channels such as 
forums to discuss protocol changes with the community. Unless a majority of network 
validators is willing to implement the change by updating their software, however, 
proposals for protocol change are bound to remain at the draft stage.  
I will now discuss two core dimensions of social consensus over which DAOs in the 
cryptocurrency industry tend to differ substantially. An examination of these dimensions 
subsequently allowed us to capture variations in social consensus mechanisms across 
DAOs in the fsQCA analyses.   
Stakeholder discussions. The role of social consensus mechanisms is to facilitate 
agreement within and between developers and miners, and amongst the broader 
community (e.g., users and merchants who accept the cryptocurrency as payments). 
Developers play a key role in the community and are trusted by its members in terms of 
their capabilities to drive and implement code modifications (Narayanan et al., 2016). 
Without substantial and frequent developer contributions, DAO development may, 
according to James Lovejoy, core developer of Verticoin, become “hemorrhaged” 
(interview #5). Looking back at the challenges he faced as a developer, Lovejoy 
remarked: “If you want the coin to grow and expand . . . active development is probably 
one of the more important things . . . There are a number of ideas of things people wanted 
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to develop. It really required a lot more time and thought than people had available or 
were willing to give” (interview #5). 
 While it is important that numerous developers contribute to stakeholder 
discussions so that a DAO can gain exposure to a variety of new and innovative ideas, it 
is even more crucial for the community to be mature enough to converge on a subset of 
these ideas and to move on to implement them. An important indicator of the 
community’s ability and willingness to do so is reflected in their code development 
activities on the repository. According to David Cohen, executive and business 
development director at the Blackcoin Foundation, “people will go to look at the GitHub 
and see how frequently commits are being made to the code, so you see that there's  . . .  
active development and meaningful . . . ongoing work being done. That creates trust” 
(David Cohen, interview #7). 
Validators’ commitment. Network validators signal their commitment to a DAO by 
devoting computing power to its blockchain. Without their continued support, a DAO 
cannot evolve and is bound to fail due to questionable security (e.g., bugs are not fixed) 
or competition (e.g., competitors improve their operations at a faster pace to leverage 
network effects). As Cassini (pseudonym of a miner, interview #16) explains, “usually, 
it’s the developers who make proposals or decisions. But in the end, it boils down to the 
miners. If they don’t follow the ideas of the developers, then they turn to other ventures.” 
In other words, validators’ commitment to the project is essential if social consensus at 
the organizational level is to be reached; this represents a major difference between 
DAOs and OSSD projects (which do not rely on network validators). Jeremy Rand, the 
core developer of Namecoin (interview #15), recalled how Namecoin developers tried to 
obtain validators’ consent to activate a software upgrade proposed in BIP#66 to solve a 
vulnerability issue. 23 
                                                 
23
 Namecoin closely follows Bitcoin’s development proposal, since Namecoin is built on the Bitcoin 
source code and can be mined using the same hardware (i.e., “merge mined” alongside Bitcoin). 
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We haven’t yet activated BIP66 [. . .], so we’re vulnerable. And so we 
immediately contacted all of the mining pools and said, hey, you need to upgrade 
to the latest version ASAP. And most of the mining pools were fairly quick to 
respond. But we were not able to quickly contact sufficient hash power to reach 
the 95 per cent threshold that’s needed to activate a soft fork, so we were hovering 
around 92 per cent [. . .] After about a week or so, we were still having no luck 
reaching the last seven or eight percent of hash power, and finally [. . .] F2Pool 
contacted us [. . .] [with] enough hash power [. . . ] We can activate that soft fork 
right now without waiting for the other miners to do their thing.  
It follows that machine consensus and social consensus occur at different but overlapping 
timescales. On the one hand, each entry on the blockchain ledger is an instantiation of 
machine consensus and only protocol updates (e.g., changes proposed through BIPs) 
require social consensus; on the other hand, validators’ commitment (as one dimension of 
social consensus) is required for both payment validation and protocol update, thus plays 
a dual role concurrently in integrating the two tasks. It should also be noted that network 
validators form a new class of stakeholders that has never existed before, either in 
traditional corporations or in distributed organizations such as OSSD projects. 
5.1.2.3 Decentralization of Strategy Making  
The origins of DAOs may be traced to the desire to remove the need for central authority. 
At the organizational level, both machine consensus and social consensus mechanisms 
operate in a decentralized fashion. However, certain organizational design elements 
create variation in the extent to which strategy making is decentralized. Thus, while 
traditional corporations typically rely on hierarchy to coordinate high-level activities, 
DAOs rely on decentralized strategy making. However, as noted in Chapter 4, 
decentralization is best seen as a continuum insofar as a DAOs’ coordination structure 
revolves around an “uneasy but inevitable and necessary alliance of decentralization with 
centralization” (Cohen, interview #7). Cohen uses Ethereum as an example:  
On the one hand, [Ethereum] to a great extent has been incredibly successful at 
offering a very decentralized approach. But there is the Ethereum Foundation, 
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there are known personalities, Vitalik Buterin and Vlad Zamfir and so forth, who 
are out there and . . .the respect that they've garnered, you know, for their 
judgement and intelligence carries a lot of weight and is very helpful in reassuring 
mainstream institutional players that this is not just a bunch of crazy geeks 
operating in some haphazard way . . . So in that sense you have centralization 
within decentralization.  
Specific coordination mechanisms within particular DAOs can mitigate the extent to 
which they are decentralized in the following ways. First, some DAOs have active 
foundations—typically, not-for-profit organizations composed of developers, managers, 
and community members serving on a voluntary basis. The goals of DAO foundations 
include user education, adoption by merchants, business development, expansion of the 
user base, branding, and strategic actions such as political lobbying (Andrew Vegetabile, 
director of the Litecoin Association, interview #4, 2016). Additionally, an important role 
of the foundation is to establish trust with the community:  
[The foundation] was an attempt to bring legitimacy and human faces . . . How 
can you trust a coin where you don't know who any of these people are, like, who 
could disappear or do anything at any time, and that's not a very friendly and 
transparent impression it makes on the public.  [David Cohen, executive and 
business development director at the Blackcoin Foundation, interview #7] 
While foundations remain independent of cryptocurrency founders and core developers to 
avoid conflicts of interest, there is a constant dialogue between the two sides. This serves 
to to align interests, limiting the extent to which a DAO is decentralized when it comes to 
strategic decision making (interview #7, 2016).  
Second, for some DAOs (e.g., Bitcoin and Peercoin), the real-world identity of the co-
founder(s) is unknown, which removes any association between the DAO and a 
leadership figure that can be consulted for strategic direction. Thus, DAOs with 
anonymous or pseudonymous co-founders (e.g., Bitcoin) tend to be more decentralized 
and autonomous.  
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Third, DAOs can have various design philosophies, ranging from the promotion of 
distributed social innovation (e.g., Namecoin, Dogecoin, Peercoin) to business 
development (e.g., Dash, Ethereum). A business-oriented development philosophy, for 
instance, entails the creation of specific positions and roles aimed at growing the user 
network to secure a competitive advantage in the cryptocurrency industry. By contrast, 
DAOs with an innovation-oriented philosophy leverage decentralization for the greater 
good, with minimal centralized control (Patrick Noskar, founder of Vericoin, interview 
#6, 2016; Sunny King, co-founder of Peercoin, interview #3, 2016). For example, while 
expressing his lack of interest in adopting a “mainstream business model” by providing 
Namecoin domain names through a central server, Daniel Kraft, lead developer of 
Namecoin (interview #8, 2016), stated: “We don’t want to endorse such a system, even if 
it could simplify and bring users [together] ... I think that the philosophy of not just me 
but also other main contributors in the community is that we don’t want that. We want to 
really be decentralized.”  
As a result, while decentralization represents the formative logic of DAOs in the 
cryptocurrency industry, the degree of decentralization at the organizational level tends to 
vary. Figure 5.2 summarizes our discussion thus far and provides an example of how task 
coordination differs between DAOs and traditional corporations.  
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Figure 12 Task coordination within Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) 
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5.2 Study Stage #2: The Growth Implications of Task 
Coordination Patterns 
5.2.1 Method: Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) 
Building on my findings from Stage #1, Stage #2 examines the interplay between various 
forms of consensus mechanisms managed under different degrees of decentralization of 
strategy making and explores how they jointly explain DAO growth (or decline). For 
emerging complex social phenomena, relationships between constructs are often “better 
understood in terms of set-theoretic relations rather than correlations” (Fiss, 2011: 395; 
Ragin, 2008: 2; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 1–3). A set-theoretic approach is both a 
methodological and an analytical tool that identifies which configurations of conditions 
are necessary or sufficient to obtain an outcome (Ragin & Fiss, 2008: 190). A necessary 
condition is one that must be present for the outcome to take place. In other words, 
without the necessary condition, it is impossible to obtain the outcome. A sufficient 
condition is a one that produces the outcome. FsQCA has the ability to disentangle the 
complexity underpinning poorly theorized social phenomena, especially when they 
involve “equifinality, conjunctural causation, and causal asymmetry” (Ragin, 2008; Fiss, 
2011; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012)24. This methodology has been increasingly used in 
recent management research to explain outcomes of strategic importance, e.g., firm 
adaptation (Vergne & Depeyre, 2016), organizational typologies (Fiss, 2011), and 
decoupling (Crilly, Zollo & Hansen, 2012). In the context of this study, fsQCA helps to 
connect the various configurations of coordination mechanisms observed at various levels 
and decentralization with the growth (or decline) of DAOs in the cryptocurrency 
industry. 
                                                 
24
 Equifinality arises in situations in which the same outcome can be produced by different configurations 
of conditions, a situation commonly observed in organizational design research (Gresov & Drazin, 1997; 
Puranam et al., 2014). Conjunctural causation refers to the idea that outcomes are rarely the product of 
single conditions taken independently, but, rather, are produced by configurations involving multiple 
conditions. Causal asymmetry is the idea that the conditions leading to the presence of an outcome differ 
from those leading to the absence of the outcome (Fiss, 2011; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 78,198), i.e., 
DAO growth and decline may be underpinned by different factors. 
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5.2.1.1 Organizational Configurations 
Methodologically, configurations have been identified as a useful approach to study 
organizational designs as clusters of attributes (such as ideal types and typologies) (Miles 
& Snow, 1978; Mintzberg, 1979; Puranam et al., 2014; Doty, et al., 1993; Fiss, 2007; 
Meyer, Tsui & Hinings, 1993). A configurational approach is appropriate to the study of 
within-form variations, because it unpacks how organizations of the same form can be 
configured differently to achieve growth (Puranam et al., 2014). Different structural 
configurations can be equally effective, thus leading to the aforementioned idea of 
equifinality (Gresov & Drazin, 1997; Puranam et al., 2014). Okhuysen & Bechky (2009) 
note that those integrating conditions for coordination—accountability, predictability, and 
common understanding are “necessary but not always sufficient” for coordination. In 
addition, the relationships between the three conditions are highly context specific. They 
can coexist, work as complements, or work as substitutes together (Okhuysen & Bechky, 
2009). A hypothesis-testing approach will not be appropriate for capturing this 
complexity. These limitations further reinforce the validity of using fsQCA to study 
coordination mechanisms as configurations. 
5.2.1.2 Sampling Strategy 
I selected 20 cryptocurrencies founded between 2009, when Bitcoin was first introduced, 
and early 2015, when we started to collect data. The sampling is stratified by period. My 
dataset includes: one cryptocurrency founded before 2010 (Bitcoin); three founded 
between 2011 and 2013, when the industry was still in its infancy and had not achieved 
mainstream public visibility; seven founded in 2013, when the industry underwent a 
period of steep growth; eight founded in 2014; and one founded in early 2015. For each 
period, I randomly selected a number of cryptocurrencies in proportion to the prevailing 
founding rate in the industry in order to obtain a balanced and representative sample. I 
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selected cryptocurrencies within the top 200 in terms of market capitalization, which 
together account for over 99 per cent of the industry’s total value. 25 
The sampled cryptocurrencies vary in terms of their coordination mechanisms. For 
example, 13 use PoW as their primary consensus algorithm, five use PoS, and two are 
hybrids (i.e., they use both PoW and PoS). The 20 cryptocurrencies also vary in terms of 
their degree of decentralization. As of May 2017, the 20 cryptocurrencies sampled 
accounted for about 70 per cent of the industry’s total market capitalization. 
5.2.1.3 Overview of the Data and Conditions Included in the fsQCA 
Analyses 
I chose to study growth in the first two quarters that followed each cryptocurrency’s 
founding. This choice was motivated by two reasons. First, most failed cryptocurrencies 
disappear within six months, so this time frame appears to be a critical threshold a fact 
confirmed by. In fact, industry insiders confirmed that the first two quarters were crucial. 
One interviewee, Douglas Pike, stated, “I would say if you’re not meeting your goals 
within three to six months, you’re not going to get them.” (interview #12) Second, while 
comparing DAOs founded at different times allowed me to examine a representative 
sample of the cryptocurrency industry’s early years, it also came a drawback, given that I 
was not studying a cohort. This meant that, at any given point in time, the sampled 
cryptocurrencies were in different stages of their idiosyncratic trajectories (i.e., they were 
not the same “age”). Thus, II remedied this potential issue by examining them all during 
the first six months of their existence, thereby making them comparable.  
 I collected longitudinal archival data on market transactions, network validation, 
and developer activity from leading specialist websites, code repositories, and executive 
                                                 
25
 The sample includes cryptocurrencies that are currently active (e.g., Bitcoin, Litecoin, Dogecoin), ones 
that are declining (e.g., Zetacoin, Megacoin), and those that became inactive over time (e.g., Paycoin, 
XCurrency). During the observation period, three cryptocurrencies fell outside of the top 200, so our 
sample contains a balanced set of cases with substantial variance in terms of growth. Following prior 
research (Wang & Vergne, 2017, Ong, Lee, Li, & Lee, 2015: 85), I excluded cryptocurrencies that were 
obvious scams from the sampling pool. 
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interviews.26 I also obtained blockchain-level data from technical documents such as 
cryptocurrency white papers. I coded variations of each sampled DAO’s design based on 
our qualitative interviews with co-founders and lead developers. 
Building on the results of the first stage of the study, I developed and calibrated an 
indicator for DAO growth and indicators for each of the three sets of coordination 
mechanisms identified. In line with my findings, I captured machine consensus 
mechanisms using two indicators: security provision and stability provision. I captured 
social consensus mechanisms using two indicators of the depth and breadth of 
stakeholder discussions, and one indicator of validators’ commitment. Finally, I created a 
tridimensional indicator of the decentralization of strategy making, which takes into 
account such factors as: the design philosophy of the DAO; whether its co-founders are 
known; and, whether it works with a foundation. 
5.2.1.4 Outcome Calibration: DAO Growth (and Decline) 
For DAOs, attracting new users rapidly is vital for generating positive network effects to 
kick-start organizational growth (e.g., the more users a DAO has, the more secure its 
network becomes, and the more attractive it becomes to new users) (Gandal & 
Halaburda, 2016). Users drive up demand for a cryptocurrency by conducting 
transactions (Narayanan et al., 2016: 171–173; Ong et al., 2015: 82–90). As Pike 
explained, 
The goal is at some point you break into an actual currency closed loop where [. . 
.] people get their currency, and then they buy something with it, and then that 
merchant [. . .] buys something with it, and then [. . .] you’ve created a new 
currency in a full loop. [. . . ] It’s very hard to get to that point, but that’s the end 
goal. [. . .] Once the coin is released, most of the development and feature releases 
also occur and those typically happen within, you know, six months. There is this 
                                                 
26
 Web data sources include: https://bitinfocharts.com; https://coingecko.com/; 
www.coinwarz.com/cryptocurrency; coinmarketcap.com; and, https://github.com. Various academic papers 
and book chapters have used CoinGecko’s data to compare cryptocurrencies (e.g., Ong et al., 2015). 
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new shiny object dynamic [. . .] [serving as] an opportunity [for cryptocurrencies] 
to gain value, gain users, to reach more people when you’re new and you’re shiny. 
And then once that wears off it’s much more difficult to meet your goals 
(interview #12). 
 I calculated DAO growth based on the number of user transactions that took place 
during the first two quarters after the founding of the DAO. I measured DAO growth by 
looking at transaction growth between the first and second quarters (Q1 and Q2 
respectively) of the cryptocurrency’s existence: 
𝐷𝐴𝑂 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ (𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒) =
 
Average number of unique transactions per day in Q2−Average number of unique transactions per day in Q1
Average number of unique transactions per day in Q1
  
A positive sign indicates growth. A negative sign indicates decline. In terms of the 
fsQCA calibration, the crossover point for growth and decline is clear cut: I set the 
calibrated condition to 0.5 for growth rates equal to 0. A twofold increase in transactions 
can be considered fast growth that outperforms that of most newly created 
cryptocurrencies, so to growth rates greater than 100 per cent, I allocated a score of 1. I 
allocated a score of 0 when the rate of decrease was 100 per cent.  
5.2.1.5 Explanatory Conditions 
I calibrated all explanatory conditions using Q1 data to explain growth outcomes from 
Q1 to Q2 in order to account for the lagged effect of coordination on growth and to 
enhance explanatory power. The paragraphs that follow outline my calibration strategy 
for each explanatory condition; related technical details about measurement can be found 
in Appendix F. 
Machine consensus mechanisms 
Security provision. Within DAOs, cryptographic proof is supposed to rely mostly on 
external resources to provide security. Proof-of-work mining’s external resource 
requirements in the form of electricity help DAOs achieve higher security and reliability 
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by increasing the cost of attacking the network or of tampering with the records stored in 
the ledger. The more secure the DAO’s network, the more predictable organizational task 
coordination will be. On the other hand, because PoS algorithms rely primarily on capital 
internalized within the DAO (i.e., existing cryptocurrency holdings), they offer an 
alternative that is more energy efficient but potentially less secure (i.e., insiders might be 
able to influence cryptocurrency prices but not electricity prices). To capture the 
difference, I coded the extent to which a DAO uses PoW. A cryptocurrency relying more 
on PoW was assigned a score above 0.5: a cryptocurrency relying more on PoS was 
assigned a score below 0.5. 
Stability provision. As noted earlier, machine consensus algorithms adjust themselves 
regularly to adapt to changing conditions in the environment (e.g., variations in 
transaction-processing speed). The key variable here is the extent to which the difficulty 
level set for network validators (e.g., miners) fluctuates. More fluctuation makes a DAO 
more responsive to shocks in its environment (thereby enhancing stability and 
effectiveness), but it can jeopardize network validators’ ability to earn cryptocurrency 
rewards (thereby potentially creating inefficiencies in resource allocation). Using data 
from Coinwarz.com on difficulty fluctuation over 14-day periods, I calibrated the 0.5 
anchor based on the median variance of normalized bi-weekly difficulty values in Q1. 
Scores greater (lower) than 0.5 indicate higher (lower) levels of stability provision.  
Social consensus mechanisms 
The OSSD literature examines developers’ engagement and efforts in relation to 
subprojects to capture coordination at the individual level (Dahlander & O’Mahony, 
2011). Building on this insight, and in line with our earlier findings, to capture social 
consensus in a DAO context, I aggregated developers’ and network validators’ activities 
to capture the breadth and depth of stakeholder discussions as well as network validators’ 
commitment to the organization.  
Breadth of stakeholder discussions. I measured the breadth of stakeholder discussions by 
calculating the average number of unique contributors to the code based on each 
cryptocurrency’s open-source code repository on GitHub.com—the largest and most 
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commonly used platform for cryptocurrency software-development projects. Contributors 
can “commit” (i.e., make changes) or propose additions and deletions to the code. The 
median number of contributors—20—was used to set the 0.5 anchor. Scores above 0.5 
indicate a broader involvement of contributors in stakeholder discussions.  
Depth of stakeholder discussions. I measured the depth of stakeholder discussions by 
calculating the average number of additions and deletions to the cryptocurrency source 
code on GitHub. Each of these contributions is typically discussed informally by the 
broader community in online forums such as Reddit. I used GitHub records to proxy their 
depth, because such records represent an objective and exhaustive list of discussion 
topics (i.e., each code modification is time stamped and clearly associated with one 
specific DAO). I set the 0.5 anchor at the median—30,000. Scores above 0.5 indicate a 
deeper involvement of contributors in stakeholder discussions. 
Validator’s commitment. As previously noted, network validators signal their 
commitment to a DAO by devoting computing power to its blockchain. This commitment 
is essential to coordinate a variety of tasks, e.g., voting on proposed changes or activating 
a new software update after reaching a wide consensus. An indicator known as the 
“network hash rate” is readily available on bitinfocharts.com to measure the computing 
power committed by each DAO’s network validators. It refers to the total number of 
calculations per second made by network validators. A higher hash rate implies greater 
commitment by network validators, who, it should be recalled, can choose to opt out 
anytime and instead commit their computing power to a competing DAO. I set the 0.5 
anchor at the median value of the network hash rate—109 hashes per second. Scores 
above 0.5 indicate a stronger commitment of network validators to a given DAO. 
Decentralization of strategy making 
As our findings from this study’s first stage indicate, DAOs that are overseen by 
foundations, that have publicly known (co-)founders, or that have a business-oriented 
design philosophy tend to be less decentralized. I collected data from interviews, 
cryptocurrency websites, and online forums on these three dimensions separately and 
then combined them (Crilly et al., 2012) to calibrate our indicator of centralization of 
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strategy making. The least decentralized DAOs are coded as 1 (and possess all three 
features), while the most decentralized DAOs are coded as 0. 
5.2.2 FsQCA findings: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for 
Growth and Decline 
Out of 20 cryptocurrencies, seven experienced growth and 13 decline in the first six 
months of their respective existences. The fully calibrated dataset is shown in Table 4 
below to enable reproducibility of the findings (Bergh, Sharp, Aguinis & Li, 2017). I ran 
all analyses with the freeware fsQCA 2.5 software package (Ragin & Davey, 2014). 
Table 4 Fs-QCA Calibration Table 
DAO Security 
provision 
Stability 
provision 
Breadth of 
stakeholder 
discussions 
Depth of 
stakeholder 
discussions 
Validators’ 
commitment 
Decentrali
zation  
Transac-
tion 
growth 
(or 
decline) 
Bitcoin 1 0 0.2 0.6 0 0.66 0.4 
Ethereum 0.8 0.33 0.6 1 0.4 0.33 0.8 
Litecoin 0.8 0.66 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.33 0.2 
Paycoin 0 0 0.4 0.2 1 0.66 0.4 
Dogecoin 0.8 0.66 1 1 0.8 0.33 0.2 
Peercoin 0.4 1 0.2 0 0.8 1 0.4 
Namecoin 1 0.66 1 0.6 0.8 0.66 0.4 
Blackcoin 0.2 0 0.4 1 0.4 0.33 0.6 
Novacoin 0.4 0.66 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.49 0.4 
Vericoin 0.2 0 0 0 0.4 0.33 0.4 
Vertcoin 0.8 0.66 1 0.4 0.6 0.49 0.4 
Reddcoin 0.2 0.33 1 1 0.6 0.66 0.4 
Zetacoin 1 0.33 0.8 0.4 1 0.66 0.49 
Dashcoin 0.8 0.33 1 0.8 0.6 0 0.6 
Worldcoin 0.8 0.33 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.33 0.49 
Feather-
coin 0.8 0.66 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.49 0.4 
Quarkcoin 0.8 0.66 0.2 0.2 0.4 1 1 
Megacoin 0.8 0.66 0 0 0.4 0.66 0.8 
Auroracoin 0.8 0.33 0.2 0.8 0.6 0 0.2 
XCurrency 0.2 0 0 0 0.6 0.33 0.4 
I ran four rounds of fsQCA analyses to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for 
both DAO growth and DAO decline. Each round of analysis yielded consistency and 
coverage scores that indicate the reliability of the results. More specifically, “consistency 
indicates the extent to which [DAOs] with high membership in a given solution set 
exhibit similar properties (i.e., consistency can be seen as a measure of a solution’s 
internal validity)”; “coverage indicates the proportion of . . . outcomes explained by a 
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given solution set (e.g., a coverage score of 1 would mean the solution explains all the 
cases” (Vergne & Depeyre, 2016: 11). In line with best practices, I used high thresholds 
for both reliability and proportional reduction in inconsistency (PRI) scores when 
searching for necessary and sufficient conditions (Ragin, 2008). Specifically, I used a 
0.90 cutoff in consistency for all conditions, and PRI thresholds of 0.74 and 0.64 for 
sufficient conditions leading to growth and decline, respectively. No truth table row 
contains true logical contradictions, and I did not make any directional assumptions in the 
logical-minimization procedure, in line with the fact that there was no prior theory on 
DAOs available to guide our analyses. 
I will discuss the configurations identified at this stage in Chapter 6. 
5.3 Study Stage #3: Triangulation and Proposition 
Formation 
Given the novelty of the DAO phenomenon and the fact that the present study is the first 
one to investigate coordination in this context, I felt that it was important to go back into 
the field and conduct a second wave of 10 interviews to triangulate and flesh out some of 
the findings from studies #1 and #2. For this reason, four of the interviews conducted 
during this second wave are follow-ups with respondents previously interviewed during 
study stage #1. These interviews shed additional light on the interpretation of the fsQCA 
results. 
I will discuss the three propositions formulated at this stage in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6 Results 
6 Results* 
* This chapter draws heavily from the results section of my paper, “The Rise of 
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations: New Forms of Task Coordination and the 
Growth of Cryptocurrencies,” co-authored with Dr. Jean-Philippe Vergne. The paper is 
currently in the first round of revision-and-resubmission (R&R) with Administrative 
Science Quarterly (ASQ). 
In this chapter, I discuss the results of the fsQCA analyses detailed in Chapter 5. As is 
often the case, I did not find any necessary conditions with an acceptable consistency 
score—the solutions yielded scores between 0.53 and 0.83, all falling short of the 0.90 
threshold. This simply means that there is no single “recipe” that must be followed every 
time to produce growth (or decline). I did, however, identify sufficient configurations of 
coordination mechanisms leading to DAO growth and decline. Sufficient conditions 
represent alternative paths that produce the same outcome.  
For the sake of conciseness, and in keeping with the exploratory character of the present 
study, Table 5 below depicts configurations with high explanatory power and in which I 
have high confidence. I thus report the so-called “parsimonious solution,” which 
“contains only core conditions that have the strongest evidence linking them to the 
outcomes” (Crilly et al., 2012: 1439; Fiss, 2011) and is independent of the researcher’s 
assumptions about the phenomenon. 27 
                                                 
27
 For similar reasons, the table does not report two configurations with low explanatory power (e.g., low 
unique coverage); the configuration “contains” only one cryptocurrency, thereby raising doubts about its 
generalizability. Blackcoin (growth) and Auroracoin (decline), two small DAOs in the industry, are thus 
not mentioned in the table, but the full results can be reproduced from Table 4 or provided by the authors 
upon request. To obtain growth configurations, I selected the minimum number of “prime implicants” 
required by the software (2) to proceed with the logical minimization—specifically, I chose ~stability 
breadth depth ~decentralization and security stability ~depth decentralization since they represent 
theoretically relevant cases observed frequently in our data. 
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Table 5 Configurations for Early Transaction Growth and Decline 
 
●: Condition is present; ⊗: Condition is absent; *: non-exhaustive list   
6.1 Configurations of Coordination Mechanisms 
Sufficient for DAO Growth (G1 and G2) 
Overall, either a strong use of machine consensus mechanisms combined with 
decentralization of strategy making (G1) or a strong use of social consensus mechanisms 
(G2) needs to be present for DAO growth in the cryptocurrency industry. Quarkcoin and 
Megacoin, which can both be found in G1, kicked off growth by relying on strong 
machine consensus. Founded around the same time in 2013, the two cryptocurrencies 
have a good deal in common. Both are strongly committed to the value of 
decentralization, and in line with this claim, both have pseudonymous co-founders and 
are not overseen by foundations. In addition, both DAOs refused to “pre-mine” 
cryptocurrency, that is, to distribute tokens to core developers and co-founders before the 
official launch date. As Sunny King (pseudonym of Peercoin’s co-founder) explains: “It 
was generally regarded as shady if you ‘pre-mined’ a bunch of coins” (interview #3) 
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because it gave some insiders an unfair advantage over other users. Pre-mining, though, 
can be used successfully to lubricate social relationships by creating a common pool of 
resources shared by a small circle of innovators who know each other and guide 
organizational development. 
This is precisely what happened with Ethereum (G2), one of the most successful DAOs 
to date. Pre-mining can incentivize developers to drive the success of software 
development by providing them with a (future and uncertain) source of income. A 
community member stated that, “it is similar to start-up founders, where the founding 
team has a certain amount of equity, and investors come in only to take a part of it. It is 
not in the interests of investors to leave the founders with nothing” (Ethereum 
Community Forum, 2014). More generally, G2 describes a path to growth that relies on 
strong social consensus. This is not to say that coordination around machine consensus is 
ignored, or that decentralization is inexistent, but simply that the emphasis, relative to 
competitors, is placed on social consensus mechanisms, especially the fostering of broad 
and deep discussions with stakeholders.  
Specifically, the DAOs that took this path (G2) relied on a large community of 
developers, which they nurtured using a less decentralized approach than their G1 
counterparts. For instance, they are concerned with project development and provide 
developer support—much as Google did in the early days of the Android operating 
system designed for smartphones. Launched in 2015, Ethereum managed to build 
considerable awareness among users and developers in relation to its core innovation, 
namely the ability to implement self-executing “smart contracts” within the blockchain. 
As a result of strategic decision making and with the goal of mainstream adoption, 
Ethereum has integrated a “Coinbase28 Buy” widget into their Mist Beta 0.8.2. In the case 
of Dash, the DAO pioneered the development of the X11 hashing algorithm to make 
“mining” faster, more secure, and more energy efficient. The organization sees itself as 
                                                 
28
 Coinbase is a major player in the cryptocurrency exchange sector. 
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composed of “investor volunteers”—“people [who] come together to invest in a network, 
and also work on developing the network” (Daniel Diaz, interview #2, 2016).  
6.2 Configurations of Coordination Mechanisms 
Sufficient for DAO Decline (D1 and D2) 
All configurations leading to decline are low in decentralization. More specifically, 
deviating from the industry’s original vision about the need to remove central authorities 
from organizational systems appears to be detrimental to early DAO growth, unless there 
is a strong reliance on social consensus mechanisms, as is the case with G2. In D1, for 
example, the DAOs that declined (e.g., Vericoin, Worldcoin, XCurrency) started off with 
low reliance on the social consensus mechanism related to the depth of stakeholder 
discussions. Without deep involvement from the developer community, DAOs based on 
weaker decentralization schemes seem to suffer in the early stages of their development.  
Compared to G2, D2 does not feature a strong reliance on social consensus mechanisms. 
Instead, it relies on the use of machine routines to provide organizational stability (e.g., 
adjusting network validators’ rewards frequently to reduce their risk level and provide 
them with a stable flow of income). It appears that blockchain system stability is better 
coordinated by relying on a decentralized community than a centralized one (see, for 
instance, Andreas Antonopoulos’s speech at the MIT Bitcoin Expo; Antonopoulos, 
2016).  
With regard to decentralized DAOs, some believe that “more usage will drive 
development rather than [that] more development will drive the usage” (Pétur Árnason, 
2017 interview #11, core developer of Auroracoin). But our results point to the primacy 
of the breadth and depth of stakeholder discussions (G2) required to kick-start growth. 
These discussions, in turn, lead to software updates that represent increases in the 
innovation potential of the DAO, as recent research has demonstrated (Wang & Vergne, 
2017). As Cassini explains, “It’s not the cryptography or the proof [. . .] that has an 
influence on the profitability, but it’s more what community is behind that coin” 
(emphasis added, interview #16). So, our results suggest that development drives usage, 
at least among DAOs that are less reliant on decentralization to coordinate their activities. 
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6.3 Propositions 
Following the fsQCA results, I put forward three propositions. 
6.3.1 Machine Consensus and Decentralization of Strategy 
Making as Complements 
Effective coordination, resting on accountability, predictability, and common 
understanding (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009), is a precondition for organizational growth 
(Mintzberg, 1979). Based on my study of Bitcoin, I conjectured that machine consensus 
mechanisms helped achieve common understanding in novel ways, to the extent that they 
relied on machine routines that are open source, publicly auditable, and built by the 
community. Generally speaking, common understanding is difficult to achieve in 
decentralized organizations precisely because there is no centralized authority conveying 
a clear sense of what the organization’s vision, strategy, and goals are.  
Looking at the fsQCA findings from study #2, I found that organizational growth results 
from a combination of strong reliance on both machine consensus and decentralization 
(G1). I also found that centralization without strong social consensus always leads to 
decline (D1 and D2).29 Taken together, these findings clearly point to the complementary 
roles played by machine consensus and decentralization. Indeed, machine consensus 
mechanisms are powerful drivers of common understanding—the one pillar of effective 
coordination that is hard to achieve in decentralized settings.  
In general, it is when strong machine consensus mechanisms are in place that 
decentralization produces its most positive effects (e.g., high predictability, since no 
insider has the discretionary power to affect operations) because its downsides are then 
mitigated by a countervailing force (i.e., common understanding provided by machine 
routines). An interview with Worldcoin’s core developer, Berzek (pseudonym, interview 
#10), provides a concrete example of how machine consensus mechanisms (here, related 
                                                 
29
 The decline configuration associated with Auroracoin, not reported in Table 2, also features 
decentralization and the absence of strong machine consensus. 
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to stability provision) can provide the kind of predictability that is often missing from 
decentralized organizations, thereby affecting their ability to coordinate effectively for 
growth:  
The problem with pure [PoW] coins (like us) is that many miners dump the coins 
immediately for a profit so there is a constant downward pressure on the price [. . 
.] This pressure is alleviated in a defined period of time—four years for Bitcoin, 
[and] one per cent weekly in our case [. . .] So our curve does not have discrete 
jumps [. . .] It is very smooth, therefore more predictable, and causes no anxiety 
for investors or supporters. 
Similarly, study stages #1 and #2 combined suggest that machine consensus fosters 
accountability at the organizational but not at the task level, where random assignment of 
tasks prevails. On the other hand, decentralized strategy making does the exact opposite 
by giving autonomy and proper incentives to DAO members at the task level—even if 
that implies less accountability at the organizational level, e.g., if a DAO causes harm, 
who can be held responsible? From a coordination perspective, it thus makes sense for 
machine consensus and decentralization mechanisms to complement each other 
effectively, and our study demonstrates that this is indeed the case in the cryptocurrency 
industry. I thus propose: 
Proposition 1: Within DAOs, coordination based on machine consensus 
mechanisms enhances common understanding at both the organizational and task 
levels, but it enhances accountability and predictability only at the organizational 
level. By contrast, coordination based on decentralized strategy making does not 
enhance common understanding, but it does enhance accountability and 
predictability at the task level. Therefore, coordination mechanisms based on 
machine consensus and decentralized strategy making are complementary, at both 
the organization and task levels. These complementarities make coordination 
particularly effective and lead to DAO growth. 
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6.3.2 Social Consensus as a Substitute for the Machine 
Consensus-Decentralization Pair 
Looking at G2, I find that social consensus mechanisms foster the growth of DAOs that 
do not heavily rely on machine consensus or decentralized strategy making. This hints at 
the existence of a substitution effect between social consensus, on the one hand, and 
machine consensus and decentralization, on the other. The importance of social 
consensus mechanisms is highlighted by Riccardo Spagni, the lead developer of the 
Monero DAO (interview #18, 2017): “Focusing on things like getting investors is 
pointless because all you’re doing is creating something that looks like a scam. Really all 
you can do is just focus on building up the community so that you have contributors to 
the project and you have people that are interested in testing the project and everything 
else sort of comes from that.” 
 On a related note, Cohen emphasizes the crucial role played by stakeholder 
discussions in the developer community: 
Honestly, I think [. . .] the developer, main developer, and the circle of 
contributing developers is particularly strong, [so] Blackcoin has retained, even 
now, two years later, a degree of respect and you know, it is sort of the brand—I 
mean of course this is a totally different consideration from the purely technical 
ones, but brand recognition and stable user base and sense of trust that, you know, 
this blockchain will not be dead tomorrow, those are very important in terms of 
adoption. (interview #7) 
 So, even though DAOs tend to place “automation at the center” (Buterin, 2014), 
machine consensus mechanisms need not be too heavily relied upon to generate growth 
(as shown in G2), nor be too much in the background to produce decline (as shown in 
D2). Arthur Breitman, core developer of the Tezos DAO, stated in an online interview, 
“to be sure, there is some math that does give you strong guarantees . . . and these are 
very, very strong guarantees. And then you have the [social] consensus itself, which . . . 
is going to be an economic and social problem, and not a mathematical one” (Breitman, 
2016). 
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 To further unpack the substitution effect between social consensus and the 
machine consensus-decentralization pairing, we need to look at how social consensus 
mechanisms provide the kind of common understanding, accountability, and 
predictability needed for effective DAO coordination. Social consensus mechanisms 
bring together communities of developers, users, and network validators in both formal 
(e.g., BIPs) and informal (e.g., online forum discussions) ways. The breadth and depth of 
these discussions, alongside network validators’ commitment to the DAO, create a sense 
of common understanding at both the task and organizational levels, much like machine 
consensus mechanisms. Social consensus mechanisms also enhance accountability and 
predictability at the task level by connecting proposals for organizational change to real-
world identities—something that machine consensus mechanisms are, by design, unable 
to achieve (even though they enhance accountability and predictability at the 
organizational level). However, without a heavy reliance on machine routines, social 
consensus mechanisms may lead to inertia, since stakeholder involvement is at risk of 
getting stuck at the discussion stage, without its being translated into action due to lower 
automation levels. This is where a degree of centralized strategy making can come into 
play to aggregate stakeholder contributions and define a course of action going forward. 
Therefore, I postulate: 
Proposition 2: Within DAOs, coordination based on social consensus 
mechanisms enhances common understanding at both the organizational and task 
levels (in a similar manner to machine consensus), but it enhances accountability 
only at the task level (unlike machine consensus). By contrast, coordination based 
on some degree of centralized strategy making enhances accountability at the 
organizational level. Therefore, coordination based on social consensus 
mechanisms acts as a substitute for coordination based on a combination of 
machine consensus and decentralized strategy making. DAOs that are not too 
decentralized but rely heavily on social consensus are able to grow, even in the 
absence of strong machine consensus.  
89 
 
6.3.3 Balancing Efficiency and Effectiveness—but Privileging 
Effectiveness 
A strong reliance on machine consensus mechanisms often leads to inefficiencies because 
it entails duplication of effort (i.e., every miner must work on solving the next block) and 
wasting resources (e.g., electricity and hardware). Nonetheless, consistent with the G1 
configuration in Table 2, I found that DAOs that generate such inefficiencies can 
coordinate effectively in order to grow. So it appears that seeking efficiencies is not a 
precondition for success for DAOs. As Spagni explains, “It’s the same inefficiencies that 
exist in blockchain technology. It’s a good sort of inefficiency. It’s the inefficiency you 
want. You want some of these things to be difficult to do because it means that it’s also 
difficult to shut down.” (interview #18) 
A DAO that cannot be shut down becomes more predictable for its stakeholders, and in 
turn this predictability enhances the DAO’s effectiveness (e.g., a system that holds 
billions of dollars’ worth of cryptocurrency in user deposits cannot effectively process 
payments when it risks being shut down, even if only temporarily). Besides, 
inefficiencies at the level of machine consensus have an interesting implication in that 
they enable the DAO to function with very little coordination at the task level. Indeed, 
when each task is assigned by default to every organizational member in a way that 
demands efforts that will ultimately be wasted, there is no need to coordinate either task 
assignment or the corresponding allocation of resources (e.g., every network validator 
must commit costly resources and try to solve the next block, even though only one 
network validator will ultimately be rewarded). Instead, resources are allocated using 
market mechanisms. As Evan Duffield, founder and lead developer of Dash explains, the 
work of network validators within a DAO represents “a market within itself” (interview 
#2, 2016):  
We have a free-floating masternode network [i.e., paid nodes that have decision-
making power based on voting rights], and so if there’s too many masternodes, 
they’ll start making too little, a couple will drop off. And if there’s too few 
masternodes, they’ll start making too much, and then that’ll increase incentives, 
and some people will buy it. And so this is a stabilizing factor. 
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In a similar fashion, reliance on extremely decentralized coordination structures—as I 
argued before, these are a useful complement to machine routines—can lead to 
inefficiencies because it inevitably brings about redundancies and slower decision 
making. In line with our findings, Pike states, “The conundrum is you don’t really want 
[a centralized organization or a foundation] if you believe in decentralization, but without 
it, you’re not as efficient as you would otherwise be. So it’s kind of a more organic 
process that is really undefined. I would say at this stage, everyone’s just trying to figure 
out how to make decisions.” (interview #12) 
Regarding the same trade-off, Spagni states, “[Decentralized self-organizing] is not as 
efficient, but [. . .] from the perspective of a cryptocurrency, it creates an environment 
that is impossible to shut down.” (interview #18) 
I thus propose: 
Proposition 3: DAOs balance efficiency with effectiveness. The more a DAO 
relies on decentralization and machine consensus, the more likely it is to be 
inefficient in terms of resource usage, but the more effective it becomes at 
coordinating in order to grow.30 
In what follows, I will discuss these findings in terms of theoretical implications, future 
directions, followed by conclusions. 
                                                 
30
 The optimal balance between efficiency and effectiveness depends on factors that are beyond the scope 
of this study, such as the cost of external resources (electricity), the price of the cryptocurrency (a higher 
price provides stronger incentives for network validators), the strength of the network effects, and the 
extent to which the effectiveness of the DAO depends on the reliability of its blockchain infrastructure. In 
the cryptocurrency/payments industry, the level of reliability expected from users is extremely high, but 
this may not be the case in other industries in which DAOs compete. 
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Chapter 7 Discussion and Conclusions 
7 Discussion and Conclusions 
DAOs are a new form of organizing that provide novel solutions to the four universal 
problems—task division, task allocation, reward distribution, and information flows 
(Puranam, Alexy & Reitzig, 2014). Motivated by establishing a deeper understanding of 
the coordination mechanisms of DAOs, this research offers a theoretical framework 
based on distributed consensus mechanisms.  
Throughout this study, I have asked the following question: how can tasks be adequately 
coordinated to enable organizational growth without placing human decision makers at 
the center of an organization? Guided by findings from the Bitcoin pilot study, the three-
stage inductive research design provides tentative answers to this question, which I have 
summarized in the three propositions developed above. In essence, this study identified a 
new set of coordination mechanisms based on machine routines, which interact with 
coordination mechanisms around social consensus and decentralized strategy making to 
produce growth (or decline) under certain conditions that are detailed in the fsQCA 
analyses. Effective coordination occurs through reliance on a previously unseen class of 
stakeholders called “network validators” and, due to the random assignment of ultimately 
redundant tasks to network validators, DAO growth sometimes occurs at the expense of 
efficient resource usage. 
 In this concluding section I will highlight the high-level contributions of this 
study to the literature on organizational task coordination, and I will outline some of the 
broader implications of the rise of DAOs for organizational and management scholarship, 
against the backdrop of a decreasing presence of the public corporation in contemporary 
business life.  
7.1 DAOs as a Novel Form of Organizing 
DAOs are characterized by several unique organization design features that were 
previously unseen in traditional organizations.  
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DAOs enable extreme forms of decentralization. This research takes a first stab at 
investigating blockchain-based implementations as a new form of organization design. It 
contributes to the organization design literature by developing a theoretical framework to 
make sense of DAOs. Specifically, it shows that machine consensus mechanisms, 
powered by incentivized voluntary contributors who validate and record stakeholder 
transactions, make DAOs uniquely positioned to offer new solutions to “the universal 
problems of organizing” faced by “distributed organizations” (e.g., Wikipedia) that do 
not rely on machine consensus (Puranam, Alexy & Reitzig, 2014: 166–169). Machine 
consensus may bear resemblance with other technology-enabled coordination systems 
such as version control, Uber, and Wikipedia, in the way task division and task allocation 
is based on self-selection and is embedded in the algorithm. However, fundamentally, 
version control is a technology system (instead of an organization), and unlike DAOs, 
Uber and Wikipedia are centrally owned and managed by corporations or foundations, 
which coordinate a large part of their tasks through centralized authorities.    
It is important to distinguish DAOs from open source projects like Wikipedia in that, 
while DAOs distribute ownership, governance, and control to various stakeholder groups, 
platforms such as Wikipedia are centrally owned and managed by a centralized 
organization, e.g., the Wikipedia Foundation Inc. The content on Wikipedia is also 
centrally controlled and censored. The recent formation of Everipedia, a blockchain-
based open source encyclopedia, serves as an application of DAO to provide an 
uncensorable, decentralized encyclopedia that incentivizes voluntary contributors with a 
token called “IQ.” Everipedia stands as a perfect example how DAOs compare and 
contrast with distributed organizations, and how DAOs can be applied to make such 
projects truly decentralized. Admittedly, DAOs enable an extreme form of 
decentralization powered by consensus mechanisms. 
Similarly, in contrast to community-governed organizational forms (e.g., OSSD projects), 
DAOs have a distinctive goal that guides the “standard development” of the organizing 
principle rather than “software development” for the product (interview #26). The DAO 
organizing principle, rooted in decentralization and automation, transforms the dynamics 
of community-based organizing to focus extensively on consensus-based decentralization 
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of decision making and coordination. As a result, while formal authority tends to develop 
in OSSD communities over time (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007), DAOs aim to mitigate 
and distribute authority by integrating machine consensus with social consensus 
mechanisms.  
Organizational innovation vs. technological innovation: Two significant innovations 
underpin Bitcoin: a technological one, namely the public and distributed ledger 
technology called blockchain, which securely maintains an immutable record of all user 
transactions; and an organizational innovation, namely, the existence of an open network 
of users with special roles and rights called miners, who lend computing power to secure 
the network in exchange for newly minted bitcoins and voting rights with respect to 
future protocol revisions (Davidson, De Filippi & Potts, 2016a; 2016b). 
As an industry expert puts it, a blockchain will not work without Bitcoin or the consensus 
algorithm (e.g., PoW) behind it (Antonopoulos, 2016 speech31). And the reason is 
simple—a blockchain can only ensure the core of its true innovation, namely an open, 
borderless and censorship-resistant system, through the organization design that performs 
tasks and provides rewards in novel and unique ways. The DAO’s innovation drives the 
blockchain technology, and this logic is fundamentally different from what we have seen 
in OSSDs and other self-organized organizations (Lee & Edmondson, 2017). 
7.2 Distributed Consensus Mechanisms 
Coordination by consensus mechanisms. Results from the pilot study suggest that 
distributed consensus is what makes the DAO organizational innovation possible. 
Subsequently, findings from the first stage reveal three key features of task coordination 
within DAOs. First, machine consensus mechanisms, driven by sets of machine 
routines, are meant to deliver provable security for user transactions and to ensure 
organizational stability in a context in which stakeholders can come and go at will. 
                                                 
31
 Sources: https://www.newsbtc.com/2016/06/01/andreas-antonopoulos-explains-blockchain-nothing-
without-bitcoin/; https://youtu.be/mRQs9Y6CUSU. 
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Machine consensus, both at the level of the tasks that it governs (e.g., record keeping) 
and at the broader organizational level, contributes rather straightforwardly to common 
understanding (i.e., all the machine routines are open source and publicly auditable). But 
its contribution to the other two integrative conditions for coordination, namely 
predictability and accountability, deserves a more nuanced explanation.  
Since every transaction remains traceable indefinitely based on its immutable blockchain 
record—this characteristic ties transactions to a specific network validator, a sender, and 
a recipient—accountability seems ensured at the organizational level. However, network 
validators are not assigned ex ante to specific transactions, since DAOs do not rely on 
hierarchy to assign tasks. In fact, network validators are randomly assigned to their tasks 
(e.g., with Bitcoin, the first miner who is lucky enough to guess a long random number 
will add the next block to the ledger and receive the coin rewards). This feature is meant 
to prevent malicious users from attacking particularly valuable nodes in the network; it is 
not unlike a situation in which a bank robber knows that, out of the 5,000 vaults out there, 
only one contains the gold reserves, but cannot know which one it is because that vault is 
chosen randomly by a computer program (and the gold is randomly moved to a new vault 
every ten minutes).  
Consequently, DAOs achieve disintermediation through randomization of work and costs 
of validation. In particular, routine work is performed in a purposefully redundant and 
wasteful way to coordinate the main tasks; effectiveness, in the form of security provision 
and stability provision, can trump efficiency to serve as the primary organizational goal. 
By randomization, difficulty fluctuation, and inefficiency at the task level, DAOs ensure 
organizational level accountability and predictability. A conceptual framework is shown 
in Figure 13.  
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Figure 13 Conceptual Framework of Consensus Mechanisms and Conditions at the 
Task vs. Organizational Levels 
 
So, even though, at the task level (e.g., transaction verification, generation of coin 
rewards), accountability cannot be assigned ex ante, this very feature contributes to 
accountability at the organizational level (i.e., it is a way to prevent cyber attacks and 
thus ensure data integrity for the ledger). Similarly, this random assignment of tasks is 
clearly at odds with enhancing predictability, but only at the task level. At the broader 
organizational level, randomization actually contributes to the DAO’s predictability by 
ensuring that transactions will be processed as per the code, without outside interference. 
Interestingly, these coordination mechanisms do entail duplication of effort and 
redundancies. Instead of using one vault and protecting it very well, Bitcoin uses 
thousands of identical vaults and makes it too costly for thieves to guess which one 
contains the money. Put differently, in order to achieve their goals (e.g., building a peer-
to-peer value-transaction network), DAOs deliberately waste resources (e.g., thousands 
of miners consume hardware resources and electricity simultaneously when only one 
miner would be enough to verify transactions). In short, DAOs work with coordination 
mechanisms that clearly emphasize effectiveness at the cost of efficiency. 
As non-hierarchical organizations, DAOs face the same high-level predictability 
challenges as OSSD communities due to a lack of formalization in terms of role 
definition for strategy making (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). However, unlike OSSD 
communities, DAOs are able to overcome some of these predictability challenges by 
relying on machine consensus and by integrating it with social consensus through a new 
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class of paid stakeholders, namely, network validators. In DAOs, social consensus is 
meant to produce agreement across stakeholder groups about organizational strategy by 
facilitating stakeholder discussions and network validators’ commitment. Offline and 
online discussions, as well as votes recorded in the public ledger, readily contribute to 
enhancing accountability and common understanding and to providing stakeholders with 
updates regarding how predictable future organizational changes will be. 
Machine consensus and social consensus are eventually integrated and aligned through 
reliance on network validators who make decisions in more or less decentralized ways. 
The third important feature of task coordination within DAOs is thus decentralization, 
conceived of here as a continuum that underpins decision making at every stage. With 
Bitcoin, for instance, new ideas are generated in a decentralized way by developers 
across the world. These ideas are subsequently pooled together in discrete blocks called 
BIPs and then discussed informally in online discussion forums. Finally, they are voted 
upon formally by decentralized miners who ultimately update the software, which is 
released in a more centralized fashion by the DAO’s core developers and is based on the 
accepted BIPs. Although decentralization makes DAOs’ ability to adapt less predictable 
at the organizational level (e.g., the strategic direction may be unclear, resulting in 
inertia), it also makes them more predictable at the task level (e.g., no organizational 
insider has the power to defraud a user). On the other hand, decentralization removes 
some of the unpredictability that comes from the existence of high-level managers with a 
lot of discretionary power (e.g., there is no CEO with the power to decide on a merger), 
but which can at times decrease accountability (e.g., if something goes wrong, who can 
be held responsible?). 
Interestingly, then, coordination mechanisms around machine consensus, social 
consensus, and decentralization of strategy making contribute to accountability, 
predictability, and common understanding in different ways and at different levels of the 
organization (task level vs. organizational level). 
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7.3 A New Form of Coordination: Coordination with 
Machine Consensus and Network Validators 
DAOs offer an alternative to human-centered organizational design by introducing new 
coordination mechanisms based on machine consensus, which automates many of the 
routine tasks performed by the organization through the use of an immutable database 
shared across all stakeholder groups (the blockchain). It would be inconceivable for a 
traditional business organization to require all employees to perform the same routine 
task but then only reward one single employee drawn at random while discarding 
everyone else’s work. Yet this counter-intuitive way of coordinating tasks is necessary 
for a DAO to achieve predictability, accountability, and common understanding, and for 
it to be able to reliably disintermediate transactions (Lopp, 2016). Besides, even though 
DAOs coordinate tasks rather formally, organizational members cannot feel coerced by 
management (since there is none) and can choose to leave and join another DAO at 
will—so DAOs offer an alternative to the usual trade-off between formal coordination 
and organizational member autonomy (Adler & Borys, 1996).   
Beyond the mere identification of a new set of coordination mechanisms (machine 
routines), this study contributes to a finer understanding of task coordination within 
organizations. Specifically, while our research confirms the crucial role played by 
predictability, accountability, and common understanding in coordination (Okhuysen and 
Bechky, 2009), it also demonstrates the practical value of distinguishing between the task 
and organizational levels when examining these three pillars (Young-Hyman, 2017). 
Indeed, certain coordination mechanisms (e.g., decentralized strategy making) enhance 
predictability at the task level but not at the organizational level, while others (e.g., 
machine consensus) do the inverse. Thus, it becomes crucial for organizations to have 
integrating mechanisms in place to compensate for these discrepancies. 
The mining process, which is based on competitive bookkeeping by network validators, 
plays such an integrating role. In the coordination literature, integrators are defined as 
“formally mandated managerial roles meant to promote coordination across specialized 
but interdependent organizational subunits, yet they do so without relying on formal 
authority” (Stan & Puranam, 2016). Integrators such as project managers (Wheelwright 
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& Clark, 1992) or account managers (Iansiti & Clark, 1994) play an essential role in the 
organizational structure by facilitating a “steady state of coordination” between 
stakeholder groups within and around organizations (Stan & Puranam, 2016; Mohrman, 
1993). However, in DAOs, network validators are able to act as “integrators” without 
holding a “formally mandated managerial role,” thanks to the machine consensus 
mechanisms that provide incentives to stabilize the organization in the long run. Network 
validators integrate functions across levels—payment processing at the blockchain level, 
security provision at the network level, and voting at the protocol level—but their work 
goes beyond traditional role-based coordination (Bechky, 2006), as they can join or leave 
the organization at will and do not depend on managerial oversight (Stan & Puranam, 
2016).  
In this sense, there is no pooled task interdependence in DAOs, but instead a randomized 
assignment of tasks spawned by a new form of automated coordination (Thompson, 
1967; Daft & Armstrong, 2012; Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). This is precisely why 
coordination within DAOs differs from the forms of coordination observed in OSSD 
projects. As Okhuysen & Bechky (2009) rightly point out, “Post-industrial work requires 
assembling specialized knowledge in ways that we have not done before while facing 
new task environments.” In both DAOs and OSSD projects, communities of volunteers 
manage and maintain code on open-source software platforms, making it transparent and 
easy to share (O’Mahony, 2003; O’Mahony, 2007; O’Mahony, Puranam et al., 2014; 
West & O’Mahony, 2008). Yet while OSSD projects may face predictability problems 
due to the lack of clear governance structures (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009; O’Mahony & 
Bechky, 2008), DAOs rely on machine consensus mechanisms to compensate for this 
while maintaining a high level of decentralization. And this is how DAOs provide novel 
solutions to the old problems of organizing. 
7.4 Growth Implications: Organizational Growth: 
DAOs vs. Traditional 
Organizational growth is historically conceived of as driven by the need to acquire 
external resources, such as financial capital, especially for new ventures. Centralization 
of production serves as the main enabler behind modern corporate growth as it is 
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conceived of as having the ability to enhance coordination efficiency, corporate wealth or 
managerial strategic decision power (Chandler, 1977; 1990; Perrow, 2002). For industrial 
corporations that seek either scale or scope, financial indicators such as sales and 
financial returns are used to capture growth in the literature (e.g., Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhven, 1990; Larson, 1992; Weinzimmer, Nystrom & Freeman, 1998). 
What does growth mean in the context of non-centralized, non-hierarchical DAOs, and 
how does it challenge the idea of growth as conventionally defined? On the one hand, if 
we focus on DAOs’ ability to support a two-sided platform for value exchanges (e.g., as 
payment systems), mainstream adoption of a DAO will rely on the growth of users who 
use the DAO for transactions to generate the network effects. On the other hand, in 
theory, DAOs can survive as long as there is one validator and some users on the 
network, although the security of the network and the health of the blockchain may be 
compromised. Fundamentally, as my interviews revealed, mainstream adoption stands as 
an important goal for cryptocurrency DAOs to make mining efficient (because the same 
level of security generated by miners can now be used by a large user base), to ensure the 
health of the network, and to retain the value of the cryptocurrency token.  
Specifically, early growth is an important indication of the success or failure of a crucial 
process called “bootstrapping” that is required to get a cryptocurrency DAO off the 
ground: 
There is a tricky interplay between three different ideas in Bitcoin: the security of 
the blockchain, the health of the mining ecosystem, and the value of the currency. 
We obviously want the blockchain to be secure for Bitcoin to be a viable 
currency. For the blockchain to be secure, an adversary must not be able to 
overwhelm the consensus process. This in turn means that an adversary cannot 
create a lot of mining nodes and take over 50 per cent or more of the new block 
creation . . . When Bitcoin was first created, none of these three existed. There 
were no miners other than Nakamoto himself running the mining software. 
Bitcoin didn’t have a lot of value as a currency. And the blockchain was, in fact, 
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insecure because there was not a lot of mining going on and anybody could have 
easily overwhelmed this process. (Narayanan et al., 2016: 70-71) 
Thus, it is reasonable to say that growth in the user base measured by transactions 
captures the growth of the consensus base formed by key stakeholders—validators, users, 
and developers. Consequently, this consensus base determines the health and the value of 
the DAO. Early growth in the use of the cryptocurrency DAO captured by growth in the 
number of transactions instead of financial indicators also helps rule out speculations 
reflected in price or market capitalization. This consensus-based notion of growth 
challenges the traditional growth motivated by efficiency, scale and scope economies, 
and centralized power and control.  
7.5 Limitations and Future Directions 
7.5.1 Limitations 
The limitations of this research come from several assumptions that shape the boundary 
conditions for the generalization of findings. 
First, I focus on the internal stakeholders who have direct decision-making power over 
the blockchain and protocol. The reason for this decision is to focus on those 
organizational actors whose tasks are directly being coordinated by machine versus social 
consensus. Specifically, my decision to focus on network validators and developers is 
based on my interviews and readings. While fully acknowledging the role of other types 
of nodes in maintaining the network (e.g., full nodes without mining functions and 
lightweight nodes which do not have to store the full blockchain ledger), a simplified 
model better serves the purpose of this study as an early attempt to understand DAOs 
from a management and organizational perspective. Similarly, external stakeholders, such 
as merchants, regulators, and third-party services, who do not directly interact with the 
operations of DAOs are precluded from my current scope of organization design. Moving 
forward, they represent important research opportunities to study governance and inter-
organizational coordination (e.g., Hsieh, Vergne & Wang, 2017).  
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Second, this study assumes stable external environments. This assumption simplifies the 
complexity a DAO faces. For example, even though the Bitcoin blockchain is extremely 
secure, when an external Bitcoin exchange is hacked (for example, in the most recent 
case, a Bitcoin exchange, NiceHash, was hacked with $64 million worth of bitcoin 
stolen), Bitcoin’s transaction volume and value will certainly be affected. Network 
activities, such as mining, may also be affected by the drop of token value depending on 
the health of the mining ecosystem. 
  Finally, I assume a homogenously distributed network without concentration. For 
example, I do not distinguish the incentive structure between mining pools (i.e., miners 
pooling computing power together to have a better chance of winning) and solo miners. 
This is intended to simplify and focus the argument on general coordination problems of 
a distributed organization. 
In terms of data analysis, as I pointed out in Chapter 5, there is a trade-off between 
sampling a range of cryptocurrency DAOs with variations in their design and focusing on 
cases founded at around the same time in order to control for cohort effects. I made a 
choice to focus on the former but sampled a number of cryptocurrency DAOs from 
different industry stages proportional to the founding rate to make my sample 
representative. Additionally, since fsQCA is not a variance-based method that requires 
control variables as in regression models, the absence of the explanatory condition 
“industry stage” will not take away the influence of other conditions as part of a 
necessary or sufficient configuration.   
7.5.2 Future Directions 
Inter-organizational coordination and governance between DAOs. DAOs have opened 
up ample opportunities for future organization research. For example, distributed trust 
has transformed traditional coordination relationships that defined organizational 
boundaries (Seidel, 2018). Specifically, to extend the research theme of this study, inter-
organizational coordination relationships are of particular interest. For example, how 
does the utility layer of a DAO (e.g., Ethereum) coordinate with a second layer ICO 
token (e.g., VeChain or EOS) that builds its products and services on the utility platform? 
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How would the shift of trust relations change inter-organizational dynamics that were 
originally based on social relations or transaction costs (Seidel, 2017)? How do these 
external stakeholders exert influence on the decision-making process of DAOs? And how 
does the new form of coordination change how we think about internal and external 
governance?  
Longitudinal studies on DAO growth. As the industry grows and matures, it is necessary 
to study the DAO growth trajectory over time and compare it with public corporations 
and identify whether and how fundamental differences exist in their growth patterns. In 
addition, performing cohort studies will be feasible and useful for longitudinal studies to 
control for industry effects and perhaps to compare patterns across various industry 
stages. Finally, alternative growth measures may shed light on the multiplicity of DAO 
objectives. For instance, while users contribute to generating network effects, investors 
drive up the value of DAOs, and regulators stand as the institutional gatekeepers that 
determine the growth or decline of the industry. By considering a broader range of 
stakeholders, it would be possible to capture what Buterin (2017) called “multifactorial 
consensus,” where “different coordination flags32 and different mechanisms and groups 
are polled, and the ultimate decision depends on the collective results of all of these 
mechanisms together.” 
In sum, the rich context, with abundant data sources, provides ample opportunity for 
future research on the evolution and sustained growth of DAOs, as well as contingencies 
under which DAOs are viable and can be implemented in varied applications (such as 
smart contracts, and signature services), in hybrid forms (e.g., centralized financial 
institutions integrating a distributed organizational form as a solution to enhance 
efficiency).  
                                                 
32
 Coordination flags refer to votes signaling preferences, for example, whether or not a hard fork is 
happening (Buterin, 2017b). 
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7.6 Managerial Implications 
Insights from this study are directly relevant to the FinTech revolution in action right 
now. Traditional financial institutions are increasingly interested in blockchain 
technology and have been extensively experimenting with the possibility of blockchain 
integration. It is foreseeable that hybrid forms of traditional and DAO can emerge, 
similar to what has taken place between OSSD and private sponsors, such as private 
corporations (O’Mahony, 2007).  
For large international banks to adopt the blockchain technology, permissioned33 
blockchains are often necessary for enterprise solutions to protect proprietary assets. 
While managers are contemplating the future of enterprise blockchains, this research 
provides a new way of thinking about adopting blockchains not in terms of technology 
adoption but in terms of the integration of new forms of governance and coordination. 
That is, if machine consensus and decentralization are complements, as suggested by the 
findings, large banks may choose to adopt the machine consensus (i.e., the blockchain 
and protocol) without adjusting the coordination structure toward the decentralization end 
of the continuum. The extent to which a highly centralized organization can capitalize on 
the unique features of blockchain technology is still a puzzle.  
Banking is, ultimately, a centralized system . . . It's great if you want to have a 
decentralized currency that isn't controlled by any one person, but if you have a 
bank or a central government providing it then it stops being decentralised and the 
whole blockchain technology aspect becomes, sort of, redundant . . . As soon as 
you centralize it and there's one controller it's unnecessary to use anything other 
than a database . . . The advantage of a block chain comes when you're farming 
out the data to anyone and you don't know who the actors are. But if it's a private 
chain and you know who the actors are and you can trust them then it's not worth 
it anymore. [James Lovejoy, Core developer at Vertcoin, interview #5] 
                                                 
33
 Permissioned or private blockchains refer to DAOs that only allow trusted nodes in the network to work 
as validators. The validation may or may not involve costs such as proof-of-work requires. 
104 
 
  Therefore, for managers to think about blockchain adoption, the complementarity 
between machine consensus and decentralization cannot be overlooked. On the other 
hand, from the standpoint of social consensus, a private blockchain means the 
development team will be paid employees either of the financial institution or of the 
FinTech start-up that provides the service (e.g., Ripple and Stellar). How is this setting 
different from traditional firms and how will adopting firms capitalize on the advantages 
offered by early adoption? 
The financial industry is only the first one to be impacted by distributed organization—
any industry relying heavily on intermediaries (e.g., brokers) can be deeply affected by 
this form of organizing. 
7.7 Organizations of the Future: An Under-Socialized 
Worldview?  
In the last section of the dissertation, I conclude my research with a few extended higher-
level thoughts. 
1. Code is Law? 
The emergence of DAOs, to an extent, reinforces the under-socialized post-capitalist 
worldview characterized by digitalization, decentralization, and disintermediation and by 
the idea that “code is law” (Lessig, 2006), that Bitcoin is the “trust machine” (Economist, 
2015a) wherein human trust is no longer necessary, and that DAOs require “little 
coordination” (Nakamoto, 2008). Intriguingly, Vitalik Buterin, co-founder of Ethereum, 
who first proposed the idea of DAOs characterized by “automation at the center, humans 
at the edges,” shared his concerns about DAO on-chain governance34 that relies on token-
holder voting rules built in machine routines in a recent post: 
                                                 
34
 On-chain governance refers to the practice of embedding DAO governance rules in the protocol. On-
chain governance is intended to create a self-amending system that “seamlessly amends the rules governing 
its protocol and rewards protocol development” (https://www.tezos.com/governance). It is said to have the 
benefit of avoiding decentralized informal human-decision making systems and can evolve rapidly to 
incorporate any necessary technological advancement. Proponents of on-chain governance generally 
believe that it avoids the downsides of informal governance, including being unstable and prone to chain 
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People who think that the purpose of blockchains is to completely expunge soft 
mushy human intuitions and feelings in favor of completely algorithmic 
governance (emphasis on completely) are absolutely crazy[.]…[L]oosely coupled 
voting as done by Carbonvotes35 and similar systems [are] underrated. (Buterin, 
2017b) 
In contrast, Buterin thinks that informal governance mechanisms such as Carbonvotes, 
that are not based on token ownership, serve as an important social means for distributed 
consensus mechanisms to work. According to Buterin (2017a; 2017b; 2018), the under-
socialized, on-chain voting that heavily relies on machine routines risks overlooking 
other representative stakeholders’ roles in coordination by focusing solely on token 
holders. Instead, he argues that a balance needs to be struck among stakeholder groups 
for a collective consensus based on formal and informal votes from the core development 
teams, coin holders, in line with established norms and a roadmap. This view reinforces 
what we learned from this research, namely, that the growth of a DAO depends on 
balancing the three elements—machine consensus, social consensus, and decentralization 
of decision making. Code is not law, and social consensus still matters. 
2. When is DAO a Viable Form?  
 Research indicates that the technological innovation potential behind cryptocurrencies 
stands as the key driver of their market value (Wang & Vergne, 2017). But, as the 
Economist (2015b) rightly points out, blockchain technology has far-reaching 
applications beyond cryptocurrency and payments. In fact, blockchain-based organizing 
and the resulting DAOs have the ability to replace centralized intermediaries in other 
applications requiring complex coordination such as asset ownership tracking, trade 
financing, digital identity provision, supply chain traceability, and more. Besides, in the 
                                                 
splits, and having the tendency to become centralized (Buterin, 2017b). On-chain governance is conceived 
of as “tightly coupled voting” across Buterin’s articles on blockchain governance (e.g., Buterin, 2017b: 
2018). 
35
 CarbonVote is an informal voting platform for the Ethereum community (see: http://carbonvote.com/). 
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last three years, more than fifty new ventures received seed funding using blockchain-
powered “initial coin offerings,” thereby bypassing, at least partly, the use of venture 
capitalist intermediaries to obtain funding faster and at more favorable valuations (e.g., in 
2014, Ethereum raised $18.4 million in a few days and is now valued at $34 billion).  
Therefore, DAOs are able to serve as intermediary organizations, in which a high level of 
security and immutability is a desired feature enabled by the consensus mechanism and 
distributed trust it produces. 
3. Market? Hierarchy? Network? Broader Implications for Organizational and 
Management Scholarship 
DAOs are coordinated by consensus mechanisms. Thus, DAOs are different from 
markets coordinated by price mechanism, hierarchies coordinated by fiat, or networks 
coordinated by social relations (Powell, 1991). How should one make sense of DAOs? 
DAOs are not governed by principal-agent relationships, since they do not have 
shareholders or managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Because they do not rely on fiat or 
hierarchies and operate transparently using public blockchains and open-source software, 
they are, to some extent, immune to the issues of opportunism and information 
asymmetry (Williamson, 1975). And because they operate with little human coordination 
and do not incur costs for monitoring employees, they may behave in ways that 
traditional perspectives in organizational economics are ill-equipped to capture. In 
particular, the growth of DAOs is likely not bound by increases in the marginal cost of 
organizing (because DAOs are not hierarchies) (Coase, 1937), and the cost of conducting 
additional transactions within DAOs can theoretically decrease with size owing to 
positive network externalities. Thus, at this stage, the scholarly community may lack the 
theoretical tools needed to understand either the growth of DAOs or, more generally 
speaking, what determines the boundaries of such organizations. The present study only 
begins to tackle this problem. Future scholarship is needed to propose revised theoretical 
frameworks to further our understanding of the DAO phenomenon. 
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4. Decentralized Autonomous Organizations: An Alternative to the Public 
Corporation?  
In a thought-provoking essay, entitled “After the Corporation,” Gerald Davis remarks 
that: 
[T]here are fewer than half as many public corporations today as there were 
fifteen years ago . . . The public corporation in the US is now unnecessary for 
production [and] unsuited for stable employment . . . Although formal 
organizations have long been the go‐to format for nearly every organized activity 
in the industrialized West . . . they are no longer the obvious default option . . . 
And while Linux and Wikipedia are cliché examples, they nonetheless serve as 
proof of concept: it is possible for voluntary, dispersed, collaborative, relatively 
non‐hierarchical forms of organizing not just to work well, but to far surpass their 
privately‐produced alternatives. (Davis, 2013: 284; 290; 299; 301) 
Meanwhile, over the last few months, over 150 DAOs have gone public through initial 
coin offerings, a public sale through which the general public can acquire, early on, 
cryptocurrency tokens to support the development of the organization (ICOtracker, 
2017). While the number of public corporations is dwindling—there are 37 per cent 
fewer today than there were in 1997 (VanderMey, 2017)—DAOs are on the rise. 
Outside the payments sector, DAOs are providing new solutions for supply-chain 
management in the luxury goods industry, record keeping in trade finance, trusted-
identity provision in online environments, and patient-history management in the 
healthcare sector. What these industries have in common is that their business activities 
are prone to moral hazard and behavioral uncertainty. As a result, expensive 
intermediaries are heavily relied upon to provide trust to the interacting parties (Zucker, 
1986). Going forward, DAOs may be able to provide competitive alternatives for 
organizing in those sectors. 
More than 30 years ago, Rothschild and Whitt (1986: 114) identified factors that should 
lead to the development of “collective organizations.” These included the demystification 
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of knowledge, defined as the process whereby “formerly exclusive, obscure, or esoteric 
bodies of knowledge are simplified, explicated, and made available to the membership at 
large” (cited in Davis, 2013: 301). By publishing all software related to the blockchain, 
protocol, and peer-to-network in an open-source format, DAOs are well on track to 
achieve this demystification. In fact, the Economist (2015b) argues that, building on the 
vision of Ethereum co-founder Vitalik Buterin, the ultimate goal of DAOs is to serve as 
“virtual companies that are basically just sets of [open-source] rules running on . . . 
blockchain[s].”  
At a theoretical level, the shift from the public corporation to the DAO may be a radical 
one, and this research represents a first attempt at exploring its implications from the 
viewpoint of organizational scholarship. I hope that organizational and management 
scholars will pay attention to these developments that are currently changing the face of 
the heavily intermediated form of capitalism that has prevailed in our economies since 
the seventeenth century.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A The Byzantine Generals Problem 
The Byzantine Generals Problem refers to the problem of reaching synchronous 
consensus in a distributed network with the presence of dishonest actors. The name 
originates from the hypothetical situation under which a group of generals in the 
Byzantine army surround an enemy city. The Byzantine generals first need to agree on a 
common battle plan of action, for instance, whether to attack or to retreat—at the same 
time (Lamport et al., 1982). A half-hearted attack leads to coordination failure, which 
results in a defeat. Second, the generals can only communicate via messengers, and third, 
one or more of the generals may be traitors and may mislead others. 
As traitors may decide to go against the group decision or deliver misinformation such 
that loyal generals cannot arrive at a unified plan, the goal of the Byzantine Generals 
Problem is to find a solution for all the loyal generals to arrive at a plan while 
neutralizing the possibility of the traitorous generals causing coordination failures (i.e., 
the adoption a bad plan) (Narayanan et al., 2015).  It has been proved that this goal is 
impossible to achieve if over one-third of the generals are traitors (Lamport et al., 1982; 
Narayanan et al., 2015). 
Fischer and colleagues (1985) further extend the analysis to asynchronous systems in 
which nodes behave deterministically. They show that consensus is impossible with even 
only a single faulty process. “The problem is for all the data manager processes that have 
participated in the processing of a particular transaction to agree on whether to install the 
transaction’s results in the database or to discard them” (Fischer, Lynch & Paterson, 
1985), hence the presence of the “transaction commit problem”. In this commit problem, 
“all data managers must make the same decision in order to preserve the consistency of 
the database” in a distributed system where data is being exchanged and processed. The 
solution is only possible if and only if all network actors are completely honest and 
reliable, which is impossible to achieve. 
Bitcoin combines public key cryptography, digital signatures, and proof of work and, for 
the first time and solved the impossibility theorem proposed by Fischer and colleague. 
Bitcoin solves the Byzantine Generals Problem by providing the “generals” (i.e., network 
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validators) with economic incentives through block reward. It also imposes costs as 
disincentives for being dishonest through proof of work and by compromising on 
consensus timing (i.e., the 10-minute block time on average). This explains why Bitcoin 
and the underlying blockchain technology represent such a significant technological 
break-through.  
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Appendix B: Semi-Structured Interview Guide 
** Each interview begins with a brief introduction of myself, the research project, and the 
objective of the interview. The open-ended structure permits conversations to develop 
and allows me to follow up on ideas the participants wish to elaborate on. 
1. Please describe your background and how you got into Bitcoin.  
2. Please describe your role, your involvement and experience working on Bitcoin. 
3. How are BIPs (or similar proposals) different from (or similar to) existing open-
source software development projects in terms of their code modification 
processes?  
4.  What determines the success/failure of a BIP? 
5. Who determines how much consensus is enough consensus?  
6. What does “lack of consensus” mean in the cryptocurrency context? 
7. What are miners’ role in activating BIPs?  
8. How does coordination between developers and miners happen? 
9. What are the biggest challenges for BIPs (or similar proposals) moving forward?   
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Appendix C Types and Roles of Nodes 
As shown in Figure 14, a Bitcoin node is a combination of four functions: wallet services 
(W), mining (M), full blockchain database (B), and network routing (N) (Antonopoulos, 
2014: 140). Where this research focuses on mining (M), wallet services (W) refer to the 
software that keeps users’ Bitcoin addresses and private keys. Wallet services allow users 
to send, receive, and store bitcoins (Antonopoulos, 2014). The blockchain database (B) 
function refers to the maintenance of a full copy of the entire Bitcoin transaction history 
on the blockchain public ledger. The network routing (N) function is required for all 
nodes to communicate with one another and to participate in the network. All nodes have 
this routing function (Antonopoulos, 2014).  
Figure 14 The four functions of a Bitcoin network node: Wallet, Miner, full 
blockchain database, and network routing 
(Adopted from Figure 6-1, Antonopoulos, 2014: 140) 
 
Figure 15 lists various types of nodes with different combinations of these functions. 
Please note that pool protocol servers such as “Stratum” (S) or “Pool” (P) are additional 
routing services that connect lightweight mining pools to the main Bitcoin peer-to-peer 
network. They do not belong to the immediate Bitcoin peer-to-peer network, but to the 
extended network, which is not considered internal to the organization. A lightweight 
client (or simplified payment verification (SPV) client) does not have to store a copy of 
the full blockchain history. Instead, it tracks only the user’s wallet, and is not responsible 
125 
 
for transaction validation. It relies on a third party (e.g., Stratum) or peers to obtain 
partial information of the blockchain and interact with the Bitcoin network 
(Antonopoulos, 2014).   
  Individual miners can join mining pools to pool their hash power and increase their 
chance of winning. Miners participating in such pools may get a share of the reward. 
Mining pool participants interact indirectly with the Bitcoin network through a third party 
via the mining protocol (Antonopoulos, 2014). 
 Figure 16 illustrates the Bitcoin network. For the purposes of this study, 
organizational boundaries are defined to include only those nodes connected by the 
Bitcoin protocol (orange ties).  
  
126 
 
Figure 15 Types of Nodes on the extended Bitcoin Network 
(Adopted from Figure 6-2, Antonopoulos, 2014: 142)  
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Figure 16 The extended Bitcoin Network 
(Adopted from Figure 6-3, Antonopoulos, 2014: 143) 
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Appendix D List of All BIPs 
# Layer Title Owner Type Status 
1  
BIP Purpose and 
Guidelines 
Amir Taaki Process Replaced 
2  BIP process, revised Luke Dashjr Process Active 
8  
Version bits with 
lock-in by height 
Shaolin Fry Informational Draft 
9  
Version bits with 
timeout and delay 
Pieter Wuille, 
Peter Todd, 
Greg Maxwell, 
Rusty Russell 
Informational Final 
10  Applications 
Multi-Sig Transaction 
Distribution 
Alan Reiner Informational Withdrawn 
11  Applications 
M-of-N Standard 
Transactions 
Gavin 
Andresen 
Standard Final 
12  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
OP_EVAL 
Gavin 
Andresen 
Standard Withdrawn 
13  Applications 
Address Format for 
pay-to-script-hash 
Gavin 
Andresen 
Standard Final 
14  Peer Services 
Protocol Version and 
User Agent 
Amir Taaki, 
Patrick 
Strateman 
Standard Final 
15  Applications Aliases Amir Taaki Standard Deferred 
16  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
Pay to Script Hash 
Gavin 
Andresen 
Standard Final 
17  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
OP_CHECKHASHVERIF
Y (CHV) 
Luke Dashjr Standard Withdrawn 
18  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
hashScriptCheck Luke Dashjr Standard Proposed 
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19  Applications 
M-of-N Standard 
Transactions (Low 
SigOp) 
Luke Dashjr Standard Draft 
20  Applications URI Scheme Luke Dashjr Standard Replaced 
21  Applications URI Scheme 
Nils Schneider, 
Matt Corallo 
Standard Final 
22  API/RPC 
getblocktemplate - 
Fundamentals 
Luke Dashjr Standard Final 
23  API/RPC 
getblocktemplate - 
Pooled Mining 
Luke Dashjr Standard Final 
30  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
Duplicate 
transactions 
Pieter Wuille Standard Final 
31  Peer Services Pong message Mike Hearn Standard Final 
32  Applications 
Hierarchical 
Deterministic Wallets 
Pieter Wuille Informational Final 
33  Peer Services Stratized Nodes Amir Taaki Standard Draft 
34  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
Block v2, Height in 
Coinbase 
Gavin 
Andresen 
Standard Final 
35  Peer Services mempool message Jeff Garzik Standard Final 
36  Peer Services Custom Services Stefan Thomas Standard Draft 
37  Peer Services 
Connection Bloom 
filtering 
Mike Hearn, 
Matt Corallo 
Standard Final 
38  Applications 
Passphrase-protected 
private key 
Mike Caldwell, 
Aaron Voisine 
Standard Draft 
39  Applications 
Mnemonic code for 
generating 
deterministic keys 
Marek 
Palatinus, 
Pavol Rusnak, 
Standard Proposed 
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Aaron Voisine, 
Sean Bowe 
40 API/RPC Stratum wire protocol 
Marek 
Palatinus 
Standard 
BIP 
number 
allocated 
41 API/RPC 
Stratum mining 
protocol 
Marek 
Palatinus 
Standard 
BIP 
number 
allocated 
42  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
A finite monetary 
supply for Bitcoin 
Pieter Wuille Standard Draft 
43  Applications 
Purpose Field for 
Deterministic Wallets 
Marek 
Palatinus, 
Pavol Rusnak 
Informational Draft 
44  Applications 
Multi-Account 
Hierarchy for 
Deterministic Wallets 
Marek 
Palatinus, 
Pavol Rusnak 
Standard Proposed 
45  Applications 
Structure for 
Deterministic P2SH 
Multisignature 
Wallets 
Manuel Araoz, 
Ryan X. 
Charles, Matias 
Alejo Garcia 
Standard Proposed 
47  Applications 
Reusable Payment 
Codes for Hierarchical 
Deterministic Wallets 
Justus Ranvier Informational Draft 
49  Applications 
Derivation scheme 
for P2WPKH-nested-
in-P2SH based 
accounts 
Daniel Weigl Informational Draft 
50   
March 2013 Chain 
Fork Post-Mortem 
Gavin 
Andresen 
Informational Final 
60  Peer Services 
Fixed Length 
"version" Message 
(Relay-Transactions 
Field) 
Amir Taaki Standard Draft 
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61  Peer Services Reject P2P message 
Gavin 
Andresen 
Standard Final 
62  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
Dealing with 
malleability 
Pieter Wuille Standard Withdrawn 
63 Applications Stealth Addresses Peter Todd Standard 
BIP 
number 
allocated 
64  Peer Services getutxo message Mike Hearn Standard Draft 
65  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
OP_CHECKLOCKTIME
VERIFY 
Peter Todd Standard Final 
66  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
Strict DER signatures Pieter Wuille Standard Final 
67  Applications 
Deterministic Pay-to-
script-hash multi-
signature addresses 
through public key 
sorting 
Thomas Kerin, 
Jean-Pierre 
Rupp, Ruben 
de Vries 
Standard Proposed 
68  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
Relative lock-time 
using consensus-
enforced sequence 
numbers 
Mark 
Friedenbach, 
BtcDrak, 
Nicolas Dorier, 
kinoshitajona 
Standard Final 
69  Applications 
Lexicographical 
Indexing of 
Transaction Inputs 
and Outputs 
Kristov Atlas Informational Proposed 
70  Applications Payment Protocol 
Gavin 
Andresen, 
Mike Hearn 
Standard Final 
71  Applications 
Payment Protocol 
MIME types 
Gavin 
Andresen 
Standard Final 
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72  Applications 
bitcoin: uri extensions 
for Payment Protocol 
Gavin 
Andresen 
Standard Final 
73  Applications 
Use "Accept" header 
for response type 
negotiation with 
Payment Request 
URLs 
Stephen Pair Standard Final 
74  Applications 
Allow zero value 
OP_RETURN in 
Payment Protocol 
Toby Padilla Standard Draft 
75  Applications 
Out of Band Address 
Exchange using 
Payment Protocol 
Encryption 
Justin Newton, 
Matt David, 
Aaron Voisine, 
James 
MacWhyte 
Standard Draft 
80   
Hierarchy for Non-
Colored Voting Pool 
Deterministic Multisig 
Wallets 
Justus Ranvier, 
Jimmy Song 
Informational Deferred 
81   
Hierarchy for Colored 
Voting Pool 
Deterministic Multisig 
Wallets 
Justus Ranvier, 
Jimmy Song 
Informational Deferred 
83  Applications 
Dynamic Hierarchical 
Deterministic Key 
Trees 
Eric Lombrozo Standard Draft 
84  Applications 
Derivation scheme 
for P2WPKH based 
accounts 
Pavol Rusnak Informational Draft 
90  
Consensus 
(hard fork) 
Buried Deployments Suhas Daftuar Informational Draft 
91  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
Reduced threshold 
Segwit MASF 
James Hilliard Standard Final 
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98  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
Fast Merkle Trees 
Mark 
Friedenbach, 
Kalle Alm, 
BtcDrak 
Standard Draft 
99   
Motivation and 
deployment of 
consensus rule 
changes 
([soft/hard]forks) 
Jorge Timón Informational Draft 
101  
Consensus 
(hard fork) 
Increase maximum 
block size 
Gavin 
Andresen 
Standard Withdrawn 
102  
Consensus 
(hard fork) 
Block size increase to 
2MB 
Jeff Garzik Standard Draft 
103  
Consensus 
(hard fork) 
Block size following 
technological growth 
Pieter Wuille Standard Draft 
104  
Consensus 
(hard fork) 
'Block75' - Max block 
size like difficulty 
t.khan Standard Draft 
105  
Consensus 
(hard fork) 
Consensus based 
block size retargeting 
algorithm 
BtcDrak Standard Draft 
106  
Consensus 
(hard fork) 
Dynamically 
Controlled Bitcoin 
Block Size Max Cap 
Upal 
Chakraborty 
Standard Draft 
107  
Consensus 
(hard fork) 
Dynamic limit on the 
block size 
Washington Y. 
Sanchez 
Standard Draft 
109  
Consensus 
(hard fork) 
Two million byte size 
limit with sigop and 
sighash limits 
Gavin 
Andresen 
Standard Rejected 
111  Peer Services 
NODE_BLOOM 
service bit 
Matt Corallo, 
Peter Todd 
Standard Proposed 
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112  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
CHECKSEQUENCEVERI
FY 
BtcDrak, Mark 
Friedenbach, 
Eric Lombrozo 
Standard Final 
113  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
Median time-past as 
endpoint for lock-
time calculations 
Thomas Kerin, 
Mark 
Friedenbach 
Standard Final 
114  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
Merkelized Abstract 
Syntax Tree 
Johnson Lau Standard Draft 
115  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
Generic anti-replay 
protection using 
Script 
Luke Dashjr Standard Draft 
116  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
MERKLEBRANCHVERI
FY 
Mark 
Friedenbach, 
Kalle Alm, 
BtcDrak 
Standard Draft 
117  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
Tail Call Execution 
Semantics 
Mark 
Friedenbach, 
Kalle Alm, 
BtcDrak 
Standard Draft 
120  Applications Proof of Payment 
Kalle 
Rosenbaum 
Standard Withdrawn 
121  Applications 
Proof of Payment URI 
scheme 
Kalle 
Rosenbaum 
Standard Withdrawn 
122  Applications 
URI scheme for 
Blockchain references 
/ exploration 
Marco Pontello Standard Draft 
123   BIP Classification Eric Lombrozo Process Active 
124  Applications 
Hierarchical 
Deterministic Script 
Templates 
Eric Lombrozo, 
William 
Swanson 
Informational Draft 
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125  Applications 
Opt-in Full Replace-
by-Fee Signaling 
David A. 
Harding, Peter 
Todd 
Standard Proposed 
126   
Best Practices for 
Heterogeneous Input 
Script Transactions 
Kristov Atlas Informational Draft 
130  Peer Services sendheaders message Suhas Daftuar Standard Proposed 
131  
Consensus 
(hard fork) 
"Coalescing 
Transaction" 
Specification 
(wildcard inputs) 
Chris Priest Standard Draft 
132   
Committee-based BIP 
Acceptance Process 
Andy Chase Process Withdrawn 
133  Peer Services feefilter message Alex Morcos Standard Draft 
134  
Consensus 
(hard fork) 
Flexible Transactions Tom Zander Standard Draft 
135   
Generalized version 
bits voting 
Sancho Panza Informational Draft 
140  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
Normalized TXID 
Christian 
Decker 
Standard Draft 
141  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
Segregated Witness 
(Consensus layer) 
Eric Lombrozo, 
Johnson Lau, 
Pieter Wuille 
Standard Final 
142  Applications 
Address Format for 
Segregated Witness 
Johnson Lau Standard Withdrawn 
143  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
Transaction Signature 
Verification for 
Version 0 Witness 
Program 
Johnson Lau, 
Pieter Wuille 
Standard Final 
144  Peer Services 
Segregated Witness 
(Peer Services) 
Eric Lombrozo, 
Pieter Wuille 
Standard Final 
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145  API/RPC 
getblocktemplate 
Updates for 
Segregated Witness 
Luke Dashjr Standard Final 
146  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
Dealing with 
signature encoding 
malleability 
Johnson Lau, 
Pieter Wuille 
Standard Draft 
147  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
Dealing with dummy 
stack element 
malleability 
Johnson Lau Standard Final 
148  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
Mandatory activation 
of segwit deployment 
Shaolin Fry Standard Final 
149  
Consensus 
(soft fork) 
Segregated Witness 
(second deployment) 
Shaolin Fry Standard Withdrawn 
150  Peer Services Peer Authentication Jonas Schnelli Standard Draft 
151  Peer Services 
Peer-to-Peer 
Communication 
Encryption 
Jonas Schnelli Standard Draft 
152  Peer Services Compact Block Relay Matt Corallo Standard Draft 
154  Peer Services 
Rate Limiting via peer 
specified challenges 
Karl-Johan Alm Standard Draft 
157  Peer Services 
Client Side Block 
Filtering 
Olaoluwa 
Osuntokun, 
Alex Akselrod, 
Jim Posen 
Standard Draft 
158  Peer Services 
Compact Block Filters 
for Light Clients 
Olaoluwa 
Osuntokun, 
Alex Akselrod 
Standard Draft 
159  Peer Services 
NODE_NETWORK_LI
MITED service bit 
Jonas Schnelli Standard Draft 
171  Applications 
Currency/exchange 
rate information API 
Luke Dashjr Standard Draft 
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173  Applications 
Base32 address 
format for native v0-
16 witness outputs 
Pieter Wuille, 
Greg Maxwell 
Informational Proposed 
174  Applications 
Partially Signed 
Bitcoin Transaction 
Format 
Andrew Chow Standard Draft 
175  Applications 
Pay to Contract 
Protocol 
Omar Shibli, 
Nicholas 
Gregory 
Informational Draft 
176   Bits Denomination Jimmy Song Informational Draft 
180  Peer Services 
Block size/weight 
fraud proof 
Luke Dashjr Standard Draft 
199  Applications 
Hashed Time-Locked 
Contract transactions 
Sean Bowe, 
Daira 
Hopwood 
Standard Draft 
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Appendix E A Sample BIP (BIP #151) 
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Appendix F Fs-QCA Calibration 
1. Calibration of Machine Consensus Mechanisms 
I used explanatory conditions’ Q1 values to explain growth (or decline) from Q1 to Q2. 
Security Provision: I calibrated security provision based on the extent to which proof-of-
work (PoW) mining was used in Q1. PoW cryptocurrencies received scores greater than 
0.5, while Proof-of-Stake (PoS) cryptocurrencies received scores below 0.5. A full 
membership (1) in security provision was assigned when the cryptocurrency was based 
solely on SHA-256 proof-of-work, the algorithm used by Bitcoin. SHA-256 is the most 
intensive algorithm in terms of computing power, and it requires specialized hardware 
designed to carry out heavy-duty computing tasks. In addition to SHA-256, other proof-
of-work cryptocurrencies have used algorithms such as Scrypt (e.g., Litecoin) and X11 
(e.g., Dash) that require less computing power. These were coded as less than 1.  
DAOs with a hybrid design (e.g., Peercoin and Novacoin), which run PoS and PoW 
simultaneously, were calibrated between 0 and 0.5, depending on the degree to which 
they incorporate PoW. These DAOs use only PoW for the initial issuance and distribution 
of the cryptocurrency, and PoW is therefore non-essential in the long run (King & Nadal, 
2012; King, interview #3). Some PoSe designs use PoW in the first two to three weeks 
for coin distribution and then become purely PoS (i.e., PoW discontinues) after the initial 
period. A PoS design that has never incorporated PoW was considered as pure PoS and 
coded as 0 (e.g., Paycoin). 
In sum, beyond the 0.5 anchor, PoW dominates the payment validation process.  
Stability provision: I calibrated stability provision by calculating the variance of network 
validation difficulty. I first normalized the raw difficulty data to make it comparable 
across cryptocurrencies. I then calculated a moving 14-day variance, and computed the 
quarterly average for Q1. The 0.5 anchor was set at the median score in our sample (0.8). 
A full membership (1) was assigned to variances over 1.0, indicating very high difficulty 
fluctuation. Conversely, a non-membership (0) was assigned to variances below 0.3, 
indicating very low difficulty fluctuation. 
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2. Calibration of Social Consensus Mechanisms 
Breadth of stakeholder discussions: I capture it by calculating the monthly number of 
unique contributors working on the code repository of the cryptocurrency. I chose the 
median—20, to be the 0.5 qualitative anchor. I assigned a full membership (1) to cases 
with over 40 unique contributors and a non-membership (0) to cases with fewer than one 
contributor.  
Depth of stakeholder discussions: To capture the depth of stakeholder discussion, I 
calculated monthly code frequency changes, i.e., the average number of additions and 
deletions to the cryptocurrency source code on GitHub for Q1. I calibrated the 0.5 
qualitative anchor at 30,000, the median observed in our sample. I assigned a full 
membership of 1 to a code frequency over 60,000, indicating a high depth of stakeholder 
discussions. And we assigned a non-membership (0) for a code frequency below 1,000, 
indicating a low depth of stakeholder discussions.  
Validators’ commitment: The network hash rate measures the aggregate computing 
power of the cryptocurrency network. I set the 0.5 anchor at the sample median hash rate 
of 1 Ghash/sec. A large mining network typically contains substantial computing power 
with a hash rate over 100 Ghash/sec, to which I allocated a full membership. Conversely, 
a network with a hash rate below 0.01 Ghash/sec was allocated a non-membership (0). 
3. Calibration of Decentralization of Strategy Making 
I calibrated it by jointly considering three dimensions: the design philosophy, the 
presence of an active foundation, and whether the founder’s identity was known. I first 
evaluated each dimension individually and determined its degree of decentralization; I 
then combined the three dimensions to generate the final calibration for decentralization. 
Our logic closely follows Crilly et al. (2012: 1435, Table 2), in which evaluations of 
high, medium, and low memberships are given to each category of CSR-related criteria, 
before they are pooled together for calibration.  
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Active foundations: As I have noted, the presence of an active foundation signals more 
centralized control of a cryptocurrency. I considered cryptocurrencies that have active 
foundations to be low in decentralization, and cryptocurrencies without active 
foundations to be high in decentralization. 
Founders’ identity: I considered those cryptocurrency DAOs with known founders to be 
low in decentralization. DAOs with pseudonymous and unknown founders were 
considered to have a mid-range or high level of decentralization, respectively. 
Design philosophy: At one end of the spectrum, some cryptocurrencies have a more 
centralized design philosophy. For example, some business-oriented cryptocurrencies 
resemble business entities in that they have a clear strategic orientation. These 
cryptocurrencies are concerned with growing the network with incentive systems, 
business development plans, and interorganizational alliance strategies (e.g., Litecoin, 
Dash, and Worldcoin). Some consider themselves as DAOs governed by the network of 
“investor volunteers” or “master nodes” with decision and voting rights (Daniel Diaz, 
2016, interview #2). DAOs in this category were considered low in decentralization. 
At the other end of the decentralization spectrum, I find more decentralized DAOs 
focused on the social dimension. Such DAOs are established with formative ideologies 
and value propositions built into their design. For example, Dogecoin appealed to the 
community by promoting awareness of cryptocurrencies and backing charitable causes 
(e.g. the NASCAR Sprint Cup Series rally). DAOs in this category are considered to have 
a mid-range level of decentralization. 
Finally, innovation-oriented DAOs that focus on decentralization received a higher score. 
In contrast to cryptocurrencies with a business-oriented model, these DAOs see 
themselves as technology leaders governed by meritocracy. For example, Namecoin aims 
to protect free speech and prevent Internet censorship by assigning domain names that 
cannot easily be tracked by centralized organizations or governmental agencies. In 
addition, Bitcoin and Peercoin promote disintermediation and mining efficiency based on 
technological innovations.  
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I combined the three dimensions for each case. I allocated a full membership (1) to DAOs 
that were highly decentralized in all three dimensions and non-membership (0) to those 
that were low in all three dimensions. The 0.5 anchor indicates DAOs with mid-range 
scores and inconsistent decentralization profiles, in line with the calibration strategy 
proposed by Crilly et al. (2012). 
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